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ABSTRACT 
This thesis collects theoretical and empirical work related to two fields of 
research. First, the literature on fiscal policy in endogCnous growth models. 0 
Second, the empirics of productivity growth using macro-level applications 
of Data Envelopment Analysis. 
As for the theoretical part of the research, attention has been paid to 
Barro-type models of endogenous growth driven by public investment. The 
endogenous growth model presented in Chapter 3 extends the Barro model 
to the case of finite lives. The main innovation is the conclusion that the 
assumed demographic structure affects both the level of long-run growth 0 
and the optimal provision rule of public capital. 
The empirical part of the research deals with two applications of the 
DEA approach to the measurement of productivity growth to the case of 
Italian regions over the period 1970-95. Departing from existing literature 
on the Italian case, TFP growth is decomposed in technical efficiency change 
and technological progress in order to study the contribution of public in- 
frastructure provision to both of them (section 5.3, Chapter 5). The second 
empirical contribution (section 5.4, Chapter 5) reconciles traditional ap- 
proachcs to the analysis of economic growth determinants and convergence 
patterns with the frontier productivity measurement literature. Efficiency 
change and technological progress are interpreted as proxies of catching- 
up and innovation respectively, in order to test the convergence hypothesis 
within Italian regions. It is concluded that Italian regions have diverged at 
a decreasing rate. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Original work presented in this thesis is related to two fields of research. 
First, the literature on fiscal policy in endogCnous growth models. Second, 0 
the empirics of productivity growth using macro-level applications of Data 
Envelopment Analysis. 
Chapters 2 and 3 collect work within the literature on fiscal policy in 
endogenous growth models. Chapter 2 is devoted to review the theory of the CD 
productive role of public capital. The first part of the Chapter focuses on 
the relationship between public capital, ao, egate output and productivity. ggr , 
In particular, it is argued that public capital may contribute to aggregate 
output either as a direct unpaid input or as a productivity enhancing envi- 
ronmental variable. The second part of the review focuses on endo,, enous 
growth models dealing with public investment. Starting from the well known 
model of Barro (1990), recent contributions dealing with endo-Cnous growth 
and public investment are grouped and discussed according to their main 
departures from the Barro model. 
The research question under investigation in Chapter 3 is: 
How does the assumption of finite lives affect the Barro rule for the 
provision of public capital? 
In order to provide an answer, I develop an endogenous growth model where 
sustained long-run growth is due to investment in public capital, the gov- 
ernment provides lump-sum transfers, public consumption, and investment 
subsidies, and consumers have uncertain lifetimes. A flexible framework 
capable of analysing the growth effects of fiscal policy in both infinite and 
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finite horizons cases is provided. The Barro rule is extended to the finite 
horizons case and it is shown to be dependent of the finite horizon index. 
In particular, the growth maximizing income tax rate is lower in the latter 
scenario and decreasing in the probability of death parameter. The growth 
hampering effect of unproductive public spending is depicted in the finite 
horizons as well as in the infinite horizons case. Increases in either public 
consumption or lump-sum transfers reduce long-run economic growth less 
in the former than in latter case. F'urthermore, the relationships relating 
the growth maximizing level of public investment and each of the other cat- 
egories of government expenditure are derived. Finally, an optimal rule for 
investment subsidies provision is analytically derived. 
The empirical part of my research focuses on the Italian regions case 
over the period 1970-95 and it is presented in Chapter 5, in which I explore 
two issues in sections 5.3 and 5.4, respectively: 
The empirical study of public capital as a productivity enhancing ex- 
ternality to regional economics; 
9 Testing of the catching-up hypothesis across Italian regions, shedding 
some insight on the determinants of convergence/divcrgence patterns. 
In Italy, the provision of productive infrastructures has historically been 
a policy instrument aimed at reducing the development gap between north- 
ern and southern regions. Indeed, since the 1950s government policy has 
driven public investment towards the South which, however, is still lacking 
in terms of per capita GDP with respect to the regions in the North of the 
country. Moreover, despite the huge amount of resources devoted to the 
provision of new infrastructure services, the South is still characterized by a 
lower endowment of infrastructures, such as transport and communication 
networks, compared to the North of the country. This is the case of public 
works which have either been completed with strong delay, have not been 
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completed at all or have ended up with under-utilized structures because of 
a failure to correspond to the actual needs of a specific area. 
Table 1.0.1: Structural Fund Commitments in Objective 1 regions (% of nominal 
values) 
Country 1989-93 1994-99 
ABHIABHI 
Austria 15.0 68.7 16.3 0.0 
Belgium - - - - 0.0 66.2 17.2 16.6 
France 28.6 15.9 10.1 45.4 9.6 32.7 18.7 39.0 
Greece 11.2 18.4 16.6 53.8 18.7 13.4 13.6 54.3 
Ireland 14.7 33.7 26.4 25.2 0.0 54.7 3.9 41.4 
Italy 14.4 35.0 1.9 48.8 21.0 21.3 27.0 30.7 
Netherlands - - - - 22.2 20.4 21.0 36.4 
Portugal 11.5 6.1 35.3 47.2 0.0 15.2 8.6 76.1 
Spain 26.7 13.2 8.8 51.4 0.6 14.3 7.5 77.6 
U. K. 10.5 38.1 20.9 30.4 12.2 25.0 33.1 29.7 
Total 17.6 21.1 16.3 45.0 7.0 24.0 12.1 56.8 
Source: Rodrf, -, ucz-Pose and Fratesi (2003). Notes: A= Support 
to agriculture and rural promotion; B= Business and tourism sup- 
port; H= Investment in education, re-qualification and all mea- 
sures targeting the human capital of the region; I= Investment in 
infrastructure, transport and environment. 
A further motivation for this study is the relevance attributed by the 
policy maker to infrastructure investment in less developed regions within 
the European Union. Table 1.0.1 (from Rodrfguez-Pose and Ratesi, 2003) 
gives a measure of such emphasis. In the Table, resources allotted by the 
Community Support Framework to Objective 1 Regions during the first two 
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periods of implementation (1989-93 and 1994-99) are disaggregated with 
respect to their allocation to four priority axes: 1) Support to agriculture and 
rural promotion (A); 2) Business and tourism support (B); 3) Investment in 
education, re-qualification and all measures targeting the human capital of 
the region (H); 4) Investment in infrastructure, transport and environment 
(I). The figures clearly show that a consisted share of the resources are 
devoted to the implementation of infrastructure projects. 
In the light of the emphasis put by the European policy maker on policies 
oriented to tile improvement of infrastructure endowment in less developed 
areas of the Union, empirical support to the thesis of the productive enhanc- 
ing role played by public capital has great policy implications. 
Chapter 5 contributes to the debate on the relationship between pub- 
lic capital and productivity in the Italian regions (see section 5.3). Previ- 
ous works on Italy have mainly exploited the production function approach 
(Picci, 1999), the growth accounting approach (La Ferrara et al., 2000) and 
the growth approach (Acconcia and Del Xfonte, 2000). These recent contri- 
butions have enhanced the literature on the topic, allowing for taking into 
account heterogeneity across Italian regions by means of panel data estima- 
tion techniques. However, I argue that their conclusions can suffer from an 
important shortcoming: they do not take account of the inefficiency issue. 
This is due to the implicit assumption that the production process is fully 
efficient, which implies that the estimates of average production functions 
will be biased in the presence of inefficiency. Furthermore, if such an as- 
sumption does not hold, total factor productivity growth will be identified 
with technological progress, while another source of productivity growth - 
technical efficiency change - will be neglected (Grossk-opf, 1993). 
The main novelty of the present contribution rests on the decomposition 
of productivity growth into technical efficiency change and technological 
progress by implementing a non-parametric frontier approach to the mea- 
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surement of productivity. The empirical analysis proceeds in two parts. In 
the first part, a DEA model is implemented under the two alternative as- 
sumptions of two (labour and private capital) and three (labour, private 
and public capital) inputs. A test of the significance of public capital as 
an additional input in the DEA model does not support the view of public 
capital affecting aggregate output as a direct unpaid factor. In the second 
part, an econometric analysis of tile linkage between productivity gains and 
the provision of public capital is performed with the aim of assessing tile 
role of public capital as a positive environmental variable. The results show 
the positive impact of public capital on both technical efficiency change and 
technological progress, especially in the southern regions. In view of these 
results, policies aimed at increasing tile endowment of infrastructure ser- 
vices maintain their relevance despite the fact that public capital is not a 
statistically significant direct input in aggregate production. 
Xlost of existing applied work on Italian regions agree on the finding of 00 
conditional convergence: Italian regions tend to converge to different steady 
state levels of per capita CDP. A less investigated topic remains the is- 
sue of the determinants of such convergence/divergence pattern. Based on 
the results obtained in the first part of the Chapter, section 5.4 is aimed 
at reconciling traditional approaches to the analysis of economic growth 
determinants and convergence patterns with the frontier productivity mca- 
surement literature. The empirical estimation process is developed in two 
steps. The first involves the decomposition of TFP growth on the basis of 
considering GDP as output, and capital and labour as the relevant produc- 
tive inputs. In the second one, the convergence issue is analysed by means 
of panel data estimation techniques. Estimated technological progress and 
technical efficiency change are interpreted, respectively, as innovation and 
catching-up measurements and the catching-up hypothesis is tested for the 
Italian regions. The analysis leads to a conclusion that regional economics 
1. Introduction 
diverge at a decreasing rate. 
Chapter 6 reports concluding remarks and some ideas for future research. 
2. MODELS OF PUBLIC CAPITAL AND GROWTH: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter does not aim at exhaustively reviewing theoretical models 
incorporating public investment for productive uses. The aim is rather to 
introduce the aspects of the literature most related to the model presented in 
Chapter 3. In particular, more emphasis will be placed on the expenditure 
side of fiscal policy, although I will deal to some extent also with the problems 
related to different systems of taxation. On the other hand, the issue of 
government deficits will not be covered. 
Section 2.2 focuses on the relationship between public capital, aggre- 
gate output and productivity. In particular, it is argued that public capital 
may contribute to ag egate output either as a direct unpaid input or as a ogr 
productivity enhancing environmental variable. 
The overview of the theory on public capital and long-run growth fol- 
lows three steps. First, the main features of the neoclassical view on fiscal 
policy and growth are introduced in section 2.4. Section 2.5 deals with 
the endogenous growth model developed by Barro in 1990, regarded as the 
path-breaking paper in the literature. Some recent works based on Barro 
(1990) are grouped in section 2.6 according to their main departures from 
the original model. In particular, subsection 2.6.1 reviews models extending 
Barro (1990) on the production side, with particular focus on the works by 
Futagami et al. (1993) and Barro and Sala-i-Alartin (1992,1999). Subsec- 
tion 2.6.2 deals with extensions to the Barro model interested in analyzing 
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the composition of public expenditure (de la Fuente, 1997; Greiner, 1999). 
Finally, in subsection 2.6.3,1 focus on the model by 'Mourmouras and Lee 
(1999), that modifies the consumption side of Barro (1990) and in section 2.7 
it will be introduced the motivation behind the model presented in Chapter 
3. 
2.2 Public Capital, Output and Productivity 
The public provision of productive services (infrastructures) may affect eco- 
nomic activity through different channels, which can be studied starting 
from the following aggregate production function': 
Yt = At (Gt) -f (Kt, Lt, Gt) 
where, at each moment in time t, Yt is a measure of real aggregate output of 
tile private sector, Ift is the aggregate stock of private capital, Lt represents 
aggregate employment, Gt is the aggregate stock of public capital and At is 00 
a measure of the level of technology. Given this general specification of the 
aggregate technology, the effects of Ct on output and productivity can be 
studied under two alternative assumptions: 
(a) public services represent a direct input of production and influence 
both production directly and productivity indirectly; 
(b) public services influence productivity indirectly without entering the 
aggregate production function as a direct input, but rather being a 
source of externalities. 
The debate. on whether (a) or (b) is the prevailing avenue through which 
public capital is related to economic activity is not new, dating back to 
' Examples of public infrastructures include highways, airport, harbors, communication 
networks, electric and gas facilities. 
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Meade (1952) who analysed both possibilities. Afore recently, the two al- 
ternative views on the productive role of public capital can be found in the 
works by Aschauer (1989a) and Hulten and Schwab (1984,1991) respec- 
tively. These works provide the theoretical background on which is based 
the wide empirical literature on tile impact of public capital on output and 
productivity growth following the so-called production function and growth 
accounting approaches. This section deals with the key features of such the- 
ory, while the empirical literature on tile productive role of public capital 
will be reviewed in Chapter 4. 
Aschaucr (1989a), assumes that Ct enters the aggregate production func- 
tion as a direct input: 
Yt = At -f (Ift, Lt, Gt) (2.2.2) 
Under this assumption, public capital contributes to output: 
(1) directly; 
(2) indirectly by enhancing, the productivity of other inputs of production. 0 
The direct impact (1) will depend on whether or not the marginal prod- 
uct of Gt is positive and, as a consequence, its output elasticity is positive 
as well. Examples of categories of public capital which are likely to directly 
contribute to national output as productive inputs of the private economy 
are all those belonging to the transport and communication network of a 
country. For instance, roads, highways, ports and all other public trans- 
port facilities can be thought as productive inputs of private providers of 
transport services. 
On the other hand, the indirect effect (2) will actually arise only if private 
and public inputs are in a relationship of complementarity, in the sense that 
YLG >0 and/or Yl, -G > 0, where YK and YL are marginal products of capital 
and labour respectively. For instance, thinking about the simple example of 
the national transport network, a higher endowment of highways is likely to 
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be positively linked to the productivity of drivers and trucks employed by 
firms that provide transport services. 
Under the assumption that public capital enters the aggregate produc- 
tion function as in (2.2.2) - in Cobb-Douglas form - the effects (1) and 
(2) can be evaluated using two alternative measures of productivity. Hence, 
behind both these potential effects there is the assumption that public cap- 
ital is a direct factor of production and, once we make such assumption, 
one effect is implied by the other as for any other direct productive input. 
Indeed, Aschauer (1989a) does not explicitly model the effect of government 
intervention in enhancing total factor productivity using some specification 
of At(Gt). However, he derives the relationship relating public capital to to- 
tal factor productivity implied by the assumption that Gt is a direct factor 
of production. He assumes that the government provides the private sector 
of the economy with a flow of services free of user charge. If such flow is pro- 
portional to the national infrastructure network, it will be equivalent to the 
stock of public capital Gt. For a Cobb-Douglas functional form of (2.2.2), 
Aschauer obtains the following logarithmic version of aggregate production: 0 
ln(Yt) = In(At) +a- In(Ift) +, 0 - ln(Lt) +, y - ln(Gt) (2.2.3) 
where a, )3 and -y are elasticity values of private capital, labour and pub- 
lic capital respectively and can be empirically estimated. The factors of 
production are exogenous 2 0 and it is implicitly assumed that they are paid 
their respective marginal products. It is important to notice that a fur- 
ther restriction imposed by the Cobb-Douglas specification in (2.2.3) is that 
the substitution elasticities of the production inputs are equal to one by 
definition. 
Once one assumes the public provision of productive services with no 
user charge, it is necessary to make clear how the government finances such 
2 In the sense that aggregate output is related to available inputs by a unilateral rela- 
tionship: Y is produced for given levels of K, L and G. 
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a provision. In the easiest case, it is possible to assume a one sector economy 
where the government purchases a share of total output and uses it to provide 
these services to the private sector. The basic assumption in Aschauer's 
analysis is that the provision of public services Gt is financed by income 
taxation at the flat rate -r, which equates the public capital-output ratio at 
each moment in time: -r = GtlYt. The rationale behind the public provision 
of productive services is that - given their nature of pure public goods - 
it would be difficult to allocate resources to their most efficient uses in any 
private market for Gt. 
Further to the basic assumption of public provision with no user charge, 
Aschauer considers the two cases of (i) public production of Gt and (ii) 
congestion in the usage of Gt. These two cases coincide with two alternative 
restrictions made on returns to scale in aggregate production: (i) constant 
returns to scale (CRTS from now on) to private inputs and (ii) CRTS to all 
factors of production. 
(i) Starting from the first case, Aschauer argues that if the existence of 
significant economics of scale in the public production of Gt is considered 
plausible, then the aggregate production function could show CRTS to pri- 
vate inputs Lt and Ift and increasing returns to scale to Lt, Kt and Gt 
together (i. e., a +)3 =1 and a +, 8 + -y > 1). It is obvious that this way of 
modelling the public provision of Gt implies a theoretical framework more 
elaborated than a simple one sector economy. For instance, the assumption 
of increasing returns to scale could be due to the fact that Gt is produced 
by the government. Hence, we should assume a two sectors economy, with 
a public sector using its own capital and labour force to produce Gt. In the 
real world, this is the case of the distribution of water, electricity and other 
public utilities for which larger levels of production imply decreasing costs 
and tile most efficient form of production are natural monopolies. 
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Under the assumption of CRTS in Lt and Kt, profit maximization in 
perfect competition implies that private inputs earn exactly their marginal 
products. Hence, the two corresponding measures of productivity derived 
from (2.2.3) will be: 
In In(At) +0 - In 
Lt )+ 
-y - In (Gt) (2.2.4) 
and 
tfpt = ln(Yt) - SK - ln(ICt) - SL - In(Lt) ---ý tfpt = In (At) + -y - In (Gt) (2.2.5) 
where SK and SL arc output shares of Kt and Lt respectively; (2.2.4) relates 
output per unit of capital to the labour-capital ratio and the absolute level of 
public capital3, whereas (2.2.5) expresses the increasing relationship between 0 
total factor productivity and the absolute level of public capital. 
(ii) The alternative restriction on returns to scale is based on the presence 
of congestion effects in the usage of Gt. This will make the assumption of 
increasing returns to scale less attractive, leading to prefer the assumption 
of CRTS to all factors of production, which will imply decreasing returns to 
scale over private inputs (i. e., a +, 3 <1 and a +, 0 + -y = 1). Since public 
capital is freely available to producers, if the aggregate production function 
exhibits CRTS to all inputs, the output will not vanish when Lt and Kt arc 
paid their marginal products. Hence, it is necessary to make some hypothesis 
on the distribution of the rents for public services amongst producers. In 
particular, Aschauer assumes that the output shares of Lt and Ift - SL 
and sl<, - are proportional to their respective marginal productivity values: 
SL =0- )3 and SK =0-a, with 0>1. If this is true, then the following 
measures of productivity can be derived: 
In -= In (At) +, 3 - In 
Lt )+ 
-y -In (2.2.6) Kt 
G"t 
Kt 
Y't 
3 We should refer to the flow of government services but, under the assumption that 
these are proportional to public capital, the two definitions are equivalent. 
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and 
tfpt = In(At) +, y - In (Gt - It) (2.2.7) 
where It ý SK - ln(l<'t) + SL - ln(Lt) and equations (2.2.4) and (2.2.5) are 
special cases of (2.2.6) and (2.2.7), respectively. 
So far we have regarded Gt as a direct input in (2.2.1), however, as we 
said at the beginning of this section - see point (b), page 8- public capital 
can play the role of an externality. In this case Gt contributes 
(3) indirectly to economic performance by enhancing total factor produc- 
tivity without being a direct input of production: 
Yt = At (Gt) -f (Kt, Lt) (2.2.8) 
In this case, the productive role of public capital is defined as an extemal 
effect on total factor productivity. This view goes back to the work by 
Meade (1952) and it has been adopted by Hulten and Schwab (1984,1991)- 
According to this view, public capital may act like an environmental fac- 
tor which enhances the productivity of productive inputs like an externality 
in the sense of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). 
To see how Gt could affect private output via At, let us first totally 
differentiate (2.2.8) under the assumption that At is not a function of Gt: 
ý't = At + o, - kt +, 6 - Lt (2.2.9) 
where dots over variables indicate time derivatives, a=A- (YKI<'IY) and 
,6=A- 
(YLLIY) are output elasticity values 4. Thus, the rate of growth 
of output is given by the rate of growth of the technological factor plus 0 
the weighted sum of the growth rates of labour and capital inputs, where 
the weights are their respective output elasticity values. Rearranging (2.2.9) 
Y 
and YL are partial derivatives of Y with respect to K and L respectively. K 
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properly, we obtain the following measure of total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth (Solow, 1957): 
At = ý't -a- ki -3- Lt (2.2.10) 
Since At is computed as a residual, this measure of TFP growth will cap- 
ture any sources of bias due to errors in measurements and/or the omission 
of relevant factors of production. For instance, if one thinks that Gt should 
enter (2.2.8) as a direct input, the measurement of At in (2.2.10) will suffer 
from the bias due to the omission of Gt 5. 
Let us now assume that public capital is an environmental factor affecting 
TFP growth as defined in (2-2-8). Under this assumption, (2.2.10) becomes: 
At +ýt(Gt) - (YKICtlYt) -K't + At(Gt) - (YLLtlYt) Lt 
ct 
where a rise in public capital yields a proportional change in the marginal 
products of both private inputs and, as a consequence, raises both output 
elasticity values a and 3. 
Since ive are not assuming that Gt is a factor of production, the rate of 
growth of the technological factor At is still correctly defined by equation 
(2.2.10). However, total factor productivity is now assumed to depend on 
Gt and, for At(Gt) = AtG't', it will be defined by two parts: 
At ý'YA - G't + At (2.2.12) 
where -y now indicates the elasticity of the measured residual with respect to 
public capital and At is the growth rate of the "true" shift in the production 
function. It is clear that the relationship in (2.2.12) is equivalent to the 
indirect effect of public capital on total factor productivity as derived by 
Aschauer in (2.2.5) expressed in terms of growth rates. 
5 Since the elasticity values are not directly observed, this equation is not adaptable to 
the empirical analysis. However, equation (2.2.10) becomes a suitable empirical specifica- 
tion under the assumption that private inputs are paid their respective marginal products. 
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2.3 Public Capital and Long-run Economic Growth 
Regardless of which of the effects (l)-(3) - see pages 9 and 13 - is the pre- 
vailing one, the fact that the provision of public capital enhances economic 
activity through one of these channels does not imply the existence of a pos- 
itive relationship between public investment in infrastructures and long-run 
economic growth. In general, the latter will arise depending on whether a 
permanent increase in public investment yields a permanent (Barro, 1990) 
or simply a temporary (Solow, 1956) effect on economic growth in the long- 
run. The latter is the conclusion reached within exogenous growth models a 
la Solow described below in section 2.4. 
The standard neoclassical prediction is that a permanent change in the 
saving rate has solely a transitory effect on economic growth. Indeed, long- 
run growth is only determined by population growth and exogenous tech- 
nological progress. Under the assumption of decreasing returns to private 
capital, an increase in the provision of public capital will only temporarily 
induce higher investment. Therefore, in the long-run the level of output will 
be higher but its rate of growth will not be affected by the increase in public 
investment. 
Abandoning the basic neoclassical assumption that production solely re- 
quires direct investment in physical capital and labour, the literature on 
endogenous growth or. new growth has placed emphasis on other forms of 
capital provided through private investment in research, knowledge and hu- 
man capital or public investment in infrastructure. As a consequence, it has 
been possible to relax the assumption of diminishing returns to capital in 
favor of the hypothesis of constant (or increasing) returns to scale in the 
accumulating factors of production. The important implication is that the 
long-run rate of growth of the economy becomes dependent on factors en- 
dogenously determined in the model, rather than being merely determined 
by exogenous variables such as population growth and technological change C, C, 
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as in Solow-tYpe models. 
Fiscal policy (changes in the structure of taxation and public expendi- 
ture) has no permanent impact on long-run growth in the standard neoclas- 
sical model. On the other hand, the long-run rate of growth is dependent 
on the investment decisions endogCnously determined in endogenous growth 0 
models and, as a consequence, fiscal policy can influence the incentive to 
invest in private capital, permanently affecting long-run growth. 0 
As for endogenous growth models dealing with public investment in in- 0 
frastructure, the seminal contribution is provided by Barro (1990), who de- 
velopcd an endogenous growth model in which publicly provided productive 
services are the source of sustained long-run growth. This model will be 
discussed in scction 2.5. 
However, although under certain conditions public investment can posi- 
tively affect economic growth, more sceptical economists argue that increas- 
ing public expenditure will generally tend to crowd out private investment 
by reducing private disposable income and incentive to save, leading to a 
reduction in the level of productivity. This view gives particular relevance 
to the negative externality effects arising from various kinds of distortions 
induced by government intervention in private markets as a buyer, seller or 
regulator (de la Fuente, 1997). It is argued, for instance, that the govern- 
ment activity as a regulator may affect the efficient allocation of resources 
in private markets. In general, the same type of inefficiency is considered 
to be caused by all the categories of government expenditure financed by 
distortionary taxation. 
2.4 Neoclassical View on Fiscal Policy and Growth 
The standard neoclassical model of growth was developed during the late 
1950s and the early 1960s and became in the following years the starting 
point of the debate on the determinants of growth. This section introduces 
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the standard model proposed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) showing 
the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy on the long-run rate of growth. On the 
supply side of the model, the homogencous good Yt is produced through the 0 
following aggregate production function: 
Yt = F(Ift, AtLt) 
where At is the labour-augmcnting (Harrod-neutral) technological factor, Lt 
is labour factor and Ift is capital input. Both At and Lt are assumed to 
grow at a constant exogenous rate: At = Aoe'yt, Lt = Loe'lt. It is assumed 
that the function F is twice differentiable and linearly homogeneous, i. e., 
the production of Yt exhibits CRTS in Ift and Lt. Furthermore, both Lt and 
Ift are assumed to have positive but declining marginal products. Under 
these assumptions it is possible to express Yt in effective units of labour, 
yt =- YtIAtLt: 
AtLt . 
F(Ift, AtLt) =F (IftlAtLt, 1) f (kt) (2.4.2) 
where f (kt), defined as the production function in intensive form, is assumed 
to satisfy the so-called Inada conditions -f (0) ý 0, limkt-,,,, f'(kt) =0 and 
liMkt-0 f'(kt) = oo - and kt has a positive but declining marginal product, 
with f'(kt) >0 and f"(kt) < 0. 
On the demand side, the economy is closed and without government. 
Total saving is assumed to be the constant fraction s of total income (that 
equates total output Yt): kt = sYt - JIft, where 5 is the depreciation rate 
of capital. 
Tile above set-up implies the well-known fundamental differential cqua- 
tion of the Solow model, which states that the rate of change of the capital 
stock (in units of effective labour) is given by the difference bctween actual 
investment sf (k) and the so-called break even investment (, q + -y + 5) k, that 
is to say, the investment that must be done in order to prevent k from falling 
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over time 6: 
sf (k) - (77 + -y + J)k (2.4.3) 
According to this differential equation, k rises or falls over time whether 
sf (k) is greater or smaller than (q + -y + 6)k. Only if investment exactly 
equates the resources needed to prevent capital from falling, k will be con- 
stant overtime at the value k*. Regardless of the initial level of k- provided 
that the Inada conditions and the laiv of diminishing returns to capital are 
satisfied and that ko >0- the economy will always converge to its balanced 
growth path (BGP from now on) where k is constant at the value k* and 
all variables grow at a constant rate. 
The unique and stable BGP is obtained by setting (2.4.3) equal to zero. 
The solution to the model gives the value k* at which all variables are 
constant and the economy grows at the exogenously given rate (77 + -Y). On 
the BGP, since L and A grow at ratesq and -y respectively, the capital stock 
K grows at the rate 77 + -17. This implies that - under the assumption of 
CRTS - total output also grows at the rate 77 + -y. Output per capita YIL 
is equal to Af (k*) on the BGP, where k* is constant and A grows at the 
rate y. Hence, long-run per capita growth is driven by the exogenous and 
constant rate of the technological progress, independently of the saving ratio 
S. 
Within this framework, any government policy aimed at influencing the 
private decisions on the allocation of resources between consumption and 
investment, will not have any permanent effect on long-run growth. Indeed, 
r' Two assumptions of the model make necessary the break even investment in order 
to keep k constant over time: 1) capital depreciates at the constant rate J and, as a 
consequence, in each period the fraction 5 of the capital stock K must be replaced in 
order to keep k constant; 2) the quantity of effective labour AL grows at the constant rate 
17 + -y, which implies that the capital stock K must grow at the same rate in order to keep 
k constant. 
7 This is due to the fact that K= ALk*, where k* is constant, hence, k1K = 77 +, y. 
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an increase in the saving rate s has a level effect, but not a growth effect 
on output. This means that a change in s influences the level of per capita 
output, leaving unchanged its growth rate on the BGP. 
As we said above, this basic model does not assume the presence of a 
government. However, we can analyse the steady state effects of fiscal policy 
changes, assuming that the saving rate s is the parameter most likely to be 
influenced by changes in public expenditure and/or taxation (Romer, 1996). 
For instance, let us consider a permanent increase in government expen- 
diture in enhancing the national transport network. Under the assumption 
that the availability of a higher endowment of transport infrastructure pre- 
sumably increases the marginal product of k, this policy will cause a per- 
manent increase in the saving rate. As a consequence, actual investment 
will be higher in (2.4.3), exceeding the level of break even investment, and 
k will start growing (k > 0) from its initial steady state value V. While 
k is increasing, per capita output YIL = Af(k) will increase at a higher 
rate than its balanced rate of growth -y. However, k will rise until actual 
investment equates again break even investment on a higher BGP. The new 
steady state value of capital k** will be higher than the initial one, but the 
rate of growth of per capita output will be again determined by -Y. This ex- 
ample shows the null impact of increases in public expenditure on Ion-run 
economic growth in Solow-type models. 
2.5 The Barro Model 
Barro (1990) incorporates a public sector in a constant-returns model of en- 
dog enous growth. As pointed out by the author, the model is based on two 
aspects of the new growth literature: models in which private returns to scale 
may be diminishing but social returns to scale can be constant or increas- 
ing, reflecting spillovers of knowledge or other externalities (Romer, 1986), 
and models without externalities but constant returns to private inputs of 
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production (Rebelo, 1991). 
The Barro model leaves room for a new macroeconomic role of public 
investment, challenging the neoclassical wisdom that fiscal policy has no per- 
manent impact on the long-run rate of growth. Although the most famous 
result of this model is the derivation of an optimal rule for the provision 
of productive public spending (the so-called Barro Rule), Barro provides 
many other insights in the debate on the relevance of taxes and government 
spending on economic growth. In particular, the model considers the cases 
of distortionary and non-distortionary taxation and the two types of pro- 
ductivc (infrastructure spending) and unproductive (public consumption) 
expenditure, deriving the growth effects of alternative combinations of taxes 
and expenditure. 
2.5.1 Decentralized Economy and Income Taxation 
A representative, infinitely lived household maximizes her lifetime utility in 
a closed economy, given a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) instanta- 
neous utility function: 
00 cl-, T 
e-Ptdt 
where o- > 0, p>0 is the constant rate of time preference and marginal 
utility has a constant elasticity, cu"(c)/u(c) = -a. Population is constant, 
there is no labour-leisure choice and each household-producer has access 
to the same technology y=f (k), where both output y and capital k are 
expressed in per capita terms. Under these assumptions, the solution to the 
lifetime utility maximization problem yields the following Euler equation: 
6=1- (f, - (2.5.2) c or 
where f is the marginal product of capital. Assuming CRTS to a broad 
concept of private capital (including both human and physical capital), the 
2. Models of Public Capital and Growth: A Literature Review 21 
individual production function can be written as in a standard Ak model: 
Ak (2.5.3) 
where A>0 stands for the constant net marginal product of capital. Sub- 
stituting f=A into (2.5.2), Barro obtains the following expression for the 
long-run per capita growth rates: 
-Y =6=1- (A - p) (2.5.4) c or 
The economy is always at a position of steady state growth in which per 
capita consumption, capital and output grow at the same rate -y shown in 
(2.5.4). Given the initial value of capital stock, k(O), the levels of c and y 
are also determined, with: 
c(O) = k(O) - (A - -y) (2.5.5) 
Within this framework, the role of the public sector is modelled cx- 
tending (2.5.3) in order to include an additional input of production. The 
government is supposed to provide a flow of public services g, made avail- 
able to each household-produccr in the economy, with neither user charge 
nor congestion effects. Hence, the production function in (2.5.3) is modified 
accordingly: 
y=l)(k, g)=*y=kAý - (2.5.6) 
(gk) 
with V>0 and V<0. Production is characterized by CRTS in k and g 
taken together and decreasing returns to scale in k separately. The intuition 
behind the extension of the production function in order to include the flow 
of public services is that private and public inputs are complementary or, 
at least, they are not close substitutes. Hence, private capital (even if it 
includes both physical and human capital) will show diminishing returns, if 
' If the inequalities A>p> A(i - cr) hold, then the steady state rate of growth is 
positive - since A>p implies -y >0 in (2.5.4) - and utility is bounded. 
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the government does not increase the provision of g in a parallel manner. 
For a Cobb-Douglas production function, (2.5.6) becomes: 
y= Akl-'ga (2.5.7) 
where 0<a<1. The government does not own capital in this model 
and, as a consequence, does not contribute to production in the private 
sector of the economy. Indeed, the publicly provided services g appearing 
in (2.5.6) and (2.5.7) are purchased by the government as a share of the 
output produced in the economy and made available free of charge to the 
representative household-producer. Hence, to keep the analysis as simple 
as possible, such public services are assumed to have the nature of a pure 
public good: g is a non-rival and non-excludable good and represents the 
total amount of government purchases. 
The government is assumed to run a balanced budget constraint at each 
moment in time: 
g= T= -r -y= -r - k- -1) 
( ýkq ) (2.5.8) 
where total expenditure g equates total revenue T collected by levying a flat- 
rate income tax -r. Due to the absence of congestion effects, each producer's 
choice on output does not influence the amount of g that lie can use. Hence, 
given the production function in (2.5.6), the after-tax marginal product of 
capital is computed by letting vary k, holding g fixed: 
Oy 
= (1 - -r) - (P 
(1 
- 4V (1 - T) (1 (2.5.9) DT- k Y) =k 
where 0<q<1 is the output elasticity of 9. 
Since ihe provision of g is not assumed to affect overall utility, the inclu- 
sion of the public sector in the model leaves unchanged the Euler equation 
in (2.5.2). However, the production side of the model changes for the pres- 
ence of the public input and the long-run rate of growth in (2.5.4) has to be 
modified in order to take into account the new marginal product of k shown 
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in (2.5.9): 
-Y -, r - 4ý (1 - 71) -p (2.5.10) ca-k 
(Oy/Ok) 
The dynamics of the model do not change after the inclusion of tile 
public sector. The economy is always at tile position of steady state, where 
c, k and y grow at the same constant rate -y, and for a given initial value of 
capital stock - k(O) -c and y are also determined, with: 
c(O) = k(O) - [(l - -r) . -1) 
(9) 
- 7)] k 
The main result of the model is contained in (2.5.10) and can be sum- 
marized as follows. Different sizes of the government are represented by 
different values of -r = gly. Letting vary the income tax rate -r - or equiv- 
alently the share of private output purchased by the government gly - the 
growth rate is affected in two directions. 
A rise in gly implies that the government makes available a higher level of 
productive services. Under the assumption that these services are positively 
linked to the marginal product of capital, there will be an increase in the 
incentive to save, with a beneficial effect on long-run growth9. However, 
the provision of productive services is financed by the income tax and - 
provided that the government runs a balanced budget constraint - -r will 
also increase, contracting disposable income, reducing private investment 
and, as a consequence, hampering growth. 
Thus, the net effect of public investment on long-run growth is ambiguous 
and will be positive or negative whether or not the growth enhancing effect 
due to higher productive services will dominate the growth hampering effect 
caused by higher taxation. The first effect prevails when the government 
is small, whereas the second will dominate when the government is large. 
9 See the positive effect of aylak on -y in (2.5.10). 
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Hence, the long-run rate of growth is increasing in -r up to a point, reaching 
a maximum at that point, after which it declines for further increases in -r. 
This analysis implies the existence of a growth maximizing level of in- 
come taxation where the value of depends on the level at which 
the two effects discussed above offset one each other. 
For the production function (2.5.6), it is complicated to study the net 
effect on -y because 77 is a function of g1k in (2.5.10). Hence, 7'max is not 
a constant and it becomes difficult to define the growth maximizing level 
of taxation. However, for the easy case of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function (2.5.7), the output elasticity of g is constant by definition and 
equal to a. When 71 is constant, the derivative of -y with respect to gly is 
given by: 
a-Y (P 1 (2.5.12) NOW 0- 
Thus, -y will be increasing or decreasing in gly whether or not (V is 
greater or smaller than 1 and Ion-run growth will be maximized for -V = 1. 0 
Since a= 71 =V- gly, it follows that: 
Tmax ý ce -9 (2.5.13) 
y 
This latter result is known in the literature as the Barro Rule, which 
states that it is optimal for the government to set its share of national output 
equal to the share that it would get if public services were a competitively 
supplied input of production'O. 
2.5.2 Central Planner Solution and Consumption Taxation 
Barro defines the result obtained in the previous section as the solution to 
a second-best policy problem. Indeed, he reco. -nizes that his model suffers 
10 A further conclusion regards the fact that -r_., turns out to be also the welfare maxi- 
mizing level of taxation: for a benevolent central planner the maximization of households' 
lifetime utility is equivalent to the maximization of long-run economic growth. 
2. Models of Public Capital and Growth: A Litcrature Review 25 
from the standard externalities implied by public expenditure and taxation. 
Thus, in the following step of his analysis, he compares the decentralized 
outcome of the model with the solution to the corresponding planning prob- 
lem in order to assess the relevance of such external effects. In the central 
planner scenario the rate of growth of consumption is derived as: 
lyp 
K' 
- 
2) 
- . 1, 
(g) 
- PI (2.5.14) c or yk 
and the derivative of -yp with respect to gly is given by: 
a-yp -ýD(glk) - (4b'- 1) (2.5.15) 
NOW U(l - 77) 
where 77 is defined between 0 and 1 and, as a consequence, the efficiency 
condition V=1- which ensures that gly is fixed at its growth maximizing 
level - holds regardless of the functional form of the production function. 
Let us now compare the long-run growth rate in the decentralized econ- 
omy -y in (2.5.10) with the one of the central planner case yp in (2.5.14). In 
(2.5.10), the term in brackets and to the left of the minus sign is: 
(1 - T) * 4) 
(ký )- (I - 71) = private marginal return on capital; (2.5.16) 
whereas the corresponding term in (2.5.14) is given by: 
1-9 -(D 
D= 
social marginal return on capital. (2.5.17) 
Y) 
(k 
Thus, given a proportional tax -r = gly, decentralized and command 
solutions differ for the term (1 - 71) and -yp > -y for any value of -r- The 
presence of the income tax causes the decentralized economy to have lower 
long-run growth with respect to the central planned economy (see the lowest 
curve in Figure 2.5.1). 
In order to assess the presence of external effects in the model, Barro 
checks whether the central planner solution can be obtained by replacing the 
income tax with a lump-sum tax in the decentralized version of the model. 
Um .- 
ýj F YORK 
y 
04 
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Under the assumption of a lump-sum tax", the long-run rate of growth 
becomes: 
c (2.5.18) -YL =-=-[. 1, 
(1) 
- (i - 77) - P] ck 
which is the same as (2.5.10), except that for the absence of the term (1 - -r). 
The growth rate now is monotonically increasing in the ratio gly, because 
after increasing gly, the marginal product of capital o9ylOk will increase and 
consumption will grow at a higher rate. 
Comparing the central planner solution in (2.5.14) with the decentralized 
solution with lump-sum taxes in (2.5.18), it is easy to verify that they coin- 
cide only if gly is set at its optimum. Indeed, -yL depends on (1 - 71), whereas 
-yp depends on (I - gly), where 77 = V. (gly), which implies that 77 = (gly) 
when V=1. The fact that the decentralized solution with lump-sum taxes 
lies on the central planner solution only under the condition V=1, leads 
Barro to conclude that in any other case - i. e., for V : 7ý 1- the income 
tax is not the only distortion in the model. 
The existence of an external effect other than income taxation is due to 
the interaction between the private output (and capital) decision and the 
public investment decision. 
As we said above, each producer computes c9y/Ok holding g fixed. In 
other words, individual producers do not expect their output (and capital) 
decisions to affect the total amount of g available for their use. However - 
provided that the equality -r = gly holds - any unit increase in aggregate 
output, will force the government to raise its provision of public services by 
gly units. Hence, the individual choice on output indirectly influences fiscal 
policy and its effect on public decision will depend on whether or not the 
government has set gly optimally. 
Under the optimal policy V=1, public spending is worthless because 
Since labour supply is assumed to be constant, a consumption tax is equivalent to a 
lump-sum tax. 
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a marginal increase brings a revenue exactly equal to its cost. Thus, the 
distortion induced by the public sector is null and the lump-sum solution 
is identical to the central planner solution. On the other hand, if the gov- 
ernment is too large, (i. e., if V<I or, equivalently, gly > a), when the 
individual producer expands his own output, the government has to increase 
in a parallel manner the provision of public services, in order to keep gly 
constant. Hence, each producer has an incentive to increase his own produc- 
tion because this behavior will lead the government to expand the provision 
of public services. Such an expansion in the provision of g due to the in- 
dividual producer's decision represents a negative externality, which causes 
the decentralized solution with lump-sum taxes to be higher than the solu- 
tion of the central planner: -yL > -yp. The opposite will be true when the 
government size is too little (in this case, V>1 or equivalently gly < a). 
Y, Yp, YL 
Figure 2.5.1: Barro model - Growth and Public Services, Cobb-Douglas Case 
Figure 2.5.1 allows to compare the outcomes of distortionary and non- 
distortionary taxes in the Cobb-Douglas case. For Tmax ý gly = a, the 
lump-sum tax gives the command optimum and, as a consequence, it is 
T =a 
V> I <=>gly< a<I <--> g/y 
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superior to the income tax. The lump-sum tax has to be preferred to the 
income tax also when gly < a. However, if gly > a, the comparison of the 
two cases becomes ambiguous because -yL becomes too large, y becomes too 
small and the solution with income tax can be a superior to the solution 
with the lump-sum tax. This is due to the fact that income taxation is not 
an appropriate solution to the "over-provision" of public services induced 
by the producers' increase of y. This distortion could be internalized by 
imposing the income tax -r = gly, (i. e., when 1Y =1 and the government 
choices a growth maximizing income tax rate). As gly becomes larger than 
its optimal value a, the marginal return on public spending (V) becomes 
smaller. Hence, moving away from the point gly =a to the right, the 
income tax becomes more and more the adequate way of correcting for the 
external effect in the economy and, as a consequence, the value of -Y gets 
closer and closer to the value of _yP12. 
2.6 Extensions to the Barro Model 
Table 2.6.1 reports the key features of the Barro model with respect to 
its production and consumption sides and to the assumptions made on the 
government. Starting from this framework, many authors have succeeded 
in providing more insights on the issue of the relationship between public 
investment and economic growth within more elaborated models. 
A summary of the literature dealing with Barro-type models is reported 
in Table 2.6.2, where models are grouped on the basis of their main depar- 
tures from Barro (1990). Many models are characterized by more than one 
departure; this explains why some authors have been cited more than once 
in the Table13. 
12 Barro also analyses the case in which the government, together with productive spend- 
ing, provides consumption services h which enter the household's instantaneous utility 
function u(c, h). This case is not covered in the present review. 
13 A further group of works extend the Barro model to the open economy case in order to 
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Table 2.6.1: Key Features of the Barro Model 
Production side: g is a flow variable 
g is a pure public good 
CRTS in k and g 
One sector economy 
Consumption side: Representative Agent model 
Infinite Horizons 
No labour-leisure choice 
Government: Balanced Budget Constraint 
Public Investment is the only category 
of public spending 
Distortionary/Non-distortionary Taxation 
The first set of models includes those interested in modifying the struc- 
ture of the production side of the model. Within this group of works, some 
authors argue that the appropriate input to enter the Ak standard produc- 
tion function in order to account for the public sector is the stock of public 
capital, rather than the flow of public services (Futagami et al., 1993). The 
main implication of such an assumption is the presence of two state vari- 
ables (private and public capital) in the model and transitional dynamics 
(TD). Other researchers - following Barro and Sala-i-Alartin (1992,1999) 
- have abandoned the way of modelling g as a pure public good, basing 
their analysis on publicly provided rival and excludable private goods and 
publicly provided goods (rival but not excludable) subject to congestion. 
Regarding tile behavior of the government, Barro-type models have been 
implemented complicating two aspects: -the composition of public expendi- 
account for the relationship between fiscal policy and exchange rates and terms of trade. 
See, for instance, Turnovsky (1997), Heijdra and Meijdarn (2002) and Kalyvitis (2003). 
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Table 2.6.2: Extensions to the Barro'Alodel 
Extensions Authors 
Production Side 
g as a stock and TD Futagami et al. (1993), Cashin (1995), Turnovsky (1997) 
Aschauer (1997), de la, Fuente (1997), Greiner (1999) 
Dasgupta (2001), Cassou and Lansing (1998) 
Ghosh and Roy (2002), Heijdra and Aleijdam (2002) 
Kalyvitis (2003), Sancliez-Robles (2003) 
Park and Philippopoulos (2003) 
Congestion Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992,1999) 
Cassou and Lansing (1998) 
Gloom and Ravikumar (1994,1997) 
Turnovsky (1996,1997), Bajo-Rubio (2000) 
Fisher and Tbrnovsky (1998), Acconcia (2000) 
Rauirich-Puigdevall (2000), Piras (2001) C, 
Consumption Side 
OGs models Mourmouras and Lee (1999) 
Ghosh and Mourmouras (2002) 
Heijdra and Nfcijdam (2002) 
End. L. S. Cassou and Lansing (1998), Greiner (1999) 
'hirnovsky (2000), Dasgupta, (2001) 
Government Side 
Debt Turnovsky (1997), Aschauer (1997) 
Greiner and Semmler (2000) 
Heijdra and Nlcijdam (2002) 
Other kinds of PPS do la Fuente (1997), Greiner (1999) 
UPS Mirnovsk-y et al. (1995), Casýin (1995) 
Dcvarajan et al. (1996) 
do Ia Fuente (1997), Greiner (1999) 
Park and Philippopoulos (2003), Bajo-Rubio (2000) 
Cassou and Lansing (1998), Acconcia (2000) 
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ture and the channels of financing public investment (taxes and debt). In 
particular, authors interested in the first aspect have attempted to extend 
the results obtained by Barro in the presence of other categories of produc- 
tive (PPS) and unproductive (UPS) public spending. 
Extensions regarding the consumption side have been the less investi- 
gated in the literature. There have been two major departures from the 
original model: the analysis of finite horizons and the hypothesis of endoge- 
nous labour supply. This review focuses on the first extension, presenting a 
summary of the perpetual youth overlapping generations model provided by 
Alourmouras and Lee (1999) and based on Blanchard (1985). The particular 
focus on this paper is motivated by the fact that its results are questioned 
in the model presented in Chapter 3. 
The second group of works which complicates the Barro model on the 
consumption side, relaxes the assumption of no labour-leisure choice in favor 
of endogenous labour supply. Some authors regard the assumption that 
households offer a fixed amount of labour as a limitation of the Barro, model. 
It seems too unrealistic to these authors abstracting from the analysis of 
the private decision of allocating time between work and leisure. Hence, 
they have devoted their interest to the analysis of fiscal policy under the 
more realistic assumption of elastic labour supply. The most instructive 
and comprehensive model dealing with this issue is provided by Rirnovsky 
(2000). 
2.6.1 Production Side 
Public Services as a Stock Variable 
Futagami et al. (1993) assume that the stock of public capital enters the 
aggregate production function, instead of the flow of public services 
14 
. The 
14 Arrow and Kurz (1970) make the same assumption within a model of exo. -enous 
growtb. 
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main reason for making this assumption is that most of publicly provided 
services (such as, highways, airports and so on) are stock variables in nature. 
Hence, the aggregate production function is still defined by (2.5.7) - see 
section 2.5, page 22 - the only difference being that g now represents a 
stock variable. This assumption allows to study not only the steady state 
effects of a change in the income tax rate, but also its impact along the path 
converging to the steady-growth equilibrium. 
Under the assumption that the stock of public capital enters the ag rcý- I-M 
gate production function, the government budget constraint becomes: 
k- -cb 
(k 
Although (2.6.1) represents the only departure from Barro (1990), the 
assumption of two state variables (private and public capital stocks) implies 
the important feature that the model has transitional dynamics. 
The solution to the representative agent lifetime utility maximization 
problem - given the lifetime utility in (2.5.1) at page 20 - subject to the 
inter-temporal consumer constraint k= (1 - -r) -f (k, g) - c, gives the same 
Euler equation as in (2.5.10) at page 23. 
The joint consideration of the government budget constraint, the usual 
profit maximizing condition and the Euler equation resulting from the life- 
time utility maximization problem, gives a system of two differential equa- 
tions describing the overall behavior of the economy: 
. ýi 
-k=T 
(4)) 
- (I - -r), D + X2 (2.6.2) X1 gkx 
6k=1, 
R1 
- T) * 
(1 
- 70) - PI - 
(1 
- 7)(1) + X2 (2.6.3) 
X2 Ck0, 
where x, and X2 are the public to private capital and the private consump- 
tion to private capital ratios respectively, and 71 is the output elasticity of 
public capital as defined in section 2.5 (see page 22). 
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Given this system, it is shown that the economy is characterized by a 
unique steady-growth equilibrium (defined byYj =252 = 0) and there exists 
a unique stable path converging to such equilibrium15. 
As for the steady state effects of an increase in the income tax rate, 
the authors are able to replicate the result of the Barro rule within their 
framework. Hence, they find that - for i? constant and equal to ce - the 
growth maximizing income tax rate equates the output elasticity of public 
capital. 
Regarding the study of the transitional dynamics after a change in T, 
their results are the following. The analysis refers to the case 77 < -F, that is 
to say, for values of -r on the decreasing part of the Barro curve, where the 
growth hampering effect of higher income taxation dominates the growth 
enhancing effect due to a higher steady state value of the public to private 
capital ratio. Thus, the government size is too large and the net effect of 
higher income taxation on the steady-growth equilibrium is negative. 
Assuming that the economy is initially at its steady-growth equilibrium, 
if a unanticipated increase in -r occurs at time 0, Futagami et al. (1993) 
distinguish two cases characterized by a different initial response of the con- 
sumption to private capital ratio X2- Indeed, their result is such that: 
99X2 (0) 'r) >(:! ý-)O when p+77<(ý! )l (2.6.4) OT 
where (2.6.4) states that the short run effect of a change in -T on X2 is Positive 
or negative according to whether p+ 71 is less or greater than 1. 
Figure 2.6.1 shows the graphical analysis of the unanticipated rise in 7- 
in the case of p+ 77 > 1. The initial steady-growth equilibrium lies in A. 
When, r rises at time 0, both the locus of ýbj =0 and -'ý2 =0 shift 
downward 
15 Since the economy in the model presented in Chapter 3 will be described by a system 
of differential equations similar to (2.6.2)-(2.6.3), this result is not discussed further here. 
The properties of the BGP implied by such system will be studied in sections 3.13.1 and 
3.13.2 of the Mathematical Appendix (see pages 92-95). 
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in the upper diagram of Figure 2.6.1. 
I 
9 
Figure 2.6.1: Futagami Model, nansitional Dynamics (p + 71 > 
According to (2.6.4), X2 initially jumps downward and then increases, 
while x, gradually increases. This implies that : ýjlxj = ýlg - k1k >0 and 
i2/X2 = 61c - k1k >0 on the transitional path and consumption decreases. 
The initial impact of the rise of T on the rate of growth of public capital is 
derived from the definition of the government budget constraint in (2.6.1): 
>0 (2.6.5) 
XI 
lience, public capital initially increases and then decreases gradually. On 
the other hand, from the Euler equation it results that: 
a(6(0, -F)/C(O, 'T)) - 
-1ý - VXj <0 (2.6.6) a-r p 
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which tells that consumption initially decreases and then increases gradually. 
The rate of growth of consumption is greater than the rate of growth of 
private capital (see the lower diagram in Figure 2.6.1). In the long run, 
the economy converges to the lower steady-growth equilibrium B. The now 
steady state value Of X2 is lower than the initial one. On the other hand, x, 
ends up with a higher steady state value. 
Figure 2.6.2 depicts the case p+ 77 < 1. After the increase in T, the locus 
of Y, =0 shifts downward, while the locus Of Y2 =0 shifts upward in the 
upper graphic. According to (2.6.4), X2 initially jumps upward and then 
decreases and x, increases. 
xl 
I 
1ý 
Y, 
X, 
Fi,, -, ure 2.6.2: Futagami Model, Týansitional Dynamics (p + 71 < 
Thus, contrary to the previous case, ii 1xi = ýlg - 
k1k >0 and ýb21X2 = 
61c - 
k1k <0 on the transitional path. The initial impacts of a higher -r on 
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c and g are the same as before. Rom the consumer budget constraint and 
equation (2.6.2), the initial impact on private capital is defined by: 
a (k- (0, -r) /k(Or» = -(P - d9X2 
(0, Ir) <0 (2.6.7) 
49-r d9-r 
and, contrary to the previous case, the rate of growth of private capital is 
greater than the rate of growth of consumption (see the lower diagram in 
Figure 2.6.2). In the new steady state equilibrium B, both x, and X2 have 
values higher than before the rise of -r occurred. 
The difference between the two cases is the short run behavior of con- 
sumption. Indeed, any change in -r generates two effects of opposite dircc- 
tions on the level of present consumption: the (inter-temporal) substitution 
effect and the income effect. The income effect negatively affects present 
consumption, while the substitution effect yields an increase in current con- 
sumption at the expense of future consumption. The relative magnitude of 
the time preference parameter will determine which of the two effects dom- 
inatcs the other. Increasing -r causes the interest rate to jump downward 
at time 0 (see the Eulcr equation) and then to increase gradually up to the 
new steady state value, which will be lower than the original one. When 
p+ 77 < 1, the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution is large and, as a 
consequence, the substitution effect will be stronger than the income effect, 
yielding an increase in current consumption. 
Following Futagami et al. (1993), other authors have considered an 
aggregate production function extended to include the stock of public cap- 
ital introducing, by doing so, transitional dynamics in their models. For 
instance, Chosh and Roy (2002) include both public services and public 
capital into the aggregate production function in the attempt of reconciling 
Barro's and Futagami et al. 's views. The aim of these authors is to study 
the trade-off of the decision faced by the government of either providing 
public services or accumulating public capital. They Nvork out a model able 
to include Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993) as special cases, using 0 
2. Models of Public Capital and Growth: A Literature Review 37 
the following production function: 
y= (g,, ' - gf'-')'-" -V (2.6.8) 
where for a=0 and a=1 the model collapses to the models by Barro and 
Futagami et al. respectively. 
Public serviccs are not pure public goods 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) discuss two extensions to Barro (1990), based 
on alternative definitions of the degree of publicness of g16' assumed to be 
either (i) rival and excludable or (ii) rival but not excludable. 
(i) According to the first definition of the flow variable g, each individual 
producer has a property right on a specific share of the total amount of 
public services. Under this assumption, this share of public services matters 
for the individual production function, rather than its total amount. Leaving 
unchanged the notation, now g becomes a rival and excludable good: each 
individual uses his own share of public services and can not use or congest 
the services provided to others. For instance, the government could purchase 
any input needed by producers and allocate it equally across firms without 
direct charges. The production function (2.5.7) at page 22 is modified in 
order to include g= Gln: 
y= Akl-" 
(G)' 
(2.6.9) 
n 
where n is the number of producers, 0<a<1, and the technology shows 
diminishing returns to k separately and constant returns to k and g taken 
together. The main difference with the model discussed in section 2.5 is 
16 The authors provide three versions of the Barro model, each of them characterized 
by an alternative definition of public services: 1) publicly provided rival and excludable 
private goods; 2) publicly provided non-rh-al and non-excludable public goods (that is to 
say, the Barro model); 3) publicly provided goods (rival but not excludable) subject to 
congestion. 
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that, each producer computes the marginal product of the capital employed 
in her firm, holding fixed g= Gln, that is to say, the part of public services 
in her availability, rather than the total amount of public services. 
Leaving unchanged the assumptions of a government running a balanced 
budget constraint and levying the income tax at the rate T= gly, the 
optimality condition for the provision of public spending is still the same: 
V= aylag = 1, which implies (from (2.6.9) - gly = a. 
The marginal product of private capital is: 
')y 
k 
(2.6.10) 
where (2.6.10) is identical to (2.5.9)17, the only difference being that now g 
is an individual share, instead of the total amount of public services. Once 
again, if government investment is financed by a lump-sum tax, private and 
social marginal returns on capital - (2.5.16) and (2.5.17), page 25 - equate 
and the rate of growth is optimal as in the Barro model. On the other hand, 
given a proportional income tax at rate r, social and private returns on 
investment in private capital will equate only if T= gly = 0. For a positive 
-r, the private return is lower than the social one, private producers will have 
a disincentive to invest and long-run growth will be negatively affected. 
(ii) In the second version of the model, the flow of public services is a 
rival but not excludable good: 
Ak" -G 
(Y) 
where for a given amount of total government purchases G, the quantity 
of public services freely available to each firm is decreasing in the usage of 
other producers. Each individual firm's decision to expand its own output 
congests the quantity of public services provided by the government to all 
other firms. Hence, the usefulness of a certain category of public capital 
17 (2.6.10) gives the solution to (2.5.9) in the Cobb-Douglas case. 
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to each individual declines as more producers use the facility. Real world 
examples of public services of this sort would be transportation facilities as 
well as public utilities. 
With this specification of the technology, production can exhibit con- 
stant returns to the two inputs k and g, only if the government is able to 
keep constant tile degree of congestion (GIY). Given the assumption of 
congestion effects, it becomes more relevant the issue of whether or not pro- 
ducers realize that their individual output decisions affect the provision of G. 
Indeed, since each producer takes G as given while deciding the scale of his 
production, there still exists an incentive to increase output and, by doing 
so, to increase congestion costs. The only instrument that the government 
can use in order to make producers aware of the congestion costs that they 
cause is a proportional user fee at the rate -r = GlY. As a consequence, in 
contrast with the previous case the optimal policy is given by a proportional 
tax on income, rather than by lump-sum taxation. 
2.6.2 Government Side 
As discussed above, the Barro model is able to predict the growth enhancing 
effect of public investment in infrastructure. This result, however, is derived 
abstracting from any other type of government expenditure and under the 
assumption of a balanced government budget constraint. The interest of 
many researchers has been devoted to relax both assumptions, laying em- 
phasis on aspects related to the composition of government expenditure, the 
mix of expenditure and taxation and the presence of public deficits. 
Table 2.6.3 summarizes the effects of alternative mixes of public expendi- 
ture and taxation on growth. Government expenditures are divided in pro- 
ductive and unproductive categories. Unproductive public spending includes 
any kind of government expenditure entering the consumers' utility function 
and, as a consequence, influencing their welfare without affecting aggregate 
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Table 2.6.3: Growth Effects of the mix of Public Expenditure and Taxation 
Public Spendin. - 
Productive Unproductive 
Taxes Distortionary +/- 
Non-Distortionary +0 
production. For instance, public consumption and lump-sum transfers to 
households are commonly considered unproductivell. On the other hand, 
the productive categories of public expenditure enter the aggregate produc- 
tion function and, by doing so, affect private production efficiency. As we 
will see later in this section, the categories of public spending classified as 
productive are essentially investment in public capital and subsidies to pri- 
vate irivestment'9. 
Examples of distortionary taxation are proportional taxes on labour in- 
come and profits, social security taxes, property taxes and so on. Lump-sum 
taxes are non-distortionary and equivalent to taxes on consumption of do- 
mestic goods and services under the assumption that labour is supplied 
inclastically. 
Table 2.6.3 shows that the expected growth effect of a given category 
of public expenditure depends upon the kind of taxation used to finance 
it. Rom the Barro model, we know that the long-run rate of growth is 
monotonically increasing in productive public spending financed by non- 
distortionary taxation. On the other hand, the growth effect of productive 
public spending financed by distortionary taxation is ambiguous and de- 
pcnds on the level of expenditure. This is the result summarized by the 
" Further examples of categories of unproductive public spending are social security and 
welfare expenditures and expenditures on recreation or other social activities. 
19 Government expenditures on Education and Health are classified by some authors 
as productive. This choice is justified by the fact that this expenditure enhances the 
productivity of human capital. 
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Barro curve for public investment and, as explained below, a similar re- 
sult is obtained by Greiner (1999) for investment subsidies. Unproductive 
public spending categories do not influence aggregate production efficiency. 
When the government finances an increase in unproductive public spend- 
ing through distortionary taxation, long-run growth is hampered. On the 
other hand if such an increase is financed by some form of non-distortionary 
taxation, long-run growth will be unaffected. 
A good starting point for reviewing the part of the literature interested 
in the composition of public expenditure is the work by de la Fuente (1997). 
This is mainly an empirical work, but it is based on a version of the Barro 
model, extended in order to include other kinds of government expenditure. 
This model modifies Barro (1990) in two respects. The first departure is 
the assumption that households instantaneous utility function (in additive 
form) is dependent on per capita private consumption c and per capita total 
government expenditure E: 
U(c, E) = /i - In(c) + (I - it) - In(E) (2.6.12) 
where E is assumed to encompass any kind of public spending, including 
investment in infrastructures. As a second departure, do la Fuentc captures 
alternative channels through which government activities affect economic 
performance, together with the productivity enhancing effect induced by 
public investment in infrastructure. This is done in a very simple way, by 
assuming that aggregate output in th'c economy is given by: 
Y= 0-f - K' - GO - (AL)'-'-13 (2.6.13) 
where the parameter O'y captures all the possible effects that the govern- 
ment can generate on aggregate output, in addition to the one induced by 
the provision of public capital in infrastructure G. The main point of the 
production function in (2.6.13) is that the inclusion of 07 allows us to en- 
compass the wide range of effects that government activities can produce in 
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the economy. The parameter 0 is a proxy of the degree of public interven- 
tion in the private sector of the economy, and its exponent -y represents a 
government externality coefficient. 
Since every single government activity can either enhance or hamper 
productivity, the not effect of the overall government size can be either 
positive or negative and the sign of -y is unknown on a priori grounds. For 
instance, the government could contribute to enhance productivity of human 
capital by raising expenditure on health services and education. In general, 
public consumption in defence, police protection or court system might be 
thought to have positive effects on productivity through different channels. 
On the other hand, other government activities could work in the opposite 
direction. This happens, for instance, when taxation is distortionary or 
public regulation activities lead to the inefficient allocation of resources in 
private markets. The net effect of the complete set of government activities 
is captured by the sign of -y, which will be positive according to whether 
growth enhancing cffects will dominate growth hampering effects. 
The government is assumed to finance public expenditure with a propor- 
tional tax on income at the rate r and to run a balanced budget constraint. 
Total public spending is composed by transfers payments, public consump- 
tion and public investment in G, with the government devoting a constant 
fraction of total output to each of these categories. Consequently, the gov- 
ernment budget constraint is: 0 
0ý OT+OP+OC ýT (2.6.14) 
where OT = Tp1Y = transfers payments, Op = GIY = directly productive 
expenditures and OC = Cp1Y = public consumption. 
De la Fuente distinguishes three channels through which the growth 
effect of changing fiscal policy parameters takes place within his frame- 
work. Total private investment Ip arc defined as the product of the av- 
erage propensity to save s and (after transfers and taxes) disposable income 
F 
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(1 - Oc - Op)Y(O): 
Ip = s[(l - -r)R(O)l - (1 - Oc - Op) - Y(O) (2-6.15) 
where s is a function of the after tax rate of return on private capital (1 - 
7-)R(O), and both the interest rate and the aggregate output depend on the 
level and the composition of government expenditure 0. 
First, fiscal policy has a direct effect on productivity through the ag 
gregate production function in (2.6.13). Second, given the presence of the 
term (I - -r), public expenditures (with the exception of lump-sum transfers) 
will tend to crowd out private investment20 . Finally, the rate of return on 
private capital is also a function of 021 . As a consequence, the distortionary 
effect of taxation can be either reinforced or offset by the impact of fiscal 
policy on the marginal product of private capital. 
Greiner (1999) extends the Barro model by dividing productive gov- 
ernment spending in investment in public capital and subsidies to private 
investment and considering the same categories of unproductive public ex- 
penditurc as de la Fuente (1997). Furthermore, in contrast with Barro 
(1990), the different effects of both variations in income and consumption 
taxation are also investigated under the alternative assumptions that labour 
is supplied either inclastically or elastically. 
On the production side of the model, it is assumed that the stock of 
public capital enters the aggregate production function as in Futagami et 
al. (1993) and the economy has transitional dynamics. However, the author 
focuses solely on the steady state effects of fiscal policy, without analysing 
its impact along the path converging to the equilibrium. 
The government budget constraint (2.5.8) at page 22 is modified in order 
" This effect will disappear under the assumption of lump-sum taxation. 
21 This is simply the positive effect of public services provision on the marginal product 
of private capital that we studied in the Barro model, see section 2.5, page 23. 
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to account for alternative government expenditures: 
T=6+ WlTp + V2Cp + OSk (2.6.16) 
where W1 and W2 are the shares of total tax revenues devoted to lump-sum 
transfers to households and public consumption respectively ((P1 + ý02 < I)i 
and Osk represents investment subsidies. Under the assumption of no de- 
preciation of capital as in the Barro model, the consumer budget constraint 
is also modified accordingly: 
C+k = (w+rK+7, ) (I - -r) + Osk + Tp (2.6.17) 
where w is labour income, r the real interest rate, 7r are profits and both -r 
and Os are defined between 0 and 1. 
Within this framework, the overall behavior of the economy turns out 
to be described by a system of two differential equations similar to (2.6.2)- 
(2.6.3) - see subsection 2.6.1, page 32 -, the only difference being the 
inclusion of additional fiscal policy parameters. The main results obtained 
in this model are related to: 
(i) the effects of each category of expenditure on long-run economic growth. 
(ii) the relationship relating each category of alternative government ex- 
penditures to the Barro rule. 
As for the effects (i), the long-run rate of growth of the economy is 
monotonically decreasing in both categories of unproductive public spend- 0 
ing. After a rise of either ýpj or ý02, less resources will be used for public 
investment in G, with a decelerating effect on long-run growth. 
On the other hand, the growth effect of an increase in subsidies to pri- 
vate investment is ambiguous. Indeed, by increasing OS, the government 
will reduce the investment in public capital, which implies a negative effect 
on growth. However, a rise of OS has also tile direct effect of increasing. 
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the opportunity cost of consumption, leading to a reallocation of private 
resources from consumption to investment and, as a consequence, positively 
affecting growth. The net growth effect of raising OS will be positive only if 
the positive effect induced by the higher incentive to save will be stronger 
than the negative effect caused by the reduction in public investment. The 
analytical condition under which this will occur is derived as: 
c9-y 
> (: ýý')o if 
19X2 OS 
> (:: ý) - 
OS (2.6.18) 
aos DOS X2 a (1 - Os) 
where x2 defines the public to private capital ratio as in the Futagami et al. 
model. Hence, the growth effect of raising Os depends on the value taken 
by the elasticity of the public to private capital ratio with respect to OS. 
Finally, Greiner (1999) modifies the optimal provision rule for public 
investment as follows: 
'Tmax : -- a+ 
os ) 
X2J 
(2.6.19) 
where (2.6.19) equates the Barro rule in (2.5.13) only for a null OS whereas, 
in the presence of other categories of government expenditure, the required 
growth maximizing rate of the income tax will be higher 22 . 
The results in (ii) are concerned with the relationships linking the op- 
timal provision of public investment to transfers to households, public con- 
sumption and investment subsidies. From (2.6.19), it is clear that T,,,,,; is 
increasing in OS. 
A similar relationship is formally derived for the shares V1, W2 devoted to 
the two, categories of unproductive expenditure. The conclusion is that given 
higher levels of unproductive public spending and/or generous investment 
subsidies, the government will be forced to increase productive investment 
in order to compensate for the negative effect on long-run growth. 
" The numerical solution to this model allows Greiner to compute 7-max = 0.38 > a, 
where a=0.30. 
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2.6.3 Consumption Side 
Alourmouras and Lee (1999) analyse the effects of productive government 
expenditure on economic growth, combining Blanchard-type consumers with 
endogenous growth driven by productive government spending. By doing 
so, the framework of an economy populated by the standard representative 
household-producer adopted by Barro is abandoned, and the relationship 
between public services and long-run growth is assessed within a perpetual 
youth overlapping generations (PY-OLGs) model a la Blanchard (1985). 
The aim of the authors is to extend the results obtained by Barro to the 
case of uncertain lifetime consumers. Since the consumption side of their 
model is a version of the PY-OLGs model by Blanchard (1985), 1 will briefly 
introduce this manner of modelling finite horizons, before discussing the 
main results obtained by Alourmouras and Lee (1999). 
It is well known that when agents have finite horizons it is complicated to 
aggregate consumption. Indeed, agents alive at a given moment in time differ 
from each other for two fundamental reasons. First, agents of different ages 
are characterized by different levels and compositions of wealth. Second, 
agents with different life horizons have different propensity to consume out 
of wealth. These two features make impossible to aggregate consumption 
over a-cnts alive at the same instant in time. 
Standard OLGs models adopt simple population structures in order to 
avoid the aggregation problem, by aggregating consumption over "types" 
of consumers (for instance "old people" and "young people" in two periods 
OLGs models). On the other hand, Blanchard (1985) succeeds in over- 
coming the aggregation problem by making two crucial assumptions on the 
probability of death faced by consumers and, as consequence, on the pop- 
ulation structure: (1) agents face a constant instantaneous probability of 
death throughout their life, and (2) there exist life insurance companies. 
(1) The main assumption imposed by Blanchard is that consumers face a 
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constant instantaneous probability of death A throughout their lifC23. 
There is no population growth and, at any time t, a new cohort of 
large size A is born. Since A is constant, the expected remaining life of 
any agent - regardless of her age - is equal to 00 tAc-Atdt = A-'. fol 
The ratio 1/A is an horizon index: as A approaches zero, 1/A goes to 
infinity and agents have infinite lives. Each agent is uncertain about 
the instant in time when she will die, but the size of a cohort declines 
deterministically through time. A cohort born at time zero has size 
Ae-, \t at time t and, as a consequence, the population size at any point 
in time t is normalized to 1: ft,:,. Ae-A(t-)ds = 1. 
(2) Under the assumption of uncertain lifetime, an agent could leave posi- 
tive assets or debts when she dies. However, if the probability of death 
faced by the large number of consumers in the economy is constant, 
private markets can provide full life insurances risklessly. Hence, it is 
convenient to assume that there exist perfectly competitive insurance 
companies providing agents with one good contin-Cnt to their life at 
the rate A. If there is no bequest motive and it is forbidden to leave 
debts when they die, agents will contract a full life insurance. They 
will insure all their wealth a, receiving Aa if they do not die and paying 
a if they die. 
Assumptions (1) and (2) allow to aggregate consumption across agents. 
In general, if x(s, t) denotes an individual variable, its aggregate counterpart 
23 Even if it might sound unrealistic, this assumption implies that consumers of different 
ages have the same propensity to consume, allowing to overcome the aggregation problem 
of standard overlapping generations models. In support of this assumption, Blanchard 
cites some evidence on the mortality rates, according to which people aged between 20 
and 40 face approximately the same probability of death. 
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will be given by: 
t 
X(t) 
00 
x(s, t) LeLýA. (-) ds. (2.6.20) 
population size 
This way of modelling finite lives is adopted by Alourmouras and Lee 
(1999), who modify the Barro model on the consumption side. Assuming 
a CRRA instantaneous utility function with a=1, they define the lifetime 
utility of the individual i, born at time s: 
ui (S, t) =F In ci (s, v) e(P+-X)dv (2.6.21) 
and the following dynamic budget constraint: 
&i (s, t) = [r(t) + A] ai (s, t) + wi (t) - ci (s, t) (2.6.22) 
where a stands for asset wealth, and w is non asset income of the household. 
Maximizing (2.6.21) subject to (2.6.22), yields the standard individual Euler 
equation: 
di (v) = [r (v) - p] ci (v) (2.6.23) 
and the individual consumption function: 
ei (t) = (p + A) [ai (t) + hi (t)1 (2.6.24) 
where individual consumption is proportional to human wealth hi(t) and non 
human wealth ai(t), and the propensity to consume (p+A) is constant across 
generations. Using the ag regation procedure suggested by Blanchard, the 09 
authors derive the rate of growth of aggregate consumption: 
C(t) = [r(t) - p] - C(t) - A(p + A) - A(t) (2.6.25) 
This Euler equation captures the dynamics of consumption under the 
assumption of finite lives. If consumers live infinite lives - i. e., A=0 
- consumption increases (declines) over time whether the interest rate is 
higher (IoNver) than the subjective discount rate. On the other hand, under 
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the assumption of finite lives (A > 0), the rate of growth of consumption 
is decreasing in the probability of death parameter A and depends on as- 
set wealth24. A higher value of A implies a higher propensity to consume 
out of wealth and, as a consequence, a lower consumption growth rate: 
(O/C), x>o < (e! 1C)'\=O- 
This model departs from Barro (1990) solely on the consumption side, 
whereas production strictly follows the original model. Thus, aggregate 
production is given by (2.5.7), page 22 - the onl difference being a positive 0y0 
depreciation rate of capital - and the government budget constraint is 
(2.5.8). Given the following definition for total investment: 
K= (1 -, r)K'-QGQ -C-W (2.6.26) 
the economy reaches its steady state equilibrium and it is described by the 
following system of equations 25 : 
A(A + p)k (2.6.27) 
r-p- -y 
-6 
gc (2.6.28) 
k 
-r)(1 - a) (glk)' -6 (2.6.29) 
k= ga"i (2.6.30) 
where lower cases now denote aggregate variables in per-output terms: c= 
C1Y, g= G1Y and k= KlY. Equation (2.6.27) shows that the consump- 
tion to output ratio depends on g for two reasons. First, achange in g affects 
c through its effect on the long-run rate of growth -y in (2.6.28). Second, a 
change in g affects c through the production function in (2.6.30). 
Given this framework, the authors do not derive analytically the steady 
state effects of varying g in the finite horizon scenario. They first note that 
24 In the model, however, the only asset is physical capital. 
25 Equation (2.6.27) is obtained by setting ý=0. The definition of the long-run rate of 
growth in (2.6.28) is obtained from the equilibrium condition (2.6.26) in per-output terms. 
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an increase in g financed by a proportional income tax, will have the effect 
of crowding out both c and k, as disposable wealth will be reduced. The 
effect of increasing g on -y, however, becomes ambiguous as in the Barro 
model. Indeed, from equation (2.6.28), it can be noted that an increase 
in g generates two effects of opposite signs on -y: a negative direct effect 
and a positive indirect effect through the reduction in k and c. Then, the 
comparison between the infinite and the finite horizons scenario is pursued 
by using a numerical simulation of the model (2.6.27)-(2.6.30). They find 
the Barro rule to be satisfied both in finite and infinite lives scenarios, 
pointing out that the Barro rule is only determined by the production side 
of the economy, which is modelled as in Barro (1990) in their framework. In 
contrast with Barro (1990), instead, they depict the existence of the Barro 
curve in the finite horizons case even in the case of government expenditure 
financed by lump-sum taxes. 
The main result of this paper is the finding of a T,,,,,, independent of 
the probability of death parameter A. In other words, the optimal level of 
public investment provision is not found to be dependent of the consumption 
externality due to the uncertain lifetime hypothesis. 
2.7 Conclusions 
The conclusion reached by -XIourmouras and Lee (1999) will be questioned in 
Chapter 3, where I will develop a representative agent model with time pref- 
crences augmented by a probability of death A and endogCnous growth due 
to government investment. This model criticizes the approach followed by 
Mourmouras and Lee (1999), on the basis of the limitations of the Blanchard 
model. Indeed, according to Blanchard (1985) the main drawback of his way 
of modelling consumers' lifetime is that "it captures the finite horizons of 
life but not the change in behavior over time, the life-cycle aspect of life". 
Hence the framework of the perpetual youth overlapping generations model 
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"is well adapted to issues where the finite horizons aspect is important, such 
as debt or deficit but poorly adapted to issues where differences in propensity 
to consume across agents are potentially important". As Alourmouras and 
Lee (1999), 1 will refer to Blanchard (1985) on the consumption side of tile 
model. However, the optimal lifetime consumption plan will be determined 
within a standard representative agent model, tile only difference being a 
rate of time preference augmented by A. 
3. FISCAL POLICY, ENDOGENOUS GROWTH, AND FINITE 
HORIZONS 
3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter focuses on an endogenous growth model in which sustained 
long-run growth is due to investment in public capital, the government pro- 
vides lump-sum transfers, public consumption and investment subsidies, and 
consumers have uncertain lifetimes. The aim is to analyse the growth ef- 
fects of varying fiscal policy parameters in infinite as well as finite horizons 
scenarios, reducing some recent theoretical contributions on this branch of 
the literature to special cases of a more general framework. 
Barro (1990) predicts the existence of an optimal level of public invest- 
ment financed by a flat rate income tax'. Greiner (1999) provides an ex- 
tension by dividing productive government spending between investment in 
public capital and subsidies to private investment and including in his the- 
orctical framework lump-sum transfers to households and public consump- 
tion 2. His main findings arc such that the growth maximizing income tax 
rate -r ...... is monotonically increasing in the levels of public consumption, 
lump-sum transfers to households and subsidies to private investment. 
On the other hand, Mourmouras and Lee (1999) analysc the effects of 
1 On the other hand, with lump-sum taxes, the Iong-run rate of growth is monotonically 
increasing in government provision of infrastructure. 
2 This author, in contrast with Barro, also analyses the different effects of both varia- 
tions in income and consumption taxation under the alternative assumptions that labour 
is supplied either inclasticallY or elastically within an economy populated by an infinitely- 
lived representative agent. 
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productive government expenditure on growth - abstracting from any other 
type of government expenditure - combining Blanchard-type consumers 
with endogenous growth. Long-run growth is always found to be lower under 
the assumption of finite lives compared to the infinite horizons case, but the 
assumption of uncertain lifetime does not affect the Barro rule. Indeed, the 
Barro curve is obtained for both the finite and the infinite horizons cases 3, 
with the optimal level of government investment on infrastructure equating 
the share of public services in the aggregate production function in both 
cases. 
In this Chapter, I develop a Ramscy-type model with endogenous growth 
due to government spending in public capital. As Xfourmouras and Lee 0 
(1999), 1 refer to Blanchard (1985) to model consumers' lifetime horizons. 
However, the optimal lifetime consumption plan is determined as in a stan- 
dard representative agent model, the only difference being a rate of time 
preference augmented by a probability of death A. Such a device makes it 
possible to build a general framework collapsing to the infinite horizons sce- 
nario by simply setting to zero the parameter A. nrthermore, this allows to 
analytically derive the role of finite lives in affecting the optimal provision 
of government spending whereas, in Mourmouras and Lee (1999), A affects 
the long-run rate of growth but T,,,,,, is independent of A. 
For a null A, the model departs from Barro (1990) solely for the presence 
of fiscal policy parameters, others than government expenditure on infras- 
tructure. Namely, lump-sum transfers to households ýpj, public consumption 
W2 and investment subsidies OS. 
For a positive A, the model is populated by uncertain lifetime consumers 
& la Blanchard, departing from Xfourmouras and Lee (1999) for the fact 
that I explicitly take into account the effect of a positive A not only on the 
'3 In contrast with Barro, instead, they depict the existence of the Barro curve in the 
finite horizons case even in the case of government expenditure financed by lump-sum 
taxes. 
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long-run rate of growth, but also on the optimal income tax rate. Thus, the 
Barro rule is extended to the case of finite-lived consumers and it turns out 
to be dependent on the horizon index. I will refer to such an extension as a 
modified Barro rule: for A=0, the optimal provision of public investment 
equates the share of public capital in the aggregate production function. 
However, if consumers live finite lives, such an optimal level will be lowered 
by the consumption externality due to A. 
The assumption of uncertain lifetime consumers also affects the relation- 
ships relating other fiscal policy parameters to long-run economic growth 
and, as a consequence, their respective impacts on the optimal public in- 
vestment provision rule. 
As for the growth effects of other fiscal policy tools, the long-run rate 
of growth -y is lowered by either higher lump-sum transfers to households 
or public consumption, regardless of the value of A. However, increases in 
either (p, or W2 of the same amounts reduce -y less for A>0 than for A=0. 
On the other hand, the growth effect of increasing investment subsidies 
is ambiguous for any value of A. Under the assumption of finite lives, the 
growth maximizing level of 0S is negatively related to A: as the consumer 
life horizon increases, the optimal value of 0S is reached before. 
As for the relationships linking to other categories of public expen- 
diture, for 0<A<1, r ...... , is increasing in ýoj, (P2 and 0S. 
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. The model will 
be built in section 3.2, introducing the behavioral assumptions imposed 
upon households, firms and the government. The two differential equations 
describing the overall behavior of the economy will be derived, depicting the 
role played by the uncertain lifetime hypothesis in decelerating long-term 
economic growth. Section 3.3 is devoted to the analysis of fiscal policy in 
the model. The growth effects of fiscal policy tools are derived analytically, 
with particular attention paid to the definition of the modified Barro rule 
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and its relationships with other fiscal policy tools. Some conclusions will 
be drawn in section 3.4. Detailed tables showing the results of numerical 
solutions are reported in Appendix 3. A. All analytical results are derived 
and shown in detail in Appendix 3. B. 
3.2 The Model 
The economy is composed of consumers who maximize their lifetime utili- 
ties, profit-maximizing competitive firms and the government. Consumers 
supply labour inclastically and - for a positive A- can have their sav- 
ings insured by an insurance company. The aggregate production function 
shows diminishing returns to scale in private and public capital separately 
and constant returns to scale in the two forms of capital taken together. 
The government runs a balanced budget constraint, financing investment in 
infrastructure through a flat income tax rate, and providing public consump- 
tion, investment subsidies to firms and lump-sum transfers to households. 
3.2.1 Firms 
The production side of the economy is described by a Cobb-Douglas pro- 
duction function in private capital K and productive public services G. 
Following Barro (1990), the government purchases a share of private output 
and uses these purchases to provide free public services to tile private sector. 
These services are assumed to be non-rival and non-excludable. Since the 
use of G by a firm does not prevent other users from benefiting from them, 
it is the total amount of publicly provided services that matters for the firms 
and enters the production function. This assumption is useful to model a 
broad concept of public capital, which can be thought as the infrastructure 
network of a country. Under the assumption that all the services belonging 
to G are publicly provided with no user fees, G represents an unpaid input 
of production and, indeed, it plays the role of a positive externality in en- 
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hancing the marginal product of private capital4. Given these assumptions, 
the aggregate production function is- 
Y= Kl-'G' =K 
(G)'; 
0a< Tf- 
This production function shows diminishing returns to scale in G and K 
separately, and constant returns to scale in K and G taken to-ether: 0 
YK > 0; YKK <0 (3.2.2) 
An increase in G leads to an increase in the marginal product of private 
capital, which iMPliCS YKG > 0- 
Assuming competitive markets, the first order condition for the firms' 
profit maximization problem requires the real interest rate to equalize the 
physical marginal product of private capital. This condition is expressed by: 
G 
K) 
(3.2.3) 
From the definition of the production function (3.2.1) and the first order 
condition (3.2.3), the following condition is derived: 
rK=(l-a)Y<Y; O<a<l (3.2.4) 
Therefore, this model allows the output of the economy (Y) to be larger 
than the payments to the owners of private capital (rK). This circumstance 
is due to the additional income induced by public spending through the 
positive effect on the marginal product of private capital. 
The following conditions are introduced and they will be used later in 
order to obtain the dynamic expression describing the evolution in time of 
private capital: 
w+ rK + 7r = Kl-'G' (3.2.5) 
TP = wiT = vl7-K'-'G' (3.2.6) 
4 This concept of external economy due to G dates back to Meade (1952). 
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where w is labour income, 7r are profits. 
Condition (3.2.5) simply states that total income must equate total out- 
put of the economy, while (3.2.6) comes from the definition of government 
,,, 
as clarified below in section 3.2.3. lump-sum transfers to households T 
3.2.2 Consumers 
Households are assumed to have uncertain lifetimes according to the model 
by Blanchard (1985). Hence, we shall assume that they face a constant 
instantaneous probability of death A throughout their life. Their expected 
remaining life is 1/A and it is constant throughout their life. Agents are of 
different ages and have different levels of wealth, but they all have the same 
propensity to consume. This approach allows for flexibility: the expected 
life 1/A is interpreted as an horizon index that can be chosen anywhere 
between 1 and infinity to study the effects of the horizons of agents on the 
behavior of the economy. The limiting case of infinite horizons will occur 
by letting A go to zero since this implies that 1/A tends to infinity. It is 
assumed that there is no intcr-generational bequest motive which, together 
with the assumption of uncertain lifetime, implies - as we will see later 
a role for an insurance market. 
Each consumer does not consider any choice regarding the allocation of 
her time endowment between labour and leisure. In other words, labour 
is inclastically supplied and the consumer supplies a constant amount of 
labour. The expected lifetime utility of the individual i is given by: 
Ui =F InC'e-(P+A)tdt (3.2.7) 
The instantaneous utility function is assumed to have a logarithmic form. C, 
The rate of time preferences p is increased by the probability of death A. 
The higher the probability of death, the more heavily consumers discount the 
futurc5 and given the assumption that A is constant throughout consumers' 
5 Cass and Yaari (1967) provide a theoretical proof of the fact that the effect of the 
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S 
life, it is possible to assume a constant propensity to consume as well. This 
way of modelling the case of finite horizons can be regarded as an application 
of Blanchard (1985) to a standard Ramsey-type model with endogCnous 
growth. 
The Blanchard model has the merit of allowing for aggregation in OLGs CD 
models. On the other hand, it suffers from the drawback of abstracting from 
the life-cycle aspect of the individual consumption behavior. This limita- 
tion can be overcome by combining the Blanchard-type consumer with the 
standard representative agent model. Indeed, by doing so, no aggregation 
procedure is needed and the relationship between finite horizons and the evo- 
lution in time of consumption can be analytically determined by referring 
the analysis to the representative agent. 
The inter-temporal budget constraint faced by the consumer must take 
into consideration the role played in the economy by the government. For 
this reason, the consumer budget constraint proposed by Greiner (1999) - 
see (2.6.17) in section 2.6.2, page 44 - is modified in order to adapt it to 
our framework(: 
k= f[w+ (r+ A) K+7r] (1 - -r) +Tp- C) 
G 10S) 
(3.2.8) 
The rationale behind this budget constraint is that the insurance covers 
only asset wealth: the consumer receives (pays) AK for every period of her 
life from (to) the insurance company and the amount K is paid to (cancelled 
by) the insurance company when the consumer dies. By using the conditions 
(3.2.5) and (3.2.6) and solving the budget constraint for k1K we obtain: 
K= 
K-"G" 
1T (I ý01) +A 
(1 -r) C (3.2.9) 
K 1_0S 1-OS K (1 - Os) 
This expression generalizes the dynamic equation of private capital in 
probability to death is to raise the individual rate of time preference. 
r' Notice the analogy with the budget constraint used by Mourmouras and Lee (1999) 
shown in equation (2.6.22) (see subsection 2.6.3, page 48). 
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Greiner (1999), differing from the latter for the term that includes the pa- 
rameter A. We could then apply this expression to both cases of infinitely 
lived and uncertain lifetime consumers by simply imposing this parameter 
to equal to some value between 0 and 1. 
The existence of a unique solution to the households' optimization prob- 
lern is subject to the condition that K and G are bounded by the increas- 
ing function elt, where 0< -y < (p +A). Provided that such a condition 
holds, the Pontryagin's maximum principle can be used to derive an opti- 
mal solution to (3.2.7) subject to (3.2.8), to which is associated the following 
Hamiltonian7: 
H= In Ce-(A+P)t + ?P J[w + (r + A) K+ -rl (1 -, r) + Tp - C1 1_OS 
(3.2.10) 
and the following necessary optimality conditions: 
o9H 01 e-(A+P)i 
0 
(3.2.11) 
ac c 1-os 
aH (r+A)(1-T) (3.2.12) 
c? K (1-0s) 
aH 
=k =ý. 
11 
[w + (r + A) K+7. ] (1 - 7-) + Tp - C} =k (3.2.13) 00 1_OS 
The first order conditions (3.2.1l)-(3.2.13) are also sufficient if the fol- 
lowing transversality condition is satisfied: 
lim e-(P+A)tV)(K - K*) >0 (3.2.14) t Do 
Substituting (3.2.11) into (3.2.12), we obtain: 
(1 - Os) 
1 
e-(, \+P)t. 
(r + A) (1 7-) (3.2.15) 
c (1-0s) 
where: 
(ýC-('ý+P)t -+ p) e-(A+P)t (3.2.16) (1-0s) ý2 cIý 
' Where ip is the shadow price of capital. 
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Substituting (3.2.16) into (3.2.15), the Euler equation is derived: 
Ü=r (1 
- -r) -A 
(7- + Os) -p (1 - Os) (3.2.17) 
c (1-0s) 
Imposing 7- = Os =A=0, it is possible to obtain 
0= (r - p) C, 
which gives the Euler equation for the case of a CRRA instantaneous utility 
function with elasticity of substitution equal to 1, when no government issues 
are considered and consumers live infinite lives. 
We can now substitute the profit maximizing condition in the Euler 
equation in order to derive the equation of motion for consumption: 
0 A(T+OS)_p 
(3.2.18) 
C 1-OS K 1_OS 
where (3.2.18) states that consumption is decreasing over time in the sub- 
jective rate of discount as well as in the probability of death parameter. A 
higher value of the discount factor p will reduce consumption growth and 
this effect will be even stronger in the presence of a positive probability of 
death. The role played by A in decelerating consumption growth over time 
can also be seen from the expression for the dynamics of private capital 
(3.2.9) where such a parameter enters with a positive sign. 
3.2.3 Government 
Tile government collects taxes T from total income produced in the econ- 
omy and uses taxes to finance public consumption Cp, lump-sum transfers 
to households Tp, investment in public capital G and investment subsidies to 
firms Osk. No public debt issues arc considered in the model and the gov- 
ernment budget constraint is the same as in Greiner (1999) - see equation 
(2.6.16) in subsection 2.6.2, page 44. 
Recalling the definition of the production function in (3.2.1) and assum- 
ing that the government uses shares (pl and V2 of tax revenue for lump-sum 
i 
transfers to households and public consumption respectively (with (p, and 
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V2 defined between 0 and 1; Wl + (P2 < 1), the budget constraint is written 
as follows: 
+ (ýPl + (P2) -rK'-"G' + Osk (3.2.19) 
Substituting k from the consumer budget constraint, we derive the dy- 
namic equation of public capital: 
d= 
Kl-'G"-' 7- (1 - Wl - ýP2) - 
OS 
(1 
- T(l - Vj)] G 1-OS 
OS AK (1 - 7-) C] (3.2.20) 7-- 0, 
ýGG 
This equation differs from the one in Greiner (1999) for the term Osl(l - 
05)-AK(1-7-)IG, which is equal to zero for a null A. Thus, as for the dynamic 
equations of consumption and private capital, we have an expression capable 
of treating the infinite horizon scenario as a limiting case. 
3.2.4 The economy 
The economy is described by the system of the differential equations (3.2.9), 
(3.2.18) and (3.2.20). NVe express public capital and private consumption in 
terms of private capital and define +Ix = dIG - 
k1K; 61c = IýIC - 
k1K. 
By doing so, the system (3.2.9)-(3.2.18)-(3.2.20) is reduced t08 : 
xel-1 T (1 - (Pl - V2) - 
OS 
[l - 7- (1 - (P1)1 1-OS 
s (3.2.2 1) 
i-os x 1-OS i-os 
(1 
-7-) A(l+ 
OS) 
xa 
1- -r (1 - Vi) c (1 - a) -+- 1-OS 1-OS Pl - 1-OS 1-OS 
(3.2.22) 
Proposition 1: There exists a Balanced Growth Path (BGP) with endoge- 
nous growth for the economy described by (3.2.2l)-(3.2.22) and such a BGP 
is unique. 
" It has to be noted that the two variables x and c are defined as x, and X2 in the 
i 
ntagami et al. model (see section 2.6.1, page 32). 
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Proof 1: see Appendix 3. B. 1, page 92 
The system (3.2.2l)-(3.2.22) will have a steady state solution which will cor- 
respond to the balanced growth path (BGP) of the original system (3.2.9)- 
(3.2.18)-(3.2.20). In such a steady state the variables in the model will grow 
at the same rate and the long-run growth rate of the economy will be given 
by: 
C= (1 - 7-) (1 - a) 
(G)' A (-r + OS) 
-P (3.2.23) C 1-OS K 1-OS 
Hence, the long-run rate of growth is decreasing both in the rate of time 
preferences p and in the probability of death parameter A. Thus, we are able 
to capture the decelerating effect on economic growth caused by A. From 
(3.2.23) it is clear that: 
(3.2.24) 
Consumers with infinite lives are willing to postpone consumption in the 
future and to increase current saving. This behavior leads to a higher long- 
run growth rate. An increase in A, ceteris paribus, is always associated with 
a lower long-run rate of growth of the economy. 
The system (3.2.2l)-(3.2.22) is similar to the one in Greiner (1999), who 
in turn refers to the model by Futagami et al. (1993). The system that 0 
we have produced departs from Greiner (1999) due to the inclusion of the 
probability of death and then it can be easily reduced to that form in order 
to make our results comparable with his conclusions. Moreover, our system 
collapses to that used by Futagami et al. (1993) when Os = ýpj = W2 =A= 
0. 
The economy in Fýitagami et al. (1993) is characterized by saddle-path 0 
stability but it is assumed that tax revenues are used for public investment 
only. On the other hand, Greiner (1999) proves that the model is both locally 
and globally determinate, arguing that: "With inelastic labour supply there 
exists at most one BGP with endogcnous growth and the Jacobian matrix 
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of the system has one positive and one negative real root, i. e., the rest 
point of the system is the saddle path". This implies that there exists a 
unique value for the initial level of consumption, which can be chosen freely 
by the household, such that the economy converges to the stable BGP in 
the long-run. 
Proposition 2: The Jacobian matrix of the system (3.2.2l)-(3.2.22) has one 
positive and one negative real root, which implies that the unique BGP is 
saddle path. 
Proof 2: see Appendix 3. B. 2, page 93 
The numerical solution of the system allows to compare the steady state 
solutions across alternative life horizons scenarios. The numerical values of 
all the parameters involved in the analysis have been chosen to make the 
results as much as possible comparable with the ones obtained in previous 
studies. The initial values used for (pl and V2 are 0.35 and 0.40 respectively. 
Greiner (1999) uses 0.30 and so we choose to adopt this valuc9. With regard 
to the rate of time preferences p, the range of the values commonly used 
is between 0.01 and 0.04, which implies that the consumer is assumed to 
use an annual discount rate varying between 1% and 4%. Following Greiner 
(1999) and recalling that the model is concerned with the behavior of the 
economy in the long-run, we assume that one time period includes a spell 
of five years and we set the annual discount rate at 0.04, which will imply 
imposing p=0.2. Finally, the income tax rate and the investment subsidies 
parameters are initially set at 0.15 and 0.10 respectively. 
By imposing 61c = i1x = 0, and solving for x and c, we find the steady 
state solutions of the two variables. When the analysis is carried out in the 
finite horizons case, one would expect the steady state solutions to change. 
9 The value of the public capital share a usually used in the literature is around 0.30. 
Barro (1990) assumes a=0.25. 
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This is due to the fact that the steady state values for x and c are affected 
by the probability of death: the higher the probability of death, the higher 
they will be. Since for a higher probability of death, households have a 
disincentive to postpone consumption in the future, the steady state level 
of consumption to private capital ratio is increasing in A. The steady state 
solution for x provides the value of the ratio GIK at which consumption is 
constant over time. As the probability of death increases, x will increase, 
since a larger amount of government spending is required in order to pro- 
mote economic growth, thus compensating for the negative effect on growth 
caused by the higher level of current consumption. 
The solution of the model for A=0 is (x = 0.0711, c=0.3191). When 
the probability of death is set at 0.03 the new steady state solution is given 
by x=0.0759 and c=0.3549; when A=0.06, we find x=0.0808 and 
c=0.3906. The balanced growth rate is -y = 0.01983 in the infinite horizons 
0.018 
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Figure 3.2.1: The Relationship between -y and A 
case, -y = 0.01934 for A=0.03, and -f = 0.01883 when A=0.06. Thus, the 
balanced growth rate is lower under the uncertain lifetime assumption and 
is decreasing in the probability of death parameter. 
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The role played by A is to increase the propensity to consume: the higher 
the probability of death, the higher the willingness of consuming today, and 
this circumstance negatively affects the long-run rate of growth. In the 
general case 0<A<1, -y is linked to A by the linear relationship shown in 
Figure 3.2.1. 
3.3 Fiscal Policy 
Given the theoretical framework provided above, it is possible to analyse the 
growth effects of changes in fiscal parameters, depicting the role played by 
the uncertain lifetime hypothesis. The following subsections 3.3.1-3.3.3 deal 
with the relationships between fiscal policy tools and long-term economic 
growth. In particular, the growth hampering effect of a rise in either pub- 
lic consumption or lump-sum transfers is described in subsection 3.3.1. In 
subsection 3.3.2, it is derived the growth maximizing income tax rate and 
how its value is influenced by the presence of public consumption and trans- 
fers to households. Finally, subsection 3.3.3 focuses on the ambiguous effect 
of investment subsidies on growth and their relationship with the growth 
maximizing income tax rate. 
3.3.1 Public consumption and lump-sum transfers 
The share of government expenditure devoted to public consumption has 
been modelled with the parameter V2- Starting with the infinite horizons 
case, an increase in public consumption implies that more resources will 
be devoted to unproductive purposes as opposed to public investment and 
private investment subsidies. As a direct consequence, productive public 
expenditure will decrease, which in turn will negatively affect growth. The 
expected effect of an increase in the parameter V2 is hence a decline in the 
balanced growth rate -y. Such a decelerating effect on long-term economic 
growth will be reflected by a smaller steady state value of x= GIK, as 
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shown in equation (3.2.23). 
Given a positive probability of death, let us consider the consequences 
of increasing public consumption. The key feature to be taken into account 
is that, compared to the infinite horizons scenario and other things being 
equal, the economy will always grow at a lower rate in the Iong-run. An 
increase in (P2, is still expected to impact negatively long-term economic 
growth, but will such an impact be more or less effective than in the infinite 
horizons scenario? 
Proposition 3: The long-run rate of growth of the economy -y is decreasing 
in public consumption W2. Increases in (P2 of the same amount reduce -y less 
for A>0 than for A=0: 
a-y- 
< aýP2 
(3.3.2) 72 
C%P2 
9 y< -y 
Proof 3: see Appendix 3.13.3, page 95 
Hence, the decrease in the long-run rate of growth caused by an increase in 
V2 will be lower when A>0. 
After increasing ý02 from 0.40 to 0.45, the balanced growth rate is lowered 
as expected in the three scenarios considered (A = 0, A=0.03 and A= 
0.06, see Table 3.3.1). A higher share devoted to public consumption causes 
a decline in the share of government expenditure devoted to productive 
purposes and, as a consequence, economic growth is negatively affected. The 
peculiar property of the finite horizons case is the following: given the same 
increase in W2, the negative effect on growth is smaller than in the infinite 
horizons case. The decline in -y is denoted with -yj in Table 3.3.1. Starting 
from the initial steady state, after an increase in public consumption the 
growth rate decreases less in the finite horizon case than in the infinite one. 
11 
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Increasing transfers to households (a higher value for the parameter ý01) 
will lead to two opposite effects. On one side, a smaller share of total 
government expenditure will be devoted to productive uses, implying a re- 
duction in the balanced growth rate. On the other hand, an income effect 
will take place, making consumers richer than before. However, provided 
that transfers are lump-sum, they will not affect decisions concerning the 
allocation of private resources between consumption and savings. Thus, the 
only expected effect will be the first one and a lower long-run growth rate is 
predictable. This is also true in the presence of a positive A, but once again 
the question of interest is whether or not an increase in households transfers 
will affect economic growth in the same way. 
Table 3.3.1: An increase in public consumption 
A=0 A= 0.03 A=0.06 
(P2 = 0.40 V2 = 0.45 (P2 = 0.40 (P2 = 0.45 (P2 = 0.40 V2 = 0.45 
x 0.0711 0.0576 0.0759 0.0620 0.0808 0.0665 
c 0.3191 0.3106 0.3583 0.3465 0.3941 0.3824 
-y 0.01983 0.01617 0.01934 0.01575 0.01883 0.01531 
-fl -0.00366 -0.00359 -0.00352 
V, = 0.35, a = 0.3, p=0.2,7- = 0.15,0 = 0.1 
Proposition 4: The long-run rate of growth of the economy -Y is decreasing 
in lump-sum transfers ýpj. Increases in W1 of the same amount reduce -y less 
for A>0 than for A=0: 
a-Y 
<0 (3.3.3) 
aýoj 
D-Y 
< (3.3.4) 
09ý01 aýoj (A=O) 
L, 
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Proof 4: see Appendix 3. B. 3, page 95 
Table 3.3.2 refers to a fiscal policy experiment similar to the one de- 
scribed above, the only difference being the increase in (pl instead Of V2- 
Thus, the objective of the analysis is to describe the impact of increas- 
ing lump-sum transfers to households on long-term economic growth, other 
things being equal. Letting ýpi varying from 0.35 to 0.40, the long-run rate of 
growth is lowered both when A=0 and for a positive probability of death, 
the latter case being characterized by a smaller reduction in -y (see -yi in 
Table 3.3.2). 
Table 3.3.2: An increase in lump-sum transfers 
A=0A=0.03 A=0.06 
ýoj = 0.35 ýoj = 0.40 W1 = 0.35 (pl = 0.40 (pl = 0.35 vi = 0.40 
x 0.0711 0.0576 0.0759 0.0620 0.0808 0.0665 
c 0.3191 0.3138 0.3549 0.3498 0.3906 0.3857 
ly 0.01983 0.01617 0.01934 0.01575 0.01883 0.01531 
-ti -0.00366 -0.00359 -0.00352 
W2 = 0.40, a=0.3, p=0.2,7- = 0.15,0 = 0.1 
Hence, increases in lump-transfers and public consumption are both less 
effective in lowering the long-run rate of growth of the economy under the as- 
sumption of uncertain lifetime than in the infinite horizon scenario. INIC note 
that the only distinguishing feature is that when the government switches 
resources from public consumption to lump-sum transfers, the steady state 
value of c becomes higher. 
Figure 3.3.1 illustrates the relationship between -y and Wi (i = 1,2), 
in a more general case. Indeed, the picture is obtained by letting vary (Pi 
between 0 and 0.60, holding fixed the share devoted to the other category of 
unproductive government expenditure. In both cases, the three top curves 
j 
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Figure 3.3.1: The relationship between -y and Vi 
(starting with the highest one) refer to values for A of 0,0.03, and 0.06 
respectively. The lowest and flattest curve represents the limiting case of 
A=0.410. As pointed out in propositions 3 and 4, an increase in either ý01 
or ýP2 leads to smaller and smaller reductions in the balanced growth rate, 
as the probability of death parameter is set to a higher value. 
3.3.2 Public investment 
Increasing the income tax rate -r yields two effects operating in opposite 
directions. In the infinite horizons case, given an increase in -r, the first effect 
to be taken into consideration is the higher taxation on returns on capital, 
which implies a disincentive to save and, as a consequence, a reduction in 
private investment with the effect of lowering long-term economic growth. 
However, an opposite effect will take place: for a given level of income, 
a higher income tax rate implies higher tax revenues which in turn leads 
to higher investment in public capital and accelerates economic growth. 
Thus, the net effect of an increase inr might be either positive or negative, 
10 Both maximum values of vi and A have been chosen to satisfy the condition 0< -y < 
(p + A). 
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depending on whether the second effect offsets the first one. The well-known 
Barro rule states that the optimal provision of public investment implies that 
a unit increase in government spending implies a unit increase in output. 
With a Cobb-Douglas production function, this means that the optimal 
government spending is equal to its share in the production function. 
In section 2.6.2, we have studied that the extension of the Barro rule 
provided by Greiner (1999) - see equation (2.6.19) - implies that higher 
levels of unproductive public spending and/or generous investment subsi- 
dies, will force the government to increase productive investment in order 
to compensate for the negative effect on the Iong-run rate of growth. 
The model presented in the previous section assumes the same fiscal pol- 
icy tools proposed by Greiner (1999), generalizing his framework to include 
the case of finite horizons. Hence, the question of how the optimal level of -T 
might be affected by the uncertain lifetime hypothesis arises. Alourmouras 
and Lee (1999) find -T ...... to be independent of the probability of death pa- 
rameter. In other words, the optimal level of public investment provision 
does not depend on the consumption externality due to the uncertain life- 
time hypothesis. They find the Barro rule to be satisfied both in finite and 
infinite lives scenarios, pointing out that this rule is only determined by the 
production side of the economy, which they model as in Barro (1990). On 
the other hand, we expect that the new growth maximizing level of -r will 
be affected by the different effect on the disincentive to save caused by the 
higher taxation on returns on capital. Indeed, once the probability of death 
is introduced in the model, the growth-maximizing income tax rate becomes: 
ax' (a - 1) (x + Os) Tmaxl(. \>O) ý Xý+j (Ce _ 1) _ AX + AC, (X + OS) 
(3.3.5) 
Proposition 5: There exists a growth maximizing income tax rate Tmax both 
in the infinite and the finite horizons scenarios, the first one being higher 
than the latter one: 
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'r? naxl(, \>o) < 7maxl(, \=o) 
(3.3.6) 
Proof 5: see Appendix 3. B. 3, page 96 
Hence, the growth maximizing level of the income tax will be reached before 
if consumers have uncertain lifetime than in the infinite horizons case. In 
contrast with 'XIourmouras and Lee (1999), optimal public investment turns 
out to be dependent on the horizon index. Such a relationship is depicted 
in (3.3.5), but it can be easily seen by directly compare our set up with the 
model provided by Barro (1990). This can be done by simply deleting Os in 
(3.3.5). By doing so, a modified Barro rule is obtained: 
x'a (3.3.7) 
xcl +A 
For A=0, (3.3.7) is equivalent to (2.5.13) - see subsection 2.5.1, page 
24 - and gives the Barro rule: the optimal provision of public investment 
is given by the share of public capital in the aggregate production function. 00 
However, if consumers live finite lives, such an optimal level will be lowered 
by the consumption externality due to A. 
In order to simulate an increase in public investment in infrastructure 
services, we lot vary the income tax rate parameter T between 0.15 and 0.50. 
The main interest of this experiment is to analyse the differences that emerge 
by assuming alternative values of A. Namely, we want to test the existence of 
the Barro curve. This result is non trivial for two reasons. First, the model 
includes additional categories of expenditures with respect to Alourmouras 
and Lee (1999). Second and more importantly, the consumption externality 
due to the finite lives assumption is likely to affect the determination of 
Holding fixed the values of all other parameters at their respective 
starting levels, the model is solved for values of -r varying from 0.15 to 0.50 
(see Table 3.3.3). 
I 
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Starting from the infinitely lived consumers case, -t increases for higher 
values of -r up to a point, after which it starts falling. The balanced growth 
rate reaches its maximum value for -r = 0.383. Thus, this is the optimal 
value of the income tax rate. A similar behavior can be depicted under the 
uncertain lifetime hypothesis. For increasing values of the income tax rate, 
the balanced growth rate increases up to a point and then it goes down: the 
relationship between -y and -r takes the form of a hump-shaped curve in the 
finite horizons case. 
Table 3.3.3: An increase in public investment 
A=0A=0.03 A=0.06 
T 0.15 0.383 0.50 0.15 0.359 0.50 0.15 0.335 0.50 
x 0.071 0.360 0.667 0.0760 0.328 0.691 0.081 0.298 0.716 
c 0.319 0.414 0.468 0.355 0.441 0.504 0.391 0.468 0.54 
'Y 0.0198 0.0306 0.0289 0.0193 0.0283 0.0256 0.188 0.0261 0.224 
V, = 0.35, (P2 = 0.40, a=0.3, p=0.2,0 = 0.1 
In Figure 3.3.2, the values of -y are plotted against the values taken by 
7- when A=0, A=0.03 and A=0.06. The highest curve refers to the 
infinite horizon case, the lowest one to a probability of death equal to 0.06. 
As argued above, the finite horizon case is always characterized by a lower 
balanced growth rate and this implies a Barro curve closer to the x-axis. 
For each given value of -r, -y is decreasing in A for the role played by the 
probability of death in reducing economic growth. Hence, the higher A, 
the lower the Barro curve. This result is in contrast with Xfourmouras and 
Lee (1999), who find the optimal role for public investment provision to be 
independent of A, due to the fact that the Barro rule only arises from the 
production side of the economy. The present framework, instead, captures 
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the consumption externality effect of A, explicitly accounting for its impact 
on optimal fiscal policy. 
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Figure 3.3.2: Barro Curve, Finite and Infinite Horizons 
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Figure 3.3.3: The relationship between T,,,... and A 
Indeed, as shown in Table 3.3.3, when the probability of death is fixed 
at 0.03 the growth maximizing income tax rate is lower with respect to 
the case of A=0 and it is even lower for A=0.06. In the first case, the 
maximum value of -y (0.02830) is achieved when = 0.359, while the 
growth maximizing income tax rate becomes 0.335 when A is set at 0.06 
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(with -y = 0.02614). 
This is coherent with the result summarized in proposition 5. The neg- 
ative relationship between A and is shown in Figure 3.3.3 for the more 
general case 0<A<1. 
Public investment with higher public consumption or higher lump-sum 
transfers 
Under the hypothesis of uncertain lifetime consumers, the relationships link- 
ing such an optimal rule for public investment to other fiscal policy tools 
will be also affected. As for unproductive public expenditure our results are 
summarized in proposition 6. 
Proposition 6: For 0<A<1, the growth maximizing income tax rate -rma, 
is increasing in both public consumption W2 and lump-sum transfers to house- 
holds W1. 
aTmax (3.3.8) 
C)vi 
1(0<, 
\<1) 
Proof 6: see Appendix 3. B. 3, page 96 
Hence, regardless of the value of A, in the presence of higher unproductive 
public expenditures, the need for a higher provision of public investment 
turns out to be always necessary. 
When the government provides the economy with higher shares of either 
transfers to households or public consumption, it will also need to increase 
public investment in order to offset the growth hampering effect caused by 
the higher unproductive use of its resources. 
In order to consider this fact, ive solve the model assuming that the 
government devotes a share W2 = 0.45 to public consumption, comparing 
the outcome with the original scenario in Which W2 was set at 0.40 (Table 
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3.3.3). The expected outcome will be a higher optimal income tax rate 
and the results of this experiment are shown in Table 3.3.4. In the infinite 
horizons case T,,,,,, is 0.394, which confirms our expectation. For values 
of the probability of death equal to 0.03 and 0.06, the same behavior is 
observed: increases to 0.368 and 0.342 respectively. 
Table 3.3.4: An increase in public investment with higher public consumption 
A=0A=0.03 A=0.06 
T 0.15 0.394 0.50 0.15 0.368 0.50 0.15 0.342 0.50 
x 0.058 0.317 0.562 0.062 0.289 0.584 0.066 0.257 0.608 
c 0.314 0.419 0.474 0.350 0., 145 0.511 0.386 0.468 0.547 
-y 0.016 0.0270 0.025 0.016 0.024 0.022 0.015 0.022 0.019 
Vi = 0.35, V2 = 0.45, a=0.3, p=0.2,0 = 0.1 
Figure 3.3.4: The relationship between -r: ..... , and 
An increase of the same amount either in ýP2 or in ýoj will have an identical 
impact on the balanced growth rate. As a consequence, after an increase of 
either V2 or V1, will be affected in the same way. For this reason, the 
results of an increase in (pl are not shown. 
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Figure 3.3.4 shows the increasing relationship between unproductive uses 
of government resources and the optimal income tax rate. 
3.3.3 Investment subsidies 
The last fiscal policy tool to be considered are investment subsidies, repre- 
sented by the parameter OS. As for the two categories of unproductive public 
spending, let us consider the growth effect of varying Os and the relationship 
linking this parameter to -r.,,. 
It is evident from the F. O. C. (3.2.11) that a change in Os affects con- 
sumers' marginal utility: higher investment subsidies lead to a reduction in 
the marginal utility for each given level of consumption. 'XIoreover, from the 
consumer budget constraint it turns out that an increase in the parameter 
0S causes private investment to be cheaper. These two effects combined 
together will shift resources from consumption to investment in the pri- 
vate sector by increasing the opportunity cost of consumption. Thus, one 
will expect that the rate of growth of the economy will increase after the 
government's decision to provide the private sector with higher investment 
subsidies. 
On the public side of the economy, however, devoting more resources 
to investment subsidies implies a depletion of resources from investment in 
public capital and thus a lower long-run rate of growth. As a consequence, 
the net effect resulting from the combination of the two effects in the private 
and in the public sectors is ambiguous. However, Greiner (1999) claims that 
there exists a growth-maximizing value for investment subsidies and that 
if it is in the interior (0,1) it will be determined by the elasticity of x 
with respect to OS on the balanced growth rate (see equation (2.6.18), page 
45). The analysis provided by Greiner (1999) refers to the infinitely lived 
representative consumer case; what if we impose a positive probability of 
death? After the decision of the government to increase 05, the two opposite 
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effects described above will occur again. On the public side of the economy, 
the decline in the share of public spending devoted to productive use will 
be the same as in the infinite lives scenario. On the other hand, we expect 
that the growth enhancing effect due to the decline in the marginal utility 
for each level of consumption will be larger than in the former case because 
of the presence of the probability of death. Hence, the growth maximizing 
level of 0S will have a smaller value: it should be reached earlier than in the 
infinite horizons case. 
Proposition 7: There exists a growth maximizing value for investment sub- 
sidies, and such a value is decreasing in the probability of death parameter 
A: 
a'y 
when 
ax OS > (: ý) - 
OS (3.3.9) 
a0s a0s Xa (1 - Os) 
C9-Y > (: 5)0 when 
OX OS 
> (! 0 - 
OS 
+A 
(i + T) (3.3.10) ýOs 
I 
(A>O) a0s X Ce 
(1 
- OS) (I _ OS)2 
Proof 7: see Appendix 3. B. 3, page 99 
The existence of a growth maximizing value of investment subsidies 
stated in proposition 7 is assessed by the simulation, whose results are sum- 
marized in Table 3.3.511. The optimal value of OS in the infinite horizon case 
is found to be 0.113. A slightly lower 0,,,,,, (0.012) is obtained by re-running 
the experiment for a value of A equal to 0.03. By setting a probability of 
death at 0.06,0,,,, becomes 0.104. 
The impact of public investment with higher investment subsidies 
As for the impact of higher investment subsidies on the growth maximizing 
income tax rate, in analog with public consumption and lump-sum transfers oy 
to households, our result is summarized in the following proposition. 
" For this simulation, for comparability purposes it has been chosen the same value of 
the income tax rate (0.425) used by Greiner (1999). 
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Table 3.3.5: Growth maximizing level of investment subsidies 
(A = 0) 0.07 0.4995 0.4469 0.03029 
0.113 0.4339 0.4281 0.03041 
0.15 0.3705 0.4085 0.03031 
(A = 0.03) 0.07 0.5115 0.4808 0.02759 
0.112 0.4520 0.4644 0.02767 
0.15 0.3944 0.4475 0.02752 
(A = 0.06) 0.07 0.5236 0.5148 0.02490 
0.104 0.4838 0.5044 0.02494 
0.15 0.4196 0.4866 0.02487 
V, = 0.35, V2 = 0.40, a=0.3, -r = 0.425 
Proposition 8: For 0<A<1, the growth maximizing income tax rate Tinax 
is increasing in investment subsidies. 
OTmax 
>0 (3.3.11) aOSl(O<A<I) 
Proof 8: see Appendix 3. B. 3, page 99 
Table 3.3.6 reports the results of an increase in OS from its starting 
value of 0.10 to 0.12, when A is set to 0,0.03 and 0.06 respectively. As 
stated before, increasing investment subsidies leads to the need for a higher 
optimal provision of investment in infrastructure. Such an impact on T,,,,, 
is evident by comparing the results in Table 3.3.6 with the ones reported in 
Table 3.3.3: in the infinite horizons scenario, -r ..... , increases 
from 0.383 to 
0.399; for A=0.03, increases from 0.359 to 0.374; when A=0.06, T"', ý' 
increases from 0.335 to 0.35. 
In the more general case of OS ranging from 0 to 0.15, such an increasing 
relationship between and OS is shownin Figure 3.3.5. 
's 
3. Fiscal Policy, Endogenous Growth, and Finite Horizons 79 
Table 3.3.6: An increase in public investment with higher investment subsidies 
A=0A=0.03 A=0.06 
0.15 0.399 0.50 0.15 0.374 0.50 0.15 0.35 0.50 
x 0.0592 0.362 0.626 0.0648 0.330 0.655 0.070 0.302 0.685 
c 0.308 0.412 0.458 0.345 0.438 0.496 0.382 0.465 0.533 
-y 0.018 0.030 0.029 0.018 0.028 0.026 0.017 0.026 0.022 
Wl = 0.35, (P2 = 0.40, a = 0.3, p = 0.2,0 = 0.12 
Figure 3.3.5: The relationship between -r,,, and OS 
3.4 Conclusions 
This Chapter was aimed at studying the growth effects of fiscal policy in a 
Barro-type endogenous growth model with finite horizons. The model pro- 
vides a flexible framework capable of studying the growth effects of fiscal 
policy both in infinite and finite horizons scenarios and reducing to limit- 
ing cases some recent Barro-type models. The optimal lifetime consumption 
plan has been determined within a standard representative agent model, the 
only difference being a rate of time preference augmented by a positive prob- 
ability of death parameter. The government was assumed to run a balanced 
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budget constraint, equating total expenditures to total revenues collected 
by levying a flat-rate income tax. I have distinguished between productive 
and unproductive categories of government expenditures. Productive public 
spending includes investment -in public capital and private investment sub- 
sidies. On the other hand, public consumption and lump-sum transfers to 
households were assumed to be unproductive. 
Comparing the two alternative scenarios of finite and infinite horizons, I 
have obtained results on (i) the growth effects of each category of government 
expenditures on long-run economic growth, and (ii) the relationships relating 
the Barro rule to the other categories of government expenditure. 
Regarding the first set of conclusions, both categories of unproductive 
government spending are shown to have a decelerating effect on long-run 
growth. This result is in line with the existing literature and verified re- 
gardless of the assumption of uncertain lifetime. However, a rise of either 
lump-sum transfers to households or public consumption reduces the long- 
run rate of growth less in the finite than in the infinite horizon scenario. 
On the other hand, the growth effects of the two categories of productive 
expenditures are ambiguous, and for both I have derived a growth maxi- 
mizing value. As for public investment, the Barro rule still holds in the 
infinite horizon scenario but, in contrast with the existing literature, is neg- 
atively linked to the probability of death parameter. This implies that the 
growth maximizing level of public investment is lower under the assumption 
of uncertain lifetime. Similarly, the growth maximizing level of private in- 
vestment subsidies is reached earlier in the finite than in the infinite horizons 
scenario. 
Relative to the second set of conclusions, the effects of public consump- 
tion, lump-sum transfers to households and investment subsidies on the 
optimal provision of public investment arc similar. Indeed, it is shown that 
the growth maximizing level of public investment tends to increase in the 
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presence of higher levels of other categories of expenditures. This result 
takes place regardless of the assumption on uncertain lifetime. 
The model is based on some restrictive hypothesis and, as a consequence, 
can be extended along a number of directions. For instance, the assumption 
of no labour-leisure choice could be relaxed in favor of the assumption of 
endogenous labour supply, providing an extension on the consumption side. 
Moreover, it is assumed the absence of public debt and it is solely considered 
the case of proportional income taxation. Hence, a further extension of the 
model could cover the analysis of alternative mixes of different categories 
of expenditures and different structures of taxation - distortionary and 
non-distortionary - and/or alternative sources of financing - dcficit or 
taxation. 
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3. A Fiscal Policy Experiment 
0.5 
0.45 
04 
Figure 3. A. 1: Steady State solution (A = 0) 
Figure 3. A. 2: Steady State solution (A = 0.03) 
04 
Fiýqurc 3. A. 3: Steady State solution (A = 0.06) 
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3. B Mathematical Appendix 
3. B. 1 Uniquencss 
Proof of proposition I There exists a BGP with endogenous growth for 
the economy described by (3.2.21) - (3.2.22) and such a BGP is unique. 
In order to prove proposition 1, we first set 6=0, 
cxa 
A (1 + Os) 
_ cxa 
11 - -r (1 - V01 C2 
c CP + T1- =0 OS) (1-0s) (1-0s) (1-0s) OS) 
(3.13.1) 
Solving (3.13.1) for c and substituting the result in (3.2.21) - see page 61 
- yields 
F (x, -) = X' 7(1 - ýPl - W2) - 
Os (1 - -r) (1 - a) 
(1-0s) 
I 
- xa+, 
(1 - -0 (1 - a) + (x + OS) +A(, r 
+ Os) (3.13.2) 
(1-0s) 
[P 
(1-0s) 
I 
A solution to F (x, 0 gives a BGP for the economy. For x=0 we have 
F (0, -) >0 
F (0, Os 
A (-r + OS) 
+>0 (3.13.3) 
I 
(1-0s) P] 
We now calculate the sign of r9F (x, -) lax: 
aF (x, -) = axct-1 T(1-W1 -V2)- 
Os (1 - 7-) (1 - a) 
Ox (1-0s) 
- (a+l)x' 
(1 -T) (1 - a) +\ 
(T + OS) 
+P (3.13.4) 
(1-0s) (1 - OF 
where 
0 
,, 
(1 - a) (1 - -T) A (-r + Os) 
C (1-0s) (1-0s) 
Thus, by substituting this result into (3.13.4): 
aF (x, -) = axa-1 
ý7(1 
- V1 - WA - 
Os (1 - -r) (1 - a) 
ax (1-0s) 
ax, 
(1 -, r) (1 a) (3.13.5) 
(1-0s) 
Rom 
6 Os [1 -T (1 - ViA AOs (1 - -r) COS 'Y =5=XT (1 - V1 - VA - (1-0s) x (1 - OS) 
+x 
(1 
- OS) 
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It follows that 
ax'-"T (1 - ý01 - W2) ý Ct 'Y + Xct-1 
0 [1 - -F (I - (POI + 
AOS (1 - -r) COS 
(1-0s) X (I - OS) X (I - OS) 
I 
Thus, by substituting this expression in (3.13.5), we obtain 
aF (x, -) -1 
OS [1 - -r (1 - W01 (1 -, r) (1 - a) 
OX 
(a - 1) -y + ax' (I-OS)- - ax' (1-0s) 
aAOs (I - -r) acOS 1 Os (1 - -r) (1 - a) +X (1 - OS) X (1 - OS) 
- axa- (1-0s) 
ý'A3.13.6) 
From (3. B. 1), it follows that 
acos QOSA (1 + OS) apOS -1 
OS 
.x (1 - OS) x (1 - OS) x. 
axc' (1-0s) 
((I - -r) (1 - a) - [1 - -r (1 - ýpjffl (3.13.7) 
Inserting this result in (3.13.6) yields 
OF (x, -) (1 - -F) (1 - a) 
ax = 
(a - 1) -Y - ax" (1-0s) 
+ aOsA 
(I - -T) aOsA (1 + Os) apos (3.13.8) 
x (1 - OS) x (1 - OS) x 
Using again the definition of -y = ((ýIC) leads to 
aF (x, -) -f- ap+ 
aA (T + Os) S (3. B. 9) 
ax (1 - OS) 
1 (1 + 
From (3.13.9) it follows that OF (x, -) lax <0 always holds on the BCP and, 
as a consequence, F (x, -) can not cross the horizontal axis from below. Since 
F (0, -) >0 and F (x, -) is a continuous function the BCP is unique. 
3.13.2 Stability 
Proof of proposition 2 The Jacobian matrix of the system (3.2.21) - 
(3.2.22) has one positive and one negative real root, which implies that the 
unique BGP is a saddle path. 
In order to prove proposition 2 we need to evaluate the partial derivatives 
of (3.2.2l)-(3.2.22) at the steady state. 
0. ý 
= axc'-' 
ýT(l 
- (P1 - W2) - 
OS [1 - -T (l - Vi)] 
(1-0s) 
I 
- (a+l)x' 
[1 
- -T 
(1 
- W01 cA (1 -r) +-- (3.13.10) (1-0s) (1-0s) (1-0s) 
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Setting --ý =0 implies that 
c a-1 7 Wl - ýP2) - 
Os [l - -r (1 - 
(1-0s) (1-0s) 
+- -r (1 - VJ)] ý COS 
(1-0s) x (1 - OS5 
+A 
(1 - -r) (1 + Os) 
(1-0s) 
By substituting this result in (3. B. 10), we obtain 
&h 
= (a - 1) X'-l 
ý7'(l 
- (Pl - V2) - 
OS [l - 7- 
(1 
- ýpl)] 
ä-x (1-OS) 
-T 
(1 - VJ)] COS AOS (1 - 7-) (3. B. 12) 
(1-OS) x (1 - OS x (1 - OS) 
ü± 
=x+ 
os (3. B. 13) 
ac 1-OS 
caxa-, 
ý (1 - -r) (1 a) [l (1 (3. B. 14) ix- (1-0s) (1-0s) 
1 
08 (1 - -r) (1 - a) A (1 + Os) - (1 - vi)1 2c 
-= xa -p -xa 
[l + ae (1-0S) (1-0s) (1-0s) (1-0s) 
(3. B. 15) 
Setting 6=0 implies that 
cA (1 + Os) +p. 
ý (1 - -r) (1 - a) 11 - (1 - (P1)1 
(1-0s) (1-05 (1-0s) (1-0s) 
By substituting this result in (3. B. 15), we obtain 
ab c (3. B. 16) 
C9C -Ci - os) 
Thus, the Jacobian matrix of the system (3.2.2l)-(3.2.22) is given by 
coýq + AOS(1-T) X+OS 
j 
(CL Xct-l(Pl - CfXC'02 - X(I-os) X(l-os) 1-os (3. B. 17) 
c caxa-103 (1-0s) 
where 
Os [i - -r (I - wi)] (3. B. 18) 
(1-0s) 
02 -T - W01 (3. B. 19) 
(1-0s) 
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03 T) 
(1 a) [1 (1 ý01)] 
(3. B. 20) (1-0s) (1-0s) 
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is: 
Det J- cX 2 Cos ý-I--Os) 
ý 
(a - 1) X"- T (1 - W1 - (P2) - 
X2 (1 - OS) 
+ XCk-j 
OS [1 -T 
(1 
- ý01)] 
_-1 
(1 
- *T) 
(I 
- a) 
c 
(1 
_ OS)2 
- 
(x + Os) cax' 
(1 
_ OS)2 
+ CAOS 
(I - T) (3. B. 21) 
X (1 - OS) 
From the definition of -y = (61G) it follows that 
17 -1 
OS [1 
- 7- 
(1 
- ý01)] C-t T (P1 - ý02) Za 
OS)2 
+ CXcit (1-0s) (1-0s) 
cAOs (1 - T) C20S 
.X (1 _ OS)2 
+X 
(I _ OS)2 
(3. B. 22) 
Substituting this result into (3. B. 21) 
cce 
XQ- 
Os (1 - -r) (1 - a) Det J= (1-0s) 
(1 
- W1 - ý02) 0 S)2- 
C'y (1 - T) 
(1 
- a) 
-- caX - (3. B. 23) (1-0s) (1 
_ OS)2 
From (3. B. 4), it follows that 
CC, Xa-1 
OS (1 
- T) (1 a) 
Ti 
- 0s) 
7(1 - (P1 - V2) - (1 _ OS)2 
ý= 
cax- 
(1 - 7-) - a) ca (X + 0s) + 
(-F + OS) (3.13.24) 
(1 _ OS)2 X 
(1 - osý 
1P 
(1-0s)] 
Substituting this result in (3. B. 23) 
Det J= -c 
ly +a 
(x + Os) 
+A 
(-r + Os) (3.13.25) 
ý 
(1 - OS) X (1 - OS) 
1P 
(1 - Os)] 
ý 
Since Det J< 0, proposition 2 is proved. 
3.13.3 Fiscal Policy 
Public consumption and lump-sum transfers 
Proof of propositions 3 and 4 The long-run rate of growth of the econ- 
omy -y is decreasing in public consumption ýP2 and lump-sum transfers W1. 
3. Fiscal Policy, Endogcnous Growth, and Finite Horizons 96 
Increases in Vi (i=1,2) of the same amount reduce -y less for A>0 than 
for A=0. 
The impact of public consumption and lump-sum transfers to households 
is derived by differentiating the long-run rate of growth -y with respect to 
ýpj, i=1,2 
49-Y a-Y ax (1 - -T) -1 49X = a- (1 a) x' ,i=1,2 (3. B. 26) ovi c9x c9vi 1-os aýpi 
where 
OX OF (X, /Oýci -rx' <0, i=1,2 (3. B. 27) äji OF (X, /OX OF (X, .) /OX 
From the proof of proposition 1, we know that aF (x, -) 149x < 0. Hence, 
axlc9ýoj <0 and 
a-Y 
<0, i=1,2 (3. B. 28) 
aýoi 
Moreover - from (3. B. 9) - JOF (x, -) /Oxj(Aý, O) > JaF (x, -) laxl(, \=O). Thus 
Jax1,9ýojj(. X>O) > 
lax1aýoil(A=0) and 
'Y 1,2 (3. B. 29) 
(Pi 
< 
Hence, propositions 3 and 4 are proved. 
The growth maximizing income tax rate 
Proof of proposition 5 There exists a growth maximizing income tax rate 
Tma,; both in the infinite and the finite horizons scenarios, the first one being 
higher than the latter one. 
In order to calculate the growth maximizing level of income taxation 
in the finite horizons case, the derivative of (3.2.23) with respect to -r is 
evaluated as follows 
0-y 
= X. 
a) +a 
(1 - T) axTI A (3. B. 30) 5-T- 
T0rxj- 
ý1-- -Os) 
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where 
, +x) 
Ox aF (x, /OT Wl - W2) + 
(OS+X)(1 
- 
X(o, 
(1 -Os) 
OT C9F (X, /C9X -, y - 
[ap 
+ a, 
\(OS+T)] (1 
+ 
02) 
(1-OST- x 
(3. B. 31) 
Solving F (x, -) for p yields 
- a) (1 - 7') - (Pl - (P2) x (Os + 7) (3. B. 32) 
(OS + x) 
1 
(1-0s) 
Let us now substitute (3. B. 32) into (3. B. 31) and the resulting expression for 
axla-r back into (3. B. 30). By doing so, it is possible to solve 69, y/49-r =0 
for -r and to obtain the growth maximizing level of income taxation in the 
presence of a positive A: 
axc, (a - 1) (X + Os) 
Xý+l (a 1) (ý 
(3. B. 33) 
,+ OS) 
which for A=0 simplifies to 
OS ) (3. B. 34) 
where 12 
+Os > 
xa+l 
axcl (a - 1) (X + Os) (3. B. 35) 
x) (a - 1) -Ax +, \a (X + Os) 
Hence 
7'maxl(, \>o) < 7maxl(. \=o) 
(3. B. 36) 
And proposition 5 is proved. 
Proof of proposition 6 For 0<A<1, the growth maximizing income 
tax rate 7-max is increasing in both public consumption W2 and lump-sum 
transfers to households Vi. 
For A=0, is given by (3. B. 34). 
12 This inequality has been evaluated using Maple 7.0 for the following values of the 
parameters: x>0,0 <a<1,0 < Os <1 and 0<A<1. 
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Let us define the implicit function F: 
IP (X (7-, OS, Vi) , 7-, 
OS, Vi) ý- Tmax -a 
(1 
+ 
is ) 
7ýý 7-max -Pý0 
(3. B. 37) 
X/ 
Totally differentiating (3. B. 34) with respect to (pi, i=1,2 and applying 
the implicit function theorem to (3-B-37): 
er 09x 2ýou i9- OTmax 
ax oýPi x2 aýPi 
i9x ýLE ýL- 2 Ur 0x ar 
2g0 a-. -9x x i)ýli ---i=1,2 
71 x2 + ýLX + 2-1 af ex A 
( 
aos ar 
(VX-) 
(3. B. 38) 
where from (3. B. 27) OxIOýoj <0 and from (3-B-31), axlo9T > 0. Hence, we 
obtain: 
d9'rmax 1 DX/(9Vi >O, i=1,2 (3. B. 39) 
X2/ao +ýgXlýg-r is 
For 0<A<1, is defined by (3. B. 33). 
Let us define the implicit function 172: 
r2(X(7-jOSilPi)i7'iOSjWi) 
-ý Tmax- 
ax" (a - 1) (X + Os) 
xcl+l (a - 1) -, \x + \a (X + Os) 
= 7-max - 
P2 
A 
= Tmax --=0 (3. B. 40) B 
Totall differentiating (3. B. 33) with respect to Vi, i=1,2 and applying y 
the implicit function theorem to (3.13.40): 
')F2 i9x ax aTmax ar2la(Pi Ox Oýpi Oýpj 
19ýoi 
1(0<, 
\<I) 
aF21ar 
--9-ra! 
L- 
Ox Or + 49X Or 
where OxIOýoi < 0, ogxl, 9, r > 0, and - for x>0,0 <a<1,0 < Os :! ý 1 and 
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0<A<1- the sign of the term ax is negativcl3: 
(1-90 -, 
aP2 I [a (a - (a + 1) xa + C, 20S (C, x'-'] B-1 ax 
Y 
JB-2 [(a 1) (a + 1) x' -A (a + 1)] A} <0 (3. B. 41) 
Therefore, for all the values of the parameters coherent with our theo- 
retical model: 
C9 Irm ax 
->O, i=1,2 (3. B. 42) avi 
axIar Ox 
Investment subsidies 
Proof of proposition 7 There exists a growth maximizing value for in- 
vestment subsidies, and such a value is decreasing in the probability of death 
parameter 
Differentiating -y with respect to OS leads to 0 
a-Y 
= . 
(l - a) (1 - -r) x,, 
[1 
+a 
(I - Os) Ox Os IA (1 + -r) (3. B. 43) 
a0s (1 _ OS)2 Os a0s x 
(1 
_ OS)2 
Since from (3. B. 47) (9xlOOs < 0, for A=0 
, 97 > (: ý)0 if 
a17 os 
> (: ýý) - 
os 
(3. B. 44) ä-os OOS xa (1 - Os) 
However, for a positive A we obtain 
a, y > (:: ý)O if OXOS > (: ý) - 
OS 
+A 
(1 + -r) (3. B. 45) 00S 
I 
(A> 0) 
ý -OS -X a (1 - Os) (I _ OS)2 
Proof of proposition 8 For 0<A<1, the growth maximizing income 
tax rate Tinax is increasing in investment subsidies. 
Differentiating (3. B. 33) with respect to Os 
af2 . 9-- ax C97rnax Ox OOS 'a -OS 
->0 (3. B. 46) OOS --9--r2! Lx -1 + 49X Ox Or (Q12) ax yr- 
13 This inequality has been evaluated usin. - Maple 7.0 for the following values of the 
parameters: x>0,0 <a<1,0 < Os <1 and 0<A<1. 
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where <0 is defined in (3. B. 41) and Ox1490S is derived by totally Ox 
differentiating F (x, 0 and using -y = OIC: 
a (1-r)(1 ýý) (X + 0, ) + A-r(l+Os) 
d9x 
=_ 
OF1aOs 
= -, 
--i -x ýi-os) (1-os" <0 (3. B. 47) aos C9F/OX ax(T+os) 2< 
-, y 
ýap 
+ 
7-1-, 9, ) 1 (1 + Hence, for 0<A<1,0-r,,,,,.,; 100s > 0. 
4. PUBLIC CAPITAL AND PRODUCTIVITY: A SURVEY ON 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this Chapter is to survey the empirical literature on the pro- 
ductive role of public capital. Since the late 1980s, applied work on the 
relationship between public capital and economic performance has been a 
widely analysed and controversial issue in the economic literature, the de- 
bate being characterized by alternative underlying theories, the employment 
of a variety of estimation techniques and leading to a wide range of results. 
The task of surveying this branch of the literature exhaustively is some- 
how ambitious and this Chapter is not aimed at this, rather intending to 
discuss the part of the literature most related to the present research. 
On one hand, this survey represents the empirical counterpart of the 
theoretical concepts introduced in Chapter 2. On the other hand, it provides 
the necessary introduction to the state of the art of the Italian literature, 
before discussing my empirical contribution on Italian regions. In the light 
of this, the survey proceeds in two steps. 
The first part of the review - section 4.2 - deals with the interna- 
tional literature, mainly interested in the U. S. economy and in cross-country 
comparisons. In particular, I overview studies that use three alternative 
methodological approaches: the growth approach - subsection 4.2.1 -, tile 
production function and growth accounting approaches - subsection 4.2.2. 
Then, in the second part of the survey - section 4.3 -I will discuss in 
more detail the most relevant applied works to the case of Italy. 
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4.2 Empirical Evidence on the Productive Role of Public Capital 
This section discusses the literature on the empirical linkage between public 
capital and economic performance. 
Subsection 4.2.1 focuses on the growth approach. This brief survey dis- 
tinguishes empirical works belonging to this field of research in two genera- 
tions, where the turning point is given by the reviewed interest stimulated 
by the emerging of new growth models. To the first generation belong works 
published in the 1980s within the broader literature on the determinants of 
growth and mainly interested in the definition of the optimal government 
size in the economy. These early studies do not have a proper theoretical 
background, in the sense that they do not properly test analytically de- 
rived relationships. They rather study partial correlations between output 
growth and alternative measures of fiscal policy. On the other hand, during 
the 1990s, the development of now growth models has spurred a second gen- 
eration of empirical investigations aimed at testing "structural" equations 
derived from the solution of growth models, including fiscal variables. 
The first part of subsection 4.2.2 deals with the so-called production 
function approach applied by Aschauer (1989a) and boosted by the interest 
of researchers in analysing the productivity slowdown experienced by the 
United States in the 1970s and the 1980s. The methodology employed by this 
author has been criticized by many researchers and his results questioned 
with respect to many statistical problems. However, the paper by Ascliauer 
(1989a) is still regarded as the seminal contribution within this empirical 
approach. After having described the main results obtained by Aschauer, I 
will discuss the main criticisms developed by other authors who have applied 
the same methodology to the American economy and, more recently, to other 
countries or samples of countries. 
The assumption behind the implementation of the production function 
approach is that the beneficial effect on economic activity of public capital is 
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due to its role of direct productive input. The second part of the subsection 
overviews works which do not make this assumption, analysing its impact 
on total factor productivity as an environmental variable. I will refer to this 
part of the literature as the traditional growth accounting approach, whose 
theoretical background is provided by Hulten and Schwab (1984,1991). 
4.2.1 Growth Regressions 
Tile first generation of empirical studies on public spending in growth regres- 
sions has been undertaken at the beginning of the 1980s, within the literature 
on the determinants of growth. The crucial interest of this broader field of 
research is the explanation of differentials in growth rates across countries 
in terms of various macroeconomic indicators. The works belonging to this 
empirical literature that arc more interesting for our analysis are those that 
view differences in fiscal policy (such as government expenditures, public 
consumption or tax measures) as the primary source of growth differentials 
across countries. 
Typically, the government size is measured by the level of public expen- 
diture and used as a regressor in cross-country regressions on growth rates 
of the following general type: 
kmn 
E 
aj - Xjj +E bj - Yi, j +E ci - Zi, j + ci, t 
j=l j=l j=l 
where -y is the average annual change in per capita GDP in country i over 00 
the period [0, t], X are k averaged fiscal policy explanatory variables, Y are 
m averaged non-fiscal policy explanatory variables (various macroeconomic 
indicators) and Z are n conditionin- variables'. 0 
Alost, commonly used conditioning variables are the initial level of per capita GDP, the 
initial private investment to GDP ratio and some measures of demograpby or education 
(such as the averaged annual population growth rate or the initial level of investment in 
human capital). 
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A number of studies have estimated alternative specifications of equation 
(4.2.1) with the aim of assessing the empirical linkage between fiscal policy 
and growth. In particular, the most common used explanatory variables X 
have been measures of the overall size of the government, disaggregated mea- 
sures of various categories of government expenditures (or measures of their 
growth rates), measures of government deficits and disaggregated measures 
of government taxation (Levine and Renelt, 1991). 
The results obtained by some works within the first generation of growth 
regressions are reported in Table 4.2.1. These arc the most cited works in 
the literature: for a complete and exhaustive survey, see Levine and Renelt 
(1991). 
Landau (1983), Kormendi and Aleguire (1985) and Crier and Wlock 
(1989) retrieve data from the Summers and Heston data base and use the 
ratio of total government expenditures to GDP as a proxy of the size of 
the government. They share the common conclusion that governments of 
smaller size arc associated with higher growth rates. For instance, Landau 
(1983) estimates the effect of two categories of government expenditures 
on per capita GDP growth: public consumption and total investment in 
education (both expressed as shares of per capita GDP). His analysis covers 
the period 1961-76 for a very heterogeneous sample of 104 countries and 
concludes for a positive impact of investment in education and a negative 
impact of public consumption on growth. However, the hampering effect of 
public consumption on growth is found to be not statistically significant for 
a sub-sample of poorest countries. 
Landau (1986) extends the analysis to Less Developed countries, assess- 
ing the role of transfers to households, educational expenditure and public 
investment. The coefficient of all these categories of public spending are 
found to be statistically insignificant. Kormendi and Aleguire (1985) esti- 
mate a non statisticall significant coefficient of public consumption expen- y0 
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diture as a share of GDP in a cross-section regression of 47 countries. 
Barro (1991) attempts to distinguish the effect of government expendi- 
tures on growth depending on their allocation amongst alternative uses. In 
order to do so, lie regresses average growth rates on the ratio of government 
consumption expenditure to GDp2 and on a measure of public investment. 
His data are on a sample of 98 countries over the period 1960-85 and the 
estimated coefficients of the two explanatory variables are equal to -0.12 and 
0.10 respectively, but only the first one is statistically significant. 
A general drawback of these early studies is that their results are difficult 
to interpret from a theoretical point of view. In particular, the negative 
estimated effect of public consumption on growth is difficult to reconcile with 
the neoclassical prediction of no permanent effect of fiscal policy on long- 
run economic growth. Engen and Skinner (1992), for instance, argue that 
the negative coefficient of the share of government expenditure in growth 
regressions can be interpreted as a signal of spurious correlation between 
the dependent and the independent variables. This authors use Instrumental 
Variables for the changes in the government share of GDP in order to correct 
for this bias. 
The evidence of a negative impact of government expenditure on growth, 
however, is commonly interpreted in support of "liberal" view according to 
which the taxes needed to finance government expenditure distort incentives 
in private markets and prevent the efficient allocation of resources, causing 0 
a fall in the level of output (de la Fuente, 1997). 
Levine and Renelt (1992), Levine and Zervos (1993) and Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) question the reliabilitY of the above studies suggesting that 
their results can be sensitive to alternative specifications of the regression 
equation (4.2.1). 
2 Excluding expenditures in defence and education, which he considers to be growth 
promoting categories of public spending. 
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For instance, Levine and Renelt (1992) work on a data set of 106 coun- 
tries over the period 1960-1986 in order to assess the robustness of the 
results obtained in previous empirical studies. They state: "Given that over 
50 variables have been found to be significantly correlated with growth in 
at least one regression, readers may be uncertain as to the confidence they 
should place in the findings of anyone study". Hence, their aim is to exam- 
ine if partial correlations estimated in previous studies are robust to small 
changes in the list of right-hand side variables in equation (4.2.1). 
In general, most of the partial correlations relating economic growth 
to each of the explanatory variables in (4.2.1) are found to be not robust 
to small changes in other explanatory variables. As for the fiscal policy 
explanatory variables X, none of the measures either of overall government 
size or disag regated measures of public spending 3 09 are found to be robust 
to alternative specifications of (4.2.1). 
The development of the new growth theory and its prediction of a per- 
manent effect of fiscal policy on long-run growth has renewed the interest 
in the empirical investigation of the growth effect of government spending. 
This has given rise to a new generation of studies characterized by the es- 
timation of reduced equations derived as solutions of endogCnous growth 
models. 
Amongst these works summarized in Table 4.2.2, those interested in 
the empirical test of endogenous Barro-type models deserve a particular 
attention. In particular, some recent studies have been aimed at empirically 
testing the prediction of Barro-type models regarding the composition of 
government expenditure and the form of taxation. Devarajan et al. (1996) 
have dealt with the first issue, whereas Kneller et al. (1999) and Bleany et 
al. (2001) have deepened the analysis in order to account for alternative 
3 They test the robustness of measures of public consumption, government capital for- 
mation, government expenditures on education and government expenditures on defence. 
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structures of taxation 4. 
The prediction of the growth effect of fiscal policy depends crucially on 
the source of financing. A rise of productive public spending financed by 
non-distortionary taxation raises the long-run rate of growth. On the other 
hand, the growth effect of a rise of productive public spending financed 
by distortionary taxation will depend on the ongoing level of expenditure. 
Increases in unproductive public spending through distortionary taxation 
negatively affect long-run growth, whereas if such increases are financed by 
some form of non-distortionary taxation, long-run growth will be unaffected. 
Kneller et al. (1999) note that the estimation of regressions of the general 
type in (4.2.1) are unable to test appropriately such predictionS5 . They argue 
that empirical works belonging to - what we have above defined - the 
first generation of growth regression arc only "partial" studies of the growth 
effects of fiscal policy, in the sense that they only consider one side of the 
government budget constraint, abstracting from the other. Let us suppose, 
for instance, that the fiscal variable X, whose growth impact we want to 
study, is public investment. If Ave omit from the estimated equation the tax 
used to finance it, the assumption about the source of financing of public 
investment will be "implicit". This is likely to produce a biased estimate for 
the coefficient of X, unless the omitted variable has a null effect on growth. 
Indeed, the estimate will be biased if the implicit source of financing has a 
non neutral impact on growth. 
For instance, Kocherlakota and Yi (1997) estimate the growth effect of 
public investment - both in U. K. and U. S. economics over very long time 
periods - finding the attached coefficient positive and significant when they 
include a tax measure in the regressed equation, and insignificant otherwise. 
4 See also Kneller and Gernmell (2002) for a study on European countries. 
5A previous study by Miller and Russek (1997) also finds growth effects of public 
expenditure to vary according to the source of financing, abstracting from the various 
type of expenditure and taxation suggested in Barro-type endogenous growth models. 
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In general, if all the elements of the government budget constraint were 
included in (4.2.1), we would have: 
k 
Exij 
=0 
j=l 
(4.2.2) 
and, in order to avoid perfect collinearity, one of the X should be omitted 
from the regression equation. By omitting Xk for each country i, equation 
(4.2.1) becomes: 
k-1 mn 
E (aj - ak) * Xij + 
1: bi * yi, j +E Ci * zij + fi, t (4.2.3) 
j=l j=l j=l 
This new regression equation implies that the correct estimate of the 0 
coefficient of each X does not indicate the growth impact of a unit change 
in X; it rather represents the growth effect of a unit change in X "offset 
by a unit change in the omitted variable, which is the implicit financing ele- 
ment". As a consequence, if the omitted element of the government budget 
constraint changes, the coefficient of each fiscal variable entering the esti- 
mated equation will change too. In particular, this will not happen only if 
the omitted variable has a null impact on growth. 
Rom equation (4.2.3), it follows that it is only possible to test the null 
hypothesis that the difference (aj - ak) is equal to zero and not the null 
hypothesis that each aj is equal to zero individually. However, it is still 
possible to test whether two aj (j ýý 1,2) are equal to each other. 
If HO : al = a2 =0 can not be rejected, more accurate estimated co- 
efficicnts of the included fiscal variables can be obtained by omitting both 
X, and X2. Hence, the appropriate way of proceeding suggested by Kneller 
et al. (1999) is "to test down from the most complete specification of the 
government budget constraint to less complete specifications, taking care to 
omit only those elements which theory suggests will have negligible growth 
effects". 
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In order to show how the mis-specification of the government budget 
constraint can lead to misleading results and does not allow to test properly 
the prediction of Barro-typc models, Kneller et al. (1999) compare results 
obtained by estimating two equations of the types in (4.2.1) and (4.2.3), us- 
ing data on OECD countries over the period 1970-95. The fiscal variables of 
interest are distortionary taxation (DT), non-distortionary taxation (NDT), 
productive expenditure (PE) and unproductive expenditure (UPE). In gen- 
eral, their results confirm that the sign of the cocfficicnts of the variables of 
interest change widely if the government budget constraint is mis-specified. 
In coherence with their suggested procedure, Kneller et al. (1999) esti- 
mate equation (4.2.3) including the fiscal variables PE and DT. They first 
omit the variables NDT and UPE individually. Then, they omit both vari- 
ables and do not reject the null hypothesis that they have a common coeffi- 
cient. Hence, they rely on the results obtained in this last case, where pro- 
ductive expenditure (included) is implicitly financed by non-distortionary 
taxation (omitted) and distortionary taxation (included) implicitly finances 
unproductive public spending (omitted). As predicted in the theory, the co- 
efficients attached to DT and PE are estimated to have negative and positive 
signs respectively and are both statistically significant. 
4.2.2 The Production nnction and The Growth Accounting Approaches 
In section 2.2, we have studied the productive role of public capital from 
a theoretical point of view. lVe concluded that if public capital enters the 
aggregate production function as an unpaid direct input, it will affect cco- 
nomic activity through a direct effect on output and an indirect cffect on the 
productivity of other inputs - see effects (1) and (2), page 9. We now deal 
with the empirical implementation of this theory, known in the literature as 
the production function approach. 
Aschauer (1989a) estimates alternative specifications of the following two 
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general equations: 
In - =aO+aj-t+a2-In 
Lt 
+a3-In 
ct )+ 
a4'CUt + Ut (4.2.4) K"t K't 
y1t 
and 
tfpt = bo + bi -t+ b2 - ln(Gt - It) + b3 - CUt + et (4.2.5) 
where t is a linear time trend and the capacity utilization rate CUt controls 
for the business cycle. Equations (4.2.4) and (4.2.5) are the empirical coun- 
terparts of equations (2.2.4) and (2.2.5) at page 12. Data on the "net stock 
of non-military public structure and equipments" are employed as a proxy of 
the variable Gt and OLS estimations are based on U. S. aggregate national 
time series data over the period 1949-1985. 
The main purpose of the author is to figure out to which extent the 
accumulation of public capital explains the behavior of productivity over the 
sample period and, in particular, the productivity slowdown experienced by 
the U. S. economy in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Aschauer's results can be summarized as follows. In a first step of his 
analysis, the OLS point estimates for the coefficients of the labour to capital 
ratio and the public to private capital ratio in equation (4.2.4) - a2 and a3 
- are positive and statistically significant (0.35 and 0.39 respectively). This 
means that under the assumption of CRTS, when either the labour to private 
capital ratio or the public to private capital ratio rises by 10%, private 
capital productivity increases by 3.5% or 3.9%, respectively. In a second 
step, equation (4.2.4) is estimated allowing for separate coefficients of the 
two private inputs in order to test the implicit restriction of CRTS in (4.2.4). 
The value of the relevant F test does not allow to reject such a restriction. 
In particular, when public capital is omitted, the coefficients of both private 
inputs become negative and significant (-0.48 and -0.66 respectively) and 
the DW test is very low in value, supporting the evidence of the presence 
of serial correlation in the residuals ut. Hence, Aschauer concludes that 
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adding Ct allows private inputs to get positive and significant elasticities 
and to eliminate serial correlation. 
As for the estimation of equation (4.2.5), the general conclusion is that 
there exists a strong empirical linkage between the provision of public capital 
stock and total factor productivity. 
The above analysis refers to the aggregate stock of non-military public 
capital, whose output elasticity is estimated to be 0.39. To some extent, the 
analysis is carried out also at a higher level of disaggregation. In particular, 
the author provides estimated values of output elasticities for the following 
categories of non-military public capital: Core public capitaIG (0.24), Ed- 
ucational Buildings (-0.01), Other Buildings 7 (0.04), Hospitals (0.06) and 
Conservation and Development (0.02)8. In general, the overall set of results 
leads to conclude that the decline in public investment in infrastructure has 
been an important determinant of the productivity slowdown experienced 
by the U. S. economy in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
A similar methodolog is applied by Aschauer (1989b) to the Group OY 
of Seven over the period 1966-85, with results supporting the evidence 
of the U. S. case: a 10% increase in public investment in infrastructure 
yields a 4% gain in labour productivity. Furthermore, "Munnell (1990a) 
and Munnell (1990b) confirm the results obtained by Aschauer by estimat- 
ing Cobb-Douglas production functions using aggregate time series for the 
period 1970-86 and pooled state data over the period 1949-87 respcctively9. 
6 This category is given by the sum of the stocks of highways, airports, electrical and 
gas facilities, water systems and sewers and mass transit. 
7 This category includes office buildings, police and fire stations, courthouse, garages, 
and passenger terminals. 
a Garcia-INlilh and McGuire (1992) estimate output elasticities of 0.04 and 0.07 for the 
categories Highways and Education respectively. 
9 Alunnell (1990b) makes the alternative assumptions of no constraints, CRTS to private 
inputs and CRTS in the threes inputs. Regardless of the restrictions imposed, public 
capital results to be highly productive, with elasticity values ranging from 0.31 to 0.39. 
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Although Aschauer's (and Nlunnell's) findings are the most cited in the 
literature, a few authors followed similar methodologies in earlier works. 
For instance, Xlera (1973) estimates Cobb-Douglas production functions for 
the primary, the secondary and the tertiary sectors of the Japanese economy 
using OLS and concluding that "social capital" had a positive and significant 
impact on output growth of the three sectors. Ratner (1983) uses pooled 
time series level data on the U. S. economy over the years 1949-73, and finds 
an output elasticity of public capital of 0.06. Costa et al. (1987) estimate 
public capital to have significantly contributed to manufacturing output in 
United States in the year 1972. Less optimistic are the conclusions reached 
by Eberts (1986) who estimates the values of. output elasticity of various 
public capital categorics10 to be well below those of private capital and 
labour input in U. S. metropolitan areas. 
Tables 4.2.3-4.2.6 provide a summary of the literature following the pro- 
duction function approach, by distinguishing a number of studies according 
to Data on which they base their analysis, implemented Estimation Tech- 
niques and Results that they obtain. Tables 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 collect empirical 
works on the U. S. economy. 
Looking at these Tables, it seems that regional panel data (R, PD) stud- 
ics are characterized more than others either by statistically insignificant or 
very low in magnitude coefficients". On the other hand, aggregate time 
series (ATS) studies generally lead to more optimistic results. Moreover, 
as originally noted by Holz-Heakin (1994), within regional studies the more 
optimistic results are produced by those neglecting state specific effects, 
whereas when unobserved state specific effects arc taken into account, out- 
put elasticity of public capital declines. In general, the major feature of 
this vast scientific production is the extremely wide range of results, which 
makes the literature finally inconclusive. 
Highways, public hospitals, sewage and sanitation facilities. 
In one case - Pinnoi (1994) - the point estimate of output elasticity is even negative. 
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Table 4.2.3: Summary of the Production Function Approach (United 
States) 
Authors Data' Estimations' Elasticities' 
Ratner (1983) N, 1949-73 ATS, L 0.06 
Eberts (1 986) NIA, 1958-78 PD, L 0.03/0.04 
Costa et al. (1987) 11,1972 TL, CS, L 0.19/0.26 
Aschauer (1989a) N, 1949-85 ATS, L 0.39 
Ram and Ramsey (1989) N, 1949-85 ATS, L 0.24 
Aaron (1990) N, 1952-85 ATS, L not robust 
Merriman (1990) 11,1972 TL, CS, L 0.20 
Aschauer (1990) 11,1965-83 PD, L 0.11 
Munnell (1990a) R, 1970-86 PCS, L 0.06/0.15 
Munnell (1990b) N, 1949-87 ATS, L, FD 0.31/0.39 
Munnell and Cook (1990) 11,1970-86 PCS, L 0.15 
Tatom (1991) N, 1949-89 ATS, FD, L 0.04 
Ford and Poret (1991) N, 1957-89 ATS, L, FD 0.39/0.54 
Eisner (1991) 11,1970-86 PCS, L not sigg. 
'N= National Data; R= Regional Data; NIA = Metropolitan Areas. 
b PD = Panel Data; ATS = aggregate time series; L= (log) Levels; TL 0 
T! ranslog production function; CS = Cross Section; PCS = Pooled Cross 
Section; FD = (log) First Differences; SE = Simultaneous Equations. 
c Figures listed are statistically significant point estimates of output elas- 
ticity of public capital; not sig. = not statistically significant estimates. 
Most papers on the U. S. economy reported in Tables 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 are 
aimed at re-examining Aschauer's results by overcoming what they claim 
to be some methodological limitations of his work. Indeed, Aschauer's es- 
timation strategy has been criticized along many directions, and his point 
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estimates of y- see "Elasticities" in Table 4.2.3 - has been often judged 
implausibly high due to some methodology drawbacks. 
Table 4.2.4: Summary of the Production Function Approach (United States, 2) 
Authors Data' EstimationSb Elasticities' 
Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1991) R, 1969-82 SE, FD 0.08 
Garcia-Milh and McGuire (1992) R, 1969-82 TL, PD, L 0.04/0.07 
Munnell (1993) R, 1970-86 PCS, L 0.14/0.17 
Holtz-Heakin (1994) R, 1969-86 PD, L, FD not sio-. 
Eisner (1994) N, 1961-91 ATS, L 0.27 
Pinnoi (1994) R, 1970-86 TL, PD, L -0.11/0.08 
Evans and Karras (1994a) R, 1970-86 PD, L, FD not sigg. 
Baltagi and Pinnoi (1995) R, 1970-86 PD, L not sigg. 
Andrews and Swanson (1995) R, 1970-86 PCs 0.11 
Sturm and De Hann (1995) N, 1949-85 ATS, L, FD 0.41/not sigg. 
Ai and Cassou (1995) N, 1947-89 ATS, FD 0.15 
Holtz-Heakin and Schwartz (1995) R, 1970-86 PD, FD 0.1 
Garcia-Milh et al. (1996) R, 1970-83 PD, FD not sigg. 
Crowder and Himarios (1997) N, 1947-89 ATS, L 0.17/0.38 
aN= National Data; R= Regional Data. 
b FD = (lo. -) First Differences; L= (log) Levels; SE = Simultaneous Equations; TL 
= 'Ranslog production function; PD = Panel Data; PCS = Pooled Cross Section; 
ATS = aggregate time series; CS = Cross Section. 
c Figures listed are statistically significant point estimates of output elasticity of 
public capital; not sig. = not statistically significant estimates. 
Amongst the works that have applied Aschauer's analysis to other coun- 
tries - see Tables 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 - the most interesting ones are those that 
have tried to correct some defects of his methodology, implementing more 
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sophisticated estimation techniques and using alternative data sets. On the 
other hand, other researchers have merely replicated Aschauers work to 
other countries by strictly following his estimation strategy and, as a conse- 0 
quence, their results are subject to similar criticisms. 
In one of the first papers interested in cross-country comparisons, Ford 
and Poret (1991) analyse 11 OECD countries and make the very restrictive 
assumption that private capital and labour form a unique private sector's 
input". They study the impact of non-military public capital on TFP 
growth, finding output elasticity values ranging from 0.15 ( Rance) to 0.70 
(Australia)13. However, their results are mixed and, under alternative spec- 
ifications of the production function, the enhancing effect of infrastructure 
on TFP growth is never significant in the U. K., Norway and Australia, al- 
ways significant in U. S. A., Canada, Germany, Belgium and Sweden, and 
only sometimes significant in France, Japan and Finland. 
The overview of some of the contributions whose analysis are summarized 
in the Tables, can use as a guide line the objections that they move to 
earlier works and how their results have improved the existing literature 
accordingly. The most common criticisms moved to Aschauer regard (i) 
spurious correlation problems due to the mis-specification of the estimated 
equation (omission of relevant variables) (ii) non-stationarity of the data, 
(iii) the reserve causality issue, and (iv) the use of aggregate time series CD 
data. 
(i) Tatom (1991) claims the mis-specification of the production function 
estimated by Aschauer, noting that the fall in public investment in infras- 
tructure coincided with the sharp rise of oil prices in the 1970s. Hence, he 
extends the regression equation in (4.2.4) - see page 112 -, adding a vari- 
12 Toen-Cout and Jongeling (1994), who study the case of the Netherlands, impose a 
similar restriction. 
13 They use two definitions of public capital; one including electricity, water and gas 
suppliers, transport and communications and defence, the other excluding the defence. 
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able as a proxy of the energy prices. This leads to a relevant reduction in 
the estimated coefficient of -y, which goes down to 0.04 14 . Further problems 
of mis-specification of the production function regard the omission of other 
relevant variables. For instance, Duggal et al. (1999) argue that, since the 
production function is a Cobb-Douglas, the capacity utilization index CU 
should enter multiplicatively the estimated equation (4.2.4). 
(ii) A second problem detected in Aschauer's work is the non-stationarity 
of the data, which may lead to spurious relationships between public capital 
and the relevant dependent variable. The variables used by Aschauer are 
indeed found to be neither stationary nor cointegrated in the following-up 
literature, which makes it necessary to use first differences (Tatom, 1991). 
Sturm and De Hann (1995) argue that Aschauer's results do not hold 
if the stationarity issue is taken into account given that none of the series 
included in the regression is stationary in levels. Their conclusion is that if 
stationarity is tested for, the model must be estimated in first differences. 
Previous studies estimating equations in first differences are character- 
ized by mixed results. Hulten and Schwab (1991) fit in first differences 
the model of Aschauer, getting sometimes negative coefficients. Evans and 
Karras (1994a) and Carcih-Alila et at. (1996) also use first differences, but 
they do not find a statistically significant relationship between public capital 
and productivity. Alunnell (1992) argues that estimations in first differences 
generate results which are difficult to interpret. Indeed, first differences spec- 
ifications destroy the long-run relationship in the data removing all trend 
components and leading to analyse the impact of public capital growth in 
one year on the productivity growth experienced in the same year. 
Amongst studies that use cointegration techniques in order to avoid spu- 
rious regressions, Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero, (1993) use aggregate time 
14 However, for their nature, energy prices should be included in a cost function and the 
choice on including them in the aggregate production function has been criticized by some 
authors; see, for instance, Duggal et at. (1999). 
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Table 4.2.6: Summary of the Production Function Approach (Other Countries, 2) 
Authors Date EstimationSb Elasticities' 
Wylie (1996) 
Otto and Voss (1996) 
Ramirez (1998) 
de Frutos et al. (1998) 
Mamatzakis (1999) 
Sturm et al. (1999) 
Dessus and Herrera (2000) 
N, Canada, 1946-91 ATS, L 0.11/0.52 
N, Australia, Q, 1959-92 ATS 0.17 
N, T%Iexico, P1,1950-90 ATS, FD 0.12 
N, Spain, 1964-92 C, ATS, L 0.21 
N, Greece, 1959-93 ATS, L 0.25 
N, Netherlands, 1853-1913 VAR M 
28 LDCs, 1981-91 PD, SE 0.13 
Ligtbart (2000) N, Portugal, 1965-95 C 0.20/0.35 00 
Everaert and Heylen (2001) N, Belgium, 1953-96 C, ECINI 0.29 
Kernmerling and Stephan (2002) German cities, 1980/86/88 SE M 
aN= National Data, LDCs = Less Developed Countries. 
bC= Cointegration Analysis; ECINI Error Correction Model; SE = Simultaneous Equations; 
VAR= Vector AutoRegression; FD (log) First Differences; L= (log) Levels; PD = Panel Data; 
ATS = aggregate time series. 
c Sign of statistically significant point estimates of output elasticity of public capital in parenthesis. 
Figures listed are point estimates of output elasticity of public capital; impl. = implausible values; 
Strong effect of public capital on output, negligible feedback effect from output to public 
capital and weak simultaneity between output and public capital. 
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series for Spain and estimate the same production function as in Aschauer 
(1989a) under the two alternative restrictions of CRTS in private inputs and 
CTRS over all inputs. They do not reject the assumption of CRTS in the 
three inputs and find an output elasticity of public capital of 0.19. 
(iii) A further source of criticism is whether a positive and significant 
correlation indicates that infrastructures raise output (and productivity) or 
it means instead that output (and productivity) positively affects the de- 
mand for public infrastructure. In other words, the problem is the direction 
of causality: does it run from infrastructures to output (and productivity) 
or in the opposite direction? Eisner (1991) puts under question the results 
obtained by Aschauer, noting that the productivity slowdown may have the 
effect of reducing the demand for public capital. In this case, the positive 
and significant coefficient for the public input into the production function 
should be interpreted as the extent to which an increase in national income 
yields a higher level of government intervention in the economy. 
To address the issue of causality, some authors have followed a simulta- 
neous equations approach. Amongst these authors, Duffy-Deno and Eberts 
(1991), Cadot et al. (1999), Kernmerling and Stephan (2002). 
Other authors have estimated Error- Correction Models instead. For in- 
stance, Everacrt and Heylen (2001) study the impact of public capital on 
total factor productivity in Belgium over the period 1953-96. Within a coin- 
tegration framework 15, they analyse the direction of causality. They strictly 
follow Aschauer (1989a), the only exception being the use of "patent statis- 
tics" as a proxy of technological progress. The estimated output elasticity 
that they find is around 0.29. 
If the production function is part of a system in which both inputs and 
output are endogenously determined, the estimation of such a production 
15 In a preliminary step of their analysis, they find that all variables included in their 
regressions exhibit a unit root. Instead of taking fist differences, they analyse the existence 
of a Iong-run equilibrium relationship. 
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function alone might be subject to possible simultaneous equation bias16. 
Dessus and Herrera (2000) study the panel of 28 Developing countries in 
the 1980s. They address the methodological problem of simultaneity bias 
by developing a framework in which public and private capital are both 
0. 
They estimate a simultaneous equations model composed by endo-enous17 
the production function in labour, private capital and public capital and the 
demand equations for private and public capital, in which the two forms of 
capital are assumed to depend on the level of output, an indebtedness index, 
their own one period lagged values and a linear time trend. The system is 
estimated using three-stagc least squares method and the coefficient of public 
capital in the production function is found to be around 0.13. 
(iv) The implicit assumption behind the use of aggregate time series 
is that marginal productivity and the rate of technological change do not 
vary across states. In other words, it is assumed the absence of any source 
of heterogeneity either across countries or across regions within a country. 
The limitation of this assumption has led progressively to prefer panel data 
techniques of estimation considering both state and time specific cffccts. In 
order to do so, given a panel of i states over t years, it is necessary to assume 
in equation (4.2.4) an error structure of the type ui, t = fi + Jt +, Ui, t, where 
fi is a time invariant state specific effect, (5t is a common linear trend across 
states and pi, t is an idyosincratic error term. 
16 In order to overcome this defect, Everaert and Heylen (2001) use fully modified least 
squares estimation procedure. 
17 A further peculiarity in this study is that the lack of data on stocks forces the authors 
to distinguish between private and public capital on the basis of a property criterion. In 
particular, they disaggregate total investment in public and private capital, assuming that 
the stock of public capital in the middle of their sample period is equal to total capital 
stock multiplied by the average share of public investment over the full sample period. 
Then, they extrapolate backward and forward from the middle year using the permanent 
inventory method and obtain stocks data for the two forms of capital for every year of the 
sample period. 
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The first studies that take into account cross-state heterogeneity are by C' 
Holz-Heakin (1994) and Evans and Karras (1994a, 1994b). Criticizing the 
use of aggregate time series made by Aschauer, they argue that it is neces- 
sary to consider the terms fi's and 6's in the error structure to account for t 
heterogeneity across United States. In particular, they indicate as sources of 
heterogeneity the differences in climate and topography and the systematic 
improvement in technologies which leads to systematic differences across 
states and over time. The authors motivate their choice of treating both fis 
and J's as fixed - and not as random terms - for three reasons. First, fi's t 
can not be considered as a sample of realizations from a population because 
the panel is composed by the entire population of United States. Second, 
the technology improves over the entire sample period. Third - as long as 
the errors pij are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables - general- 
ized least square estimation of the production function leads to consistent 
estimates when fi's and Jt's are treated as fixed effects but would yield in- 
consistent estimates if the two effects were ignored or treated as random 
terms. 
Using the same data as Nlunnell (1990a), Evans and Karras (1994a) 
compare OLS and Panel Data estimations of a production function similar 
to (4.2.4) - see page 112 -, the only difference being the inclusion of the 
unemployment rate instead of CU. The main results of their regressions 
is that the positive and significant OLS point estimate of the coefficient of 
public services, disappears when they control for country and time specific 
effects. This result seems to be robust to different specifications of the error 
term ui, t, to the alternative specification of a translog production function 
and to different levels of disaggregation of public services. In particular, 
Educational Services is the only category of public services to get positive 
and significant coefficient when panel data techniques of estimations are 
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employcd18. However, Ai and Cassou (1997) demonstrate the presence of 
multicollinearity in the data used by Holtz-Heakin (1994) and Evans and 
Karras (1994a). Using the same data set employed by Holtz-Heakin (1994), 
they regress public capital on state and time dummies, obtaining a corre- 
lation index close to 1. A similar regression is carried out on data used by 
Evans and Karras (1994a). Even in this case, total public capital - and 
the disaggregated categories "highways", "water and sewers" and "others" 
- turns out to be highly correlated with state and time dummies. 
All the above studies estimate average aggregate production functions 0 
augmented to include public capital. However, public capital can be produc- 
tive without being an unpaid factor, but rather acting like an environmental 
variable to the private sector of the economy. Going back to 'Meadc (1952), 
this view stands behind the empirical studies following the growth account- 
ing (or sources of growth) approach. In general, empirical studies within this 
approach reach less optimistic conclusions on the productiveness of public 
capital. The most influential paper of this part of the literature is by Hulten 
and Schwab (1991), whose main results are as follows. 
Recalling the concepts introduced in subsection 2.2 (see pages 13-14), 
TFP growth is decomposed in two parts: 
At ý 7A G't+ At (4.2.6) 
where. -yA is the elasticity of measured TFP growth with respect to public 
capital, At is the "true" Solow residual, and At is measured from the data 
using At ý 
ý't 
- SK 'Iýt - SL * -ýt - 
Within this framework, the external effect 
of public capital on private output is studied for the manufacturing sector 
of the U. S. economy during the period 1970-86. 
The main interest of Hulten and Schwab (1991) is the role of public 
18 In order to overcome the problems related with the estimation longitudinal data using 
OLS, Andrews and Swanson (1995) use the same data employed by Munnell (1990b) and 
find a less optimistic value of 0.11 for the output elasticity of public capital. 
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capital as a source of externalities, but their analysis does not exclude the 
view of public capital as unpaid factor of production. Indeed, referring to 
Meade (1952), they estimate the following equation: 
il 
At = (-yA + -t) - (it + (i - 1)kt + At + ut (4.2.7) 
where -yA is defined as in equation (4.2.6), -y is the elasticity of output with 
respect to public capital and i=a+, 3+-y. Hence, measured TFP growth is 
regressed on the rate of growth of public capital, the rate of growth of private 
capital and the "true" Solow residual. The parameter (-yA + -Y) relates public 
capital to TFP growth, embodying both its direct effect as unpaid factor - 
i. e., effect (1) at page 9- and its indirect as environmental variable - i. e., 
effect (3) at page 13. Indeed, (-yA + -y) is interpreted as the overall elasticity 
of output with respect to public capital. The coefficient of Kt is given by the 
elasticity of scale minus one and it is used to test the restriction of CRTS to 
all inputs. The "true" residual is measured by a constant or alternatively 
by a dummy for each of the years included in the sample period. 
In general, estimating alternative versions of equation (4.2.7), Hulten and 
Schwab (1991) find little evidence of a positive relationship between public 
capital and TFP growth. Similar weak relationships are also estimated for 
some disaggregated categories of public capital such as "Roads" and "Water 
and Sewer". 
4.3 Empirical Evidence on the Italian Case 
The inves . tigation of the empirical linkage between public capital and eco- 
nomic performance has received an increasing interest in Italy. The issue 
is indeed particularly attractive in the case of Italy given the relevance at- 
tributed by policy-makers to infrastructure policies aimed at filling the dc- 
velopment gap between northern and southern regions. In the light of this, 
empirical studies - summarized in Table 4.3.1 - have tried to measure the 
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power of public capital in enhancing economic performance with the aim of 
providing recommendations for the implementation of such policies. 
The empirical literature has progressively moved towards more sophisti- 
cated estimation techniques. At the same time, more disaggregated analyses 
have been carried out as the availability of regional data on public capital 
has allowed this to be done. 
Early applied studies employed cross-sectional data. Brancalente and 
Di Palma (1982) use infrastructure indexes for Italian regions as calculated 
for the year 1977. The results obtained by applying OLS regressions and 
rotated-factor analysis support the idea of a positive relationship between 
infrastructure endowment and regional development. 
The first empirical work using aggregate time series was by Jappelli and 0 
Ripa di Meana (1990), who point out that policies aimed at reducing public 
debt should carefully consider the growth effect of investment in infrastruc- 
ture. As argued by the authors, the lack of data on public capital stocks 
precluded to strictly follow the methodology suggested by Aschauer (1989a). 
As a consequence, they assume the following reduced form equations for ag- 
gregate supply and demand, with the objective of evaluating the impact of 
public investment on aggregate supply'9: 
ao +al -ig +a2 -eg +a3 -m+a4 -cu+a5 *t 
Yd= bo+bi -ig +b2 -cg+b3 - m+b4 - cu+b. 5 -t (4.3.2) 
where all variables are expressed in terms of shares of private capital stocks, 
y' is CDP, cg is public consumption, ig is public investment, m is the stock 
of money, cu is a capacity utilization index and t represents a linear time 
trend. 
19 The authors, however, claim the lack of reliability of the employed data set and, 
consequentially, consider their results as giving only preliminary evidence on the issue. 
The difference between (4.3.1) and (4.3.2) is interpreted as the trade surplus. 
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The coefficient of ig is expected to be positive, capturing both the direct 
impact of public investment on output and its indirect positive effect in en- 
hancing private inputs productivity. Since an increase in public consumption 
cg may yield a reduction of resources in the private sector and an increase 
in labour supply, the expected sign of c. is positive as well. However, the 
impact of c. on output is decreasing in the degree of substitutability between 
cg and private consumption. Hence, a. rise of cg should impact more on y, 
than a rise of cg of the same amount. 
Both cg and ig also have a direct impact on yd. Nevertheless, as for their 
impact on y', the effects of the two categories of government expenditure 
on aggregate demand are expected to be different in magnitude. Indeed, 
if cg is a substitute for private consumption, an increase in cg should lead 
to a less than proportional change in yd. On the other hand, if public and 
private capital are complements, any increase in ig leads to a higher marginal 
productivity of capital and higher private investment, implying a more than 
proportional impact on yd. 
The estimations are carried out for two different time periods 1882-1960 
and 1961-88. For the period 1961-88, the authors use two alternative defini- 
tions of public investment: Public Administrations' investment and Public 
Sector's investment (where the Public Sector includes Public Administra- 
tions and Autonomous Administrations of the State and Public Corpora- 
tions). As expected, al is found to be positive and significant in most cases. 
The statistically significant point estimates range from 3.08 (over the period 
1882-1960) to 6.67 (over the period 1970-88, for the tighter definition of pub- 
lic investment). The estimate of the coefficient a2 is generally positive and 
very low in magnitude as expected, but never significantly different from 
zero. 
Since these early studies, progress has been made thanks to the avail- 
ability of regional data on public capital stocks which has allowed recent 
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empirical investigations to improve the evidence on the Italian case. The 
first version of regional data on public capital stocks was provided by Picci 
(1995a) for the period 1970-91, lately extended by Bonaglia and Picci (2000) 
to cover the years 1992-96. Recently, Picci (2002) has disaggregated regional 
stocks of public capital for the 103 Italian provinces, following the earlier 
work performed by Peroni and Picci (2000) for the provinces of Emilia Ro- 
magna. 
Tile reconstruction of regional data on public capital stocks has been 
based on a procedure which can be summarized as follows (Bonaglia and 
Picci, 2000). 
(1) First, public investment aggregate time series provided by Rossi et al. 
(1993) for the period 1890-1992, have been extended to the year 1996. 
(2) Then, the series of regional public investment have been obtained 
on the basis of the information retrieved from the annual surveys 
(from 1954 to 1996) provided by the National Institute of Statis- 
tics (ISTAT)20 . 
These surveys are performed by means of the dis- 
tribution of questionnaires to local public officers and allow to col- 
lect data on the amount of public investment, the type of good and 
the administration responsible for its realization and for its financ- 
ing 21 
,. 
The categories of goods considered in the surveys are nine: 
Roads and Airports (GRA), Railways and Subways (GRS), Marine 
(ports, lake and river navigation) (CM), Water (river planning, etc. ) 
and Electrical Lines (GWE), Public Buildings and Schools (GPBS), 
Sanitation (hospitals, water filtering, sewers) (KS), Land Reclamation 
and Irrigation (GLRI), Telecommunications (GT) and Other types of 
'0 Istat (1954-1996), Opere Pubbliche, Roma. 
21 Public works are those financed by the State (including Ministries and Cassa per il 
Mezzo. -iorno), Public Administrations (Regions, Provinces and Municipalities) and Public 
Companies. 
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works (such as pipelines, infrastructures for tourism etc. ) (GO). The 
sum (GRA+GRS+GAI+GWE+GT) defines the "core" component of 
public capital and includes the categories which are more likely to 
directly affect productivity. The sum of the remaining categories 
(GWE+CPBS+GO) defines to the so-called "non-core" public cap- 
ital. 
(3) The regional time series obtained in (2) have been made coherent with 
data aggregated at a national level calculated in (1). This is done by 
splitting the aggregate time series in (1) amongst the 20 Italian regions 
- for each of the nine categories of public goods - in such a way that 
the ratios of all the components of these disaggregations equate the 
ones of the data contained in (2). 
(4) Finally, regional capital stocks (for each of the nine categories of public 
goods) have been obtained by means of the permanent inventory (PI) 
method applied to each of the 180 time series obtained in (3). 
The major limitation of the use of the PI method in order to derive stock 
data is that this procedure is likely to overestimate the endowment of infras- 
tructure in the regions that are least efficient in using public funds. Indeed, 
stock data reconstructed on the basis of the PI method are representative 
of the amount of financial resources employed over time to constitute the 
stocks themselves, whereas physical measures are representative of the ac- 
tual endowment of a give infrastructure service 22 . 
The ideal measure of the 
stock of regional public capital would be some physical index of the endow- 
mcnt of infrastructure in each region. However, such indexes, are available 
only for a few years, whereas data on stocks reconstructed from public in- 
vestment are available for long series and are well adaptable to econometric 
22 For a comparison between these two alternative measures of data on stocks, 'see Picci 
(1995b). 
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techniques of estimation. 
The availability of data on the stock of public capital has allowed to 
apply the methodologies suggested by Aschauer (1989a) and Hulten and 0 
Schwab (1984,1991) to the case of Italy. 
Applications to the Italian case of the production function approach are 
performed by Picci (1997 and 1999). Picci (1997) uses aggregate data at a 00 
national level from Rossi et al. (1993) and Picci (1995a). Following essen- 
tially the same methodolog suggested by Aschauer (1989a), lie estimates Oy 
the following equations: 
yt - It = bo + b, -t+ b2 - kt + (i - b3) - It + b4 - gt + b, 5 - cut + ut (4.3.3) 
tfPt ý CO + Cl *t+ C2 ' qt + C3 * CUt + et (4.3.4) 
where all variable are expressed in logarithms and gt is the stock of public 
capital. The OLS estimate of the output elasticity of gt implied by equa- 
tion (4.3.3)23 - under alternative restrictions on the returns to scaIC24 - 
is found to be statistically significant with values varying from 0.35 to 0.85. 
This results support the view of the determinant role of public capital in 
affecting economic performance over the sample period. The same con- 
clusion is achieved by estimating equation (4.3.4) and reinforced when the 
4ccore" component of public capital is used as a regressor in both (4.3.3) and 
(4.3.4). 
Picci (1999) uses panel data estimation techniques in order to overcome 
criticisms about the use of aggregate data (Holtz-Heakin, 1994), the relc- 
vance of the use of such techniques being noticeable in their ability to reflect 
heterogeneity across regions. Using data on regional public capital stocks in 
Bona-lia and Picci (2000), a Cobb Douglas production function is estimated 0 
23 Given (4.3.3), the output elasticity of public capital is defined as (N + b'4)/(l - a), 
where b4 is the coefficient of gt-I and (1 - a) is the coefficient of (yt-I - It-1). 
24 Only in one case the restriction of CRTS can be rejected. 
4. Public Capital and productivity: A Survey on empirical evidence 132 
for each of the 20 Italian regions over the period 1970-95 according to the 
following model: 
yi, t = bo + bi - li, t + 
b2 
- ki, t + 
b3 ' gi, t + Ci, t (4.3.5) 
where i and t denote cross-sectional and temporal dimensions of the data 
respectively, and ci, t = fi + (5t + 11i, t, Where fi is a time invariant region 
specific effect, (5t is a time specific effect (invariant across regions) and Pj, t 
is an i. i. d. idiosyncratic error term. Hence, the model gives the options of 
estimating a pooled OLS regression - for fi =0-a random effects model 
or a fixed cffccts model. 
The results of the analysis regard the whole country and the four macro- 
regions (North-East, North-NVest, Center and South) over the overall sample 
period and for two sub-pcriods (1970-1982 and 1983-1995). 
Regarding the results for Italy as a whole, the pooled OLS estimate of 
b3 is found to be negative and statistically significant. However, tile null by- 
pothcsis that all fixed effects do not vary across regions is rejected, Icading to 
rely on the fixed effects estimate of b3, whose magnitude is estimated around 
0.36 25 . Furthcrmorc, equation (4.3.5) is re-cstimated splitting the stock of 
public capital in its "core"and "non-core"componcnts, which turn out to be 
characterized by output elasticity values of 0.50 and -0.05 respectively. The 
performing of the adequate tests allows to reject the restriction of CRTS to 
the three inputs, but not tile analogous restriction on the two private inputs 
alone. Then, the model is estimated in some alternative specifications (first 
differences, second order translog specification and long differences) in order 
to check for the robustness of the results. 
When the analysis is disaggregated at a macro-rcgional level, the es- 
timated values of b3 arc found to be 0.21 in the North-East, 0.15 in the 
North-Wbst, 0.89 in the Center and 0.60 in tile South over the full sample 
25 The random effects point estimates are also positive and si. -nificant but the Hausman 
test leads to rely on the results of the fixed effects model. 
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period. As done for the whole country, the output elasticities of the "non- 
core"and "corc"componcnts of g are estimated for the four macro-regions, 
confirming the higher productivity enhancing effect of the latter, especia Ily 
in the North-East. Moreover, the coefficient of the "non-core" component is 
found to be negative only in the North-West, leading to conclude that the 
result obtained for the whole country is only due to this macro-region. 
Finally, the results obtained in the two sub-sampIcs periods 1970-82 and 
1983-95 show a mixed picture. For Italy as a whole, the estimate of b3 is 
higher in the first period (0.48 versus 0.42). However, at the macro-regional 
level of the analysis the same is true only for the central regions (0.83 versus 
0.56). The same evidence arises for the "core" component of g and the South 
of the country. 
Bonaglia et al. (2000) evaluate the impact of productive infrastructures 
on economic performance following both the growth accounting and the 
production function approaches 26 . Results are presented both for the whole 
Italian economy and separately for sub-periods and macro-regions. When 
the authors implement the growth accounting approach, a Cobb-Douglas 
production function is considered as including private capital, labour and 
public capital. Thus, public capital is assumed both to influence TFP and 
to enter the production function as a direct unpaid input. Their main find- 
ings are the following: on the pooled sample, public capital seems to have 
contributed positively to TFP growth (the share of TFP growth attributed 
to public capital accumulation is estimated to be 0.45). On the other hand, 
the positive role of public capital as an input in the production function is 
not found to be significant at the national level. In terms of regional disa- 
gregation, poorer regions seem to have benefited more from public capital 
provision than northern regions 27. 
26 They also estimate cost functions. 
27 Their analysis is limited to the manufacturing sector, whereas some of the categories 
included in the stock of public capital are not likely to affect the productivity of this 
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The work by Acconcia and Del Xfonte (2000) has the aim of verifying 
if public spending has played a role in determining differentials in terms of 
labour productivity across Italian regions during the period 1963-93. How- 
ever, they are also able to study the impact of public capital on output in 
terms of an elasticity in a preliminary step of their analysis. 
They first estimate the distribution of steady state levels of output per 
worker, using an AR(2) model for each Region during the sample period and 
then regress the resulting cross-sectional distribution on an infrastructure 
index2'. Under the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function with 
CRTS and perfect capital mobility across regions, they find an estimate of 
0.32, which implies a value of the output elasticity of public capital varying 
between 0.1 and 0.22 (for values of output elasticity of private capital ranging 
from 0.7 to 0.3). 
The main objective of the authors, however, is to study public spending 
as a determinant of productivity differentials across regions. With this pur- 
pose in mind, they estimate the following model both for the whole economy 
and the "manufacturing and energy"sector: 
Yi, t - yi't-T ý 77 , Yi, t-T +E wi - xi, j + Ei't (4.3.6) 
where differentials in productivity growth across regions are explained by 
relative initial conditions and a set of explanatory variables X including 
cg = public consumption, ig = government spending for investment in in- 
frastructure and dl = sum of the depreciation rate of public capital and 
the growth rates of labour force and technolog Two versions of equation oy. 
(4.3.6) are estimated under alternative assumptions on -r and ci, t. 
The first version of the model stresses the cross-sectional dimension of 
the data. Hence, variables are averaged assuming -r =5 and the error term 
sector. 
23 This index of infrastructure endowment is measured at 1995 and includes roads, rail- 
ways, energy, telephone and sewers. 
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q, t is assumed to be composed by a region specific effect fi invariant with 
time plus the idiosyncratic term vi, t. Given the further assumption that fi 
depends on an index (gh) of infrastructure and education, the error term 
becomes ci, t =b- ghi, 70 + z7i + vi, t and (4.3.6) is re-written as: 
yi, t-yi, t-5 = a+b. ghi, 70+77*Yi, t-5+ýPl*igi, t+W2*Cgi, t+V3-dli, t+6i, t (4.3.7) 
which is estimated using OLS and IV. The OLS estimate of the coefficient 
ý91 is estimated to be positive and statistically significant for both the whole 
economy (0.004) and the manufacturing sector (0.012). The opposite is true 
for V2 (-0.035), whereas the cocfficient of gh is positive and significant (0.013 
for all sectors and 0.011 for the manufacturing sector). When (4.3.7) is re- 
estimated using IV, the results about the point estimates of W1 are mixed: 
the estimated coefficient is positive and significant for the manufacturing 
sector (0.021), but statistically insignificant for the whole economy. On 
the other hand, the negative impact of public consumption on growth is 
confirmed by the magnitude of the estimates (-0.010 and -0.020 respectively) 
for both the whole economy and the manufacturing sector. 
In order to exploit the time dimension of the data, the second version of 
model (4.3.6) assumes 7- =1 and ei, t = fi, j + f2, i -t+ vi, t: 
Yi, t-yi, t-1 =77-yi, t-l+-I)I(D)*igi, t+(P2(D)'Cgi, t+(1)3(D)-dli, t+ci, t (4.3.8) 
where (D, (D), r=1,2,3, is a polynomial in the lag operator D, fl, i is a 
region specific effect and f2, i -ta region specific time trend. The objective of 
the authors is to test the relevance of the long-run effects of ig and cg and 
whether, eventually, the two cffects cancel out. For this reason they choose 
a number of five and six lags for both variabICS29. 0 
29 Two lags are chosen for the initial level of productivity and dl. In order to check 
for the robustness of the results, equation (4.3.8) is also re-estimated under alternative 
assumptions on the numbers of lags. 
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Estimation results confirm the positive effect of public investment on 
productivity for the whole economy - -1)1(5) = 0.013 - and the manu- 
facturing sector - -1)1(6) = 0.032 - whereas public consumption gets in- 
significant coefficients in all cases. Equation (4.3.8) is also re-estimated for 
the two groups of low-income (southern) regions and high-income (north- 
ern) regions and considering three disaggregated categories of infrastructure 
capital separately. Results are such that public investment seems to have 
a relevant impact on productivity in the manufacturing sector of the low- 
income regions - with estimates (Dj(5) = 0.048 and -1)1(6) = 0.072 - but 
not statistically significant effect in the high-income regions. 
This evidence is motivated by the fact that infrastructure services may 
have decreasing returns, so that marginal increases in their endowment yields 
only to negligible productivity enhancing effects in regions that are already 
well endowed. The analysis of data on public investment in transport infras- 
tructure (roads, airports and railways), buildings (public buildings, schools, 
and public spending devoted to private building) and SER (sanitation, en- 
ergy and reclamation) allow to find a confirmation to this argument. Indeed, 
none of these categories explain productivity differentials across high-income 
regions. On the other hand, the point estimates of transport and SER in 
the low-income regions are 0.048 and 0.043, respectively. 
5. FRONTIER APPROACH TO THE MEASUREMENT OF TFP 
GROWTH IN THE ITALIAN REGIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter focuses on two empirical studies on Italian Regions over the 
period 1970-1995. Both contributions will follow the so-called frontier ap- 
proach to the measurement of TFP growth by means of Data Envelopment 
Analysis. The methodology employed in both studies is reviewed in section 
5.2, paying attention on the relevant departures from the existing literature 
about the explored topics. 
The aim of the Chapter is to address the two empirical research ques- 
tions raised in Chapter 1 (see page 2): first, the study of the impact of 
public capital as a productivity enhancing externality to regional economics 
(section 5.3); second, the testing of the catching-up hypothesis across Italian 
regions (section 5.4). 
In section 5.3 regional productivity growth is decomposed into techni- 
cal efficiency change and technological progress by implementing a non- 
parametric frontier approach. The empirical analysis involves two steps. 
First, we implement a DEA model under the two alternative assumptions 
of two (labour and private capital) and three (labour, private and public 
capital) inputs and test for the statistical significance of public capital as 
an additional input. Second, an econometric analysis of the linkage between 
productivity gains and the provision of public capital is performed with 
the aim of assessing the role of public capital as a positive environmental 
variable. 
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Based on the results obtained in the first part of the Chapter, see- 
tion 5.4 is aimed at shedding some light on the determinants of conver- 
gence/divergence patterns across Italian regions and follows two stages. 
First, we consider the decomposition of TFP growth obtained in the two 
inputs scenario. Second, the convergence issue is analysed by means of panel 
data estimation techniques. Estimated technological progress and technical 
efficiency change are interpreted, respectively, as innovation and catching- 
up measurements and the catching-up hypothesis is tested for the Italian 
regions. 
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. The theoretical 
background of the methods that I employ is introduced in section 5.2. Sec- 
tion 5.3.1 deals with the description of the data set and the descriptive analy- 
sis of the variables involved in the study. Subsection 5.3.2 reports the results 
of the DEA model and those of the econometric analysis of public capital 
(and nine disaggregated categories of public capital) on TFP growth (and 
its two components technological progress and technical efficiency change). 
Some conclusions for this study are drawn in section 5.3.3. As for the second 
study of the Chapter, results and conclusions are reported in sections 5.4.1 
and 5.4.2, respectively. 
5.2 Frontier Approach to the Measurement of TFP Growth 
As we have seen in Chapter 4, empirical studies within the production func- 
tion and growth accounting approaches (section 4.2.2) share the common 
assumption that the aggregate production of observed units is fully effi- 
cient. As for studies on Italian regions (see section 4.3), this implies that 
regional economies are all assumed to be fully efficient: observed output in 
each region is equal to the potential level of production at each moment in 
time. From the empirical point of view this assumption is reflected by the 
estimations of averaged production functions within the production function 
5. Fýontier Approach to the Measurement of TFP Growth in the Italian Regions 139 
approhch and by the identification of TFP growth with technological progress 
within the growth accounting approach. The main motivation of the con- 
tribution in section 5.3 is to apply the so-called frontier approach to the 
measurement of TFP growth to the analysis of the productive role of public 
capital in Italian regions, in the attempt of overcoming the limitation of the 
existing literature (i. e., neglecting the inefficiency issue). 
The analysis of inefficiency in aggregate production is a subject which 
has recently become of great concern in the empirical literature comparing 
productivity growth across countries. In the remainder of this section, I 
present the key features of the theoretical background of my empirical work, 
which is mainly due to Fhre et al. (1994a, 1994b). 
The productivity measurements carried out within the non-frontier ap- 
proach assume that the production process is fully efficient. This assumption 
leads to identify TFP growth with technological progress (Grosskopf, 1993). 00 
Denoting input and output quantities at time t and t+1 as xt, xt+', yt C5 
and yt+l, respectively, the production functions at time t and t+1 will be 
respectively represented by: 
yt =A (t) f (xt) 
yt+' =A (t + 1) f (x, +, ) (5.2.2) 
The TFP index at time t will be given by the ratio of produced output 
and total inputs employed: 
t 
TFP (t) - =A (5.2.3) (xt) 
As a consequence, TFP growth between time t and t+1 will be evaluated 
using the following expression: 
TF P (t + 1) 
_A 
(t + 1) (5.2.4) TFP (t) ýi -(t-) 
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It is clear that TFP growth is explained only in terms of technological 
progress. In fact, (5.2.4) is equivalent to the formulation originally intro- 
duced by Solow (1957), who provided the original analysis of the growth 
accounting approach. Let us consider the Cobb-Douglas production func- 
tion in N inputs: 
t )(kn 
yt =A (t) 11 (X, (5.2.5) 
1 
Taking first derivatives, dividing by yt and using observed factor shares 
as proxies for the a,, terms, TFP growth between time t and t+1, will be 
evaluated as: N 
E-n X, (5.2.6) 
Ay1 Xn 
The observed output is hence assumed to be equal to the frontier output 
and the growth accounting measurement of TFP growth will capture shifts 
in the technology, i. e., technological change. However, such an estimate will 
be biased in the presence of inefficiency. Note that (5.2.6) is the general 
version of the equation (2.2.10) - see section 2.2, page 14 - which defines 
the Solow residual for the case of two inputs (labour and private capital). 
On the other hand, the frontier approach allows for the analysis of techni- 
cal efficiency change. Technological progress is assumed to push the frontier 
of potential production upward, while efficiency change will reflect the ca- 
pability of productive units to improve production with a set of given inputs 
and available technology. Assuming the presence of technical inefficiency in 
productive processes leads to a discrepancy between observed output and 
maximum efficient potential output: 
yt <A (t) f (xt) (5.2.7) 
yt+l <A (t + 1) f (xt+') (5.2.8) 
The concept of distance function (Malmquist, 1953) is introduced into 
the analysis in order to bring observed output up to its efficient level. The 
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output distance function Do is given by: 
Dot (xt, yt) = inf 0xt, 
Y t) E S' (sup 10 : (xt, Oyt) E St 
10 
(5.2.9) 
where 0 is a scalar and St represents the production technology. The out- 
put distance function is hence defined as the reciprocal of the maximum 
expansion in production - given available inputs - such that output is 
still feasible, i. e., (xt, Oyt) E S' (Farrell, 1957). 
The definition of the distance function in (5.2.9) completely characterizes 
the technology. Indeed, the following is true: 
Dot (xt, y') :51 if and only if (xt, Oyt) E S' (5.2.10) 
and the value taken by the distance function will be 1 if and only if produc- 
tion is technically efficient. 
From the concept of distance function it follows that: 
Dt xty (5.2.11) 0(' yt) (t) f (xt) 
t+I t+l y t+l Dot+' (x ,y)- (t + 1) f (xt+1) 
(5.2.12) 
where, at each moment in time, in the presence of technical inefficiency, 
maximum potential output A (t) f (x') will be equal to the observed output 
Yt corrected for the output distance function Do (xt, Y 9. 
The TFP indexes at time t and t+1 will be given respectively by: 
TFP (t) ==A (t) Dt (xt, y') (5.2.13) f (xt) 0 
and 
t+l 
TFP (t + 1) A (t + 1) Dt+' (xt+', t+1) 7 (-x t+1) y 
(5.2.14) 
which yields the following expression for the TFP growth index between the 
two periods: 
TFP (t + 1) 
-A 
(t + 1) Do+' (xt+l, y t+l) (5.2.15) 
TFP (t) A (t) Dt (xt, t) 0y 
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The measurement of TFP growth obtained in (5.2.15) will be equivalent 
to the one obtained following the growth accounting approach in (5.2.4) 
only in the absence of inefficiency (i. e., only if TFP change can be explained 
solely in terms of technical change). On the other hand, in the presence of 
inefficiency, measurements of TFP growth based on non-frontier methods 
will lead to biased results. 
Both non-pararactric linear pro-ramming techniques (Data Envelopment 0 
Analysis, DEA) and the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) have been em- 
ployed within the frontier approach. The implementation of both techniques 
suffers from limitations and implies advantages. The main weakness of non- 
parametric techniques when compared to SFA is related to the fact that 
the estimated gap between actual and potential output may result in up- 
ward bias since inefficiency scores may be influenced by other factors such 
as unobserved measurement errors. 
On the other hand, SFA is able to distinguish between inefficiency and 
other possible causes of the discrepancy between observed and maximum 
potential output. However, this is made possible by separating two com- 
ponents of the error term in the stochastic production function and the 
distributional assumptions may significantly affect the results. Moreover, 
the need to specify a functional form for the production frontier together 
with the assumption of a common technical change across production units 
represent two important limitations which make us prefer the use of non- 
parametric techniques. In fact, DEA does not require the imposition of any 
functional form for the technology set and allows technical change to vary 
across decision-making units. 
The implementation of non-parametric techniques implies the use of the 
output-oriented' CCD 'Malmquist productivity index introduced by Caves 
1 As pointed out by Caves et al. (1982), productivity differences over time may be 
interpreted in two ways: by interpreting productivity changes as changes in maximum 
output conditional on a given level of inputs (output-oriented productivity indexes) or by 
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et al. (1982) using the two distance functions defined above in (5.2.11) and 
(5.2.12) and the two following mixed period distance functions: 
,t t+l t+l) 
y t+l Do(x ly 
(5.2.16) 
A (t) f (xt+l) 
Dt+l (Xt y t) -y (5.2.17) 01A (t + 1) f (Tt) 
On the basis of the above output distance functions, Caves et al. (1982) 
define their output oriented Malmquist productivity indexes for period t and 
+I as: 
Dt t+l ) 
t+1) 
11, lot (Xt, y ti Xt+l, y t+1) =0 
(X y (5.2.18) 
Dt (xt, t) 0y 
evaluated with respect to technolo, -, Y at time t; and: 
xt, t, xt+l, t+l) = 
Dot+l (xt+', yt+') (5.2.19) 
. A, 101 
(yy 
t+l t t) Do (x, y 
evaluated with respect to tcclinolo. -Y at time t+1. 
In order to avoid the subjective choice of the reference technology, an 
additional productivity index is defined as the geometric mean of (5.2.18) 
and (5.2.19): 
I t+1 t+1 2 
Y) Dt+1 (x Y tt t+1 t+11 
[Dot (xt+', t+1 0 Mot (x yx, Y ,, I --- bot (x t+1 t Y9 
(5.2.20) 
t (xt, yt) Do (X ,I 
Fdre et al. (1994a, 1994b) decompose (5.2.20) into two components 
in order to account for both technical efficiency change and technological 
change (under the assumption of CTRS): 
Dt+1 (xt+', Y t+1) Dtc (Xt+l, yt+') Dotc klotc (xt, yt, xt", yt+l) - OC 0, 
(xt, yt) 
Dt (xt, yt) Dt+1 (xt+l, yt+l) Dt+1 (xt, yt) OC OC OC 
(5.2.21) 
where the first ratio represents the change in technical efficiency between 
period t and period t+1 and the term in brackets measures the shift in 
interpreting them as changes in minimum input requirements, conditional on a given level 
of outputs (input oriented productivity indexes). We will focus our attention on the first 
possibility. 
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technology between the two periods. AI,,, greater than 1 indicates that 
productivity has risen between period t and t+1 and this can be explained 
in terms of technical efficiency improvement and/or technological progress. 0 
A value of the index smaller than 1, will indicate a TFP slowdown between 
the two periods. It is important to notice that the two components may move 
in opposite directions. For instance, if neither input (xt = xt+, ) nor output 
(yt = yt+, ) change between the two periods, AI,,, will be equal to 1 and 
technical change and cfficicncy change will be reciprocal but not necessarily 
both equal to 1. 
The graphical example in Fdre et al. (1994b) for the CRTS case provides 
the key intuition of the decomposition of the Malmquist index in (5.2.21). 
y 
f 
d 
c, e 
b 
a 
Figure 5.2.1: The Decomposition of the Malmquist Index 
In Figure 5.2.1, S' and S'+1 represent the production frontiers at time 
t and t+1, respectively. In this simple graphical example, the level of 
production observed at time t is not efficient. Indeed, observed output 
ya is below the frontier and maximum potential output is given by 
y b. According to the definition in (5.2.11), the output distance function 
0x 
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is defined by the ratio Oa/Ob < 1. Since S' C S'+', a technical advance has 
taken place between time t and t+1. However, observed production at time 
t+I (y = d) is still inefficient and the output distance function of the new 
period is equal to OdlOf < 1. 
Given the two distance functions OalOb and OdlOf and recalling the 
decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index in (5.2.21), we can define 
the ratio: 
OdlOf 
Oa/Ob = efficiency change 
(5.2.22) 
which for values greater than one will indicate that production is closer to its 
efficient level in period t+1 than in period t (i. e., an efficiency improvement 
occurred between the two periods). From Figure 5.2.1, we can also derive the 
graphical counterparts of the two mixed output distance functions in (5.2.16) 
and (5.2.17), which are necessary to obtain the decomposed Malmquist index 
of our example: 
Dot (xt+', yt+l) =y 
t+l 
= 
Od (5.2.23) 
A (t) f (xt+l) Oe 
Dt+l (xt, y t) =yt-= 
Oa (5.2.24) 0A (t + 1) f (xt) Oc 
where the ratio in (5.2.23) represents the highest proportional change in out- 
put requirements to make (xt+l, yt+') feasible in relation to the technology 
at time t. On the other hand, the ratio defined in (5.2.24) indicates the 
highest proportional change in output requirements to make (xt, y') feasible 
in relation to the technology at time t+1. 
Finally, the 'XIalmquist productivity index can be expressed as: 
t+l Od Oa 
[ Odloe Oa/ob] 1/2 
= 
Od/Oa [Of Oc 1/2 
, 0',; yt, xt", y)= Of/ Ob Od10f Oa/Oc Of Ob Oe Ob] 
(5.2.25) 
In applied Nvork considering suitable panel data, the TvIalmquist produc- 
tivity index may be calculated by using DEA linear programming techniques. 
In the present application, I will use the panel of the 20 Italian regions over 
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the period 1970-95. The availability of such a panel allows to locate the 
best practice frontier in each year of the sample period. The region (or 
regions) characterized by the most efficient aggregate production will lie on 
the frontier. 
The frontier technology with CTRS at time t is constructed from the 
data as: 
KK 
St t, t) t-E Zk, t k, t. k, t k, t < Xt . Zk, t > 
(X Y: YM Yrn, EZ Xn 
- n' -0 
(5.2.26) 
I 
k=1 k=1 
where k=1,.. K are regions, x=1,.. ' 
N are inputs, and y=1,.., Al are 
outputs. In our case only one output is considered (regional GDP), and the 
terms Zk, t stand forweights on each region. The assumption of CRTS can 
be relaxed by imposing the restriction EK 1 Zk, 
t = 1, which will give the k= 
case of variable returns to scale (VRTS). 
In order to calculate the Nfalmquist productivity index for each region at 
each time t, the distance functions illustrated in (5.2.11), (5.2.12), (5.2.16) 
and (5.2.17) have to be evaluated. Following FRre et al. (1994b), we will 
refer to the case of CRTS. The distance function in (5.2.11) is evaluated by 
solving the following linear programming problCM2 for each region V: 
k, t k', t T Dt xy max Ok-, (5.2.27) 
subject to 
K 
k-, t k-, t > ok' k, t Z YM YM (5.2.28) 
k=l 
K 
k-, t k, t < k, t ZZ Xn 
-Xn 
(5.2.29) 
k=I 
Zk-, t >o (5.2.30) 
The evaluation of Dt+1 (xl+', yt+') will imply solving a linear program- 0 
ming problem such as the one in (5.2.27)-(5.2.30), transposing superscripts 
Charnes et al. (1978,1981). 
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t with t+1. The mixed distance function in (5.2.16) is obtained by solving 
the following problem: 
0 
k', t+l, k', t+1)]-' = max0 k-i (5.2.31) 
[Dt (X 
y 
subject to 
K 
k, t k, t > ok' k-', t+l z YM YM (5.2.32) 
k=l 
K 
z k, t x k, t < k', t+l (5.2,33) n- Xn 
k=l 
z k, t >o (5.2.34) 
The solution to the linear proggramming problem in (5.2.3l)-(5.2.34) with 
superscripts t and t+1 transposed will give Dt+'(xt, t). 0Y 
The Alalmquist index as decomposed in (5.2.21) was applied for the first 
time in Fdre et al. (1994b) to the comparison of productivity growth in a 
sample of 17 OECD countries over the period 1979-88. In this study, the 
authors provide a new explanation of the convergence process, interpreting 
technical efficiency change and technological progress as measurements of 
catching-up and innovation respectively. Since then, these techniques have 
received increasing attention in analysing the convergence issue and the 
impact on productivity growth of factors others than private capital and 
labour units. 
For instance, Taskin and Zaim (1997) test the catching-up hypothesis 
for a group of 23 countries including both low-income and high-income 
economics over the period 1975-90. Their findings are such that innova- 
tion turns out to be tile main source of productivity growth in high-income 
countries, while low-income economics arc characterized by a higher tech- 
nical efficiency. change, which allows them to approach the best practice 
frontier at a faster rate. However, only private capital and labour are as- 
sumed to affect the production correspondence. 
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Some recent studies have made attempts of considering additional fac- 
tors that might influence both technical efficiency change and technological 
progress patterns by following Fdre et al. (1994a, 1994b). Alaudos et al. 
(1999) and Alurillo-Zamorano and Vega-Cervera (2001) use data on OECD 
countries and consider human capital and energy as additional productive 
factors. Puig-Junoy (2001) uses data on tile U. S. economy and consid- 
ers public capital as a productive input in addition to private capital and 
labour. In this paper both DEA and SFA are implemented in order to de- 
compose productivity growth in technical efficiency change and technological 
progress. Boisso et al. (2000) also deal with data on the U. S. economy and 
test for the significance of public infrastructure investment in affecting tech- 
nical efficiency levels. Pedraja Chaparro et al. (2000) use data on the Span- 
ish regions and follow a two-step procedure. They first implement DEA, 
assuming that private capital and labour are the only productive inputs, 
and obtain technical efficiency change and technological progress scores. In 
a second step, productivity growth and its two components are regressed on 
human capital and public capital, finding a positive and statistically signif- 
icant correlation in both cases. 
5.3 TFP Growth and Public Capital: The Case of Italy 
The first objective of this Chapter is to contribute to the debate on the 
empirical linkage between public capital and productivity in the Italian re- 
gions. The main novelty will be the decomposition of productivity growth 
into technical efficiency change and technological progress by means of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Malmquist productivity indexes, leading 
to the main conclusion of the significant role played by public capital as a 
productivity enhancing externality to regional economics. 
Existing applied work on Italy has focused on the production function 
approach (Picci, 1997 and 1999), the growth accounting approach (La Fer- 
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rara et al., 2000), and the growth approach (Acconcia and Del XIonte, 2000). 
These recent contributions have enhanced the literature on the topic, alloAv- 
ing for taking into account heterogeneity across Italian regions by means 
of panel data estimation techniques. However, their conclusions can suffer 
from a common shortcoming: they do not take account of the inefficiency 
issue. 
This is due to the implicit assumption that the production process is 
fully efficient, which implies that the estimates of average production func- 
tions will be biased in the presence of inefficiency. Furthermore, if such an 
assumption does not hold, TFP growth will be identified with technological 
progress, while another source of productivity growth - technical efficiency 
change - will be neglected (Grosskopf, 1993). 
In the attempt of overcoming the limitations of the existing literature 
by implementing a non-parametric frontier approach to the measurement of 
productivity, my contribution departs from previous studies in three main 
aspects. First, I account for both technical efficiency change and technolog- 
ical progress, checking how the empirical evidence is modified accordingly. 
Second, since both technical efficiency change and technological progress arc 
not only assumed to be time varying but also evaluated for each regional 
economy, an additional source of heterogeneity across regions is introduced. 
Third, the productive process is not restricted to being described by any 
functional form and the maximum degree of flexibility is allowed by the use 
of non-parametric analysis. 
The DEA procedure is first implemented assuming a non-parametric pro- 
duction function in private capital and labour and then considering public 
capital as an additional input. The significance of public capital as a produc- 
tive input is tested empirically using the Banker test (1996), which allows 
to compare these two alternative scenarios. Indeed, the null hypothesis that 
public capital does not directly affect the production correspondence as a 
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productive factor can not be rejected. 
An econometric analysis of the contribution of public capital to pro- 
ductivity gains is then performed. The main finding of such an analysis 
is the positive and statistically significant relationship between infrastruc- 
ture services and both the mutually exclusive and exhaustive components 
of TFP growth. Our results suggest that public capital indirectly affects 
productivity, rather than directly enhancing it as an additional input in the 
production function. In other words, it seems that during the period 1970- 
95 public capital has played the role of a positive externality to regional 
economics. Finally, a detailed analysis of the productivity effects of each of 
the categories of public capital is provided for the whole country and for the 
two macro-regions (Center-North and South) with the aim of verifying our 
conclusions at higher level of territorial disaggregation. 
5.3.1 Data 
I use data on the 20 Italian regions for the period 1970-95. Observed output 
is regional GDP. Available inputs are represented by units of labour, private 
capital and public capital. Data on GDP and units of labour are retrieved 
from CRENOS NewRegiolt60-963. Data on public and private capital stocks 
are those calculated by Bonaglia and Picci (2000)4, whose statistical work 
has been described in section 4.3, pages 129-1305. 
Table 5.3.1 shows average annual growth rates of GDP, private capi- 
tal and labour for the North-East, the North-West, the Center and the 
South of Italy in the overall sample period and during the three sub-periods 
1970-79,1980-89 and 1990-95. Italian regions belong to the four macro- 
regions as follows: North-West = Piemonte (PIE), Lombardia (LOM), Valle 
3 http: //,. NN,,, %v. crenos. it. 
4 http: //www. spbo. unibo. it/picci/indexkp. html. 
5 GDP, private capital and public capital values are expressed at constant prices 1990; 
units of labour are expressed in thousands. 
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Table 5.3.1: Average Growth Rates (%) of GDP, Labour and Private Capital (1970- 
95) 
hlacro-Regions GDP L K 
1970-79 
North-East 4.38 1.44 4.96 
North-West 2.66 0.42 3.70 
Center 4.02 1.34 5.76 
South 3.67 0.72 8.93 
Italy 3.68 0.93 6.46 
1980-89 
North-East 2.11 0.52 2.73 
North-West 1.85 0.06 1.91 
Center 2.03 0.63 3.46 
South 2.24 0.73 1.93 
Italy 2.09 0.53 2.39 
1990-95 
North-East 2.10 -0.67 1.63 
North-West 0.78 -0.93 0.17 
Center 1.31 -0.73 1.05 
South 0.99 -1. G5 LG3 
Italy 1.23 -1.12 1.22 
Full sample 
North-East 3.00 0.62 3.36 
North-West 1.93 -0.02 2.23 
Center 2. G5 0.61 3.84 
South 2.52 0.21 UO 
Italy 2.53 0.33 3.73 
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d'Aosta (VDA), Liguria (LIG); North-East = Tkntino Alto Adige (TAA), 
Veneto (VEN), Friuli Venezia Giulia (FVG), Emilia Romagna (ER); Cen- 
ter = Toscana (TOS), Umbria (UMB), 'Marche (INIAR) and Lazio (LAZ); 
South = Abruzzo (ABR), Molisc (MOL), Campania (CAM), Puglia (PUG), 
Basilicata (BAS), Calabria (CAL), Sicilia (SIC) and Sardegna (SAR). In the 
whole sample period, the regions in the North-East had the best economic 
performance (+3%), followed by those in the Center (2.65%), in the South 
(2.52%) and in the North-West (1.93%). GDP has been growing at decreas- 
ing rates over time in the whole country. Labour input averaged a quite flat 
performance, with increases larger than 1% only in the Center and in the 
North-East during the 1970s. Labour units decreased during the 1990s in 
the whole country, particularly in the South (-1.65%). On the other hand, 
the accumulation of private capital was higher in the regions of the South, 
mostly due to the performance of the 1970s. 
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Figure 5.3.1: Public Capital Stocks, Annual Growth Rates (1970-95) 
As shown in Figure 5.3.1 tile provision of public capital grow at decreas- 
ing rates between 1970 and 1995. This was mainly due to tile performance of 
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Figure 5.3.2: "Core"Public Capital Stocks, Annual Growth Rates (1970-95) 
its "core" component6 (Figure 5.3.2), whereas "non-core" public capital ap- 
pears to have a less well-depicted decreasing behavior (Figure 5.3.3). Public 
capital grew more in the South than in the Center-North during the 1970s, 
the period with the highest accumulation of both public and private capital 
in the South. The following decade was characterized by a slowdown in pub- 
lic capital provision in the area, mainly due to the end of the state agency 
"Cassa del Xlezzogiorno"for the development of the southern regions. Simi- 
larly, northern regions suffered from a decline in the rate of growth of public 
capital, which decreased by less than in the South though. In the early 
1990s, the decreasing trend of the previous years did not come to an end. 
Figure 5.3.4 shows the time path of the "core/non-core" public capital ratio. 
The ratio increased up to the end of the 1970s in the Ccnter-North, while it 
started to decline from 1976 in the southern regions. These figurcs seem to 
6 The "core" component of public capital includes the categories which are more likely to 
directly affect productivity: Roads and Airports, Railways and Subways, Marine (ports, 
lake and river navigation), Water (river planning, etc. ) and Electrical Lines and Telecom- 
munications 
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show that productive spending only in the first half of the period character- 
ized the allocation of public capital towards the southern regions, whereas 
it continued up to the end of the 1970s in the Center-North. Afterwards the 
ratio shows a declining pattern in both the macro-regions. 
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Figure 5.3.3: "Non-Core" Public Capital Stocks, Annual Growth Rates (1970-95) 
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5.3.2 Results 
The empirical analysis proceeds in two parts. In the first part of the analysis, 
I apply the DEA procedure to the measurement of TFP growth. First, I 
assume that non-parametric regional production functions include private 
capital and labour only. Then, the DEA model is constructed under the 
alternative scenario that public capital enters as an additional input the non- 
parametric production function of each Italian region. Finally, a test of the 
relevance of public capital as a direct input of production is performed on the 
basis of the comparison between the two scenarios. This part of the analysis 
can be thought as testing the power of public capital in producing the direct 
cffect on output - see effect (1) at page 9- with the advantage with respect 
of previous studies of taking into account inefficiency in production. 
The second part of the analysis uses econometric techniques of estima- 
tion in order to assess the role of public capital in determining TFP growth 
in Italian regions over the sample period. Hence, the aim on this part of the 
analysis is the assessment of public capital in generating the indirect effect 
on TFP growth described by the effect (3) in section 2.2 at page 13. This 
investigation of the role of public capital as an environmental variable takes 
advantage of accounting for inefficiency, improving the evidence provided by 
the traditional growth accounting approach. The analysis considers the im- 
pact of public capital on TFP growth and both its components, technological 
progress and efficiency change. The same investigation is carried out for the 
"core" component of public capital and for the nine categories Roads and Air- 
ports (GRA), Railways and Subways (GRS), Marine (ports, lake and river 
navigation) (GIVI), Water (river planning, etc. ) and Electrical Lines (GWE), 
Public Buildings and Schools (CPBS), Sanitation (hospitals, water filtering, 
sewers) (GS), Land Reclamation and Irrigation (GLRI), Telecommunica- 
tions (GT) and Other types of works (such as pipelines, infrastructures for 
tourism etc. ) (GO). 
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The DEA Alodel 
The DEA procedurC7 is implemented under tivo alternative assumptions: 
(a) two inputs: private capital and labour; 
(b) three inputs: private capital, public capital labour. 
Thus, it is not simply assumed on a priori grounds that public capital enters 
the aggregate production function, testing instead whether infrastructure 
services have a direct impact on output by the implementation of the Banker 
test (1996). Table 5.3.2 reports annual mean values of the Xlalmquist index 
and its mutually exclusive and exhaustive components for Italy during the 
three sub-periods 1970-79,1980-89 and 1990-95 and in the two alternative 
scenarios (a) and (b). 
Starting with the two inputs scenario (a) and looking at , we note that 
productivity - tfp ch. in column 4- increased by 1.5%, 1.1% and 1.7% per 
annum averaged over the 1970s, the 1980s and the early 1990s, respectively. 
The poorest performance took place during the years 1974,1975,1981 and 
1982. The highest values belong to 1976, to the last observation of the 1970s 
and to the late 1990s. 
As for the decomposition of the productivity change index, our results 
show how during the sample period productivity growth was due mainly 
to gains in innovation - tech. ch. in column 3- rather than technical 
efficiency change - eff. ch. in column 2. However, technical efficiency 
change prevails over technological progress when TFP slows down, namely 
after the two oil shocks. 
When public capital is assumed to be an additional input in model (b), 
TFP change follows a pattern similar to one observed in the two inputs 
scenario, gencrally showing lower values for productivity growth though. 
The average change in productivity, however, is found to be less than in the 0 
7 DEA models are performed using DEAP 2.1 (Coelli, 1996). 0 
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Table 5.3.2: Technical Efficiency Change, Technological Progress and TFP Growth 
- Italy (1970-95) 
(a) Inputs: L and K (b) Inputs: L, K and G 
Year eff. ch. tech. ch. tfp ch. Year eff. ch. tech. ch. tfp ch. 
70-71 0.999 1.006 1.005 70-71 1.003 0.996 0.999 
71-72 0.981 1.039 1.019 71-72 0.998 1.027 1.015 
72-73 1.009 1.023 1.032 72-73 1.014 1.017 1.031 
73-74 1.023 0.980 1.002 73-74 1.005 0.996 1.001 
74-75 1.005 0.969 0.973 74-75 0.998 0.972 0.971 
75-76 0.990 1.046 1.036 75-76 0.986 1.047 1.033 
76-77 1.003 1.012 1.015 76-77 1.000 1.012 1.012 
77-78 1.000 1.022 1.022 77-78 0.999 1.019 1.018 
78-79 0.996 1.036 1.032 78-79 0.995 1.034 1.029 
Alean 1.001 1.014 1.015 Mean 0.999 1.013 1.012 
80-81 1.003 0.991 0.995 80-81 1.000 0.992 0.992 
81-82 0.994 1.003 0.998 81-82 0.999 0.996 0.995 
82-83 1.008 0.994 1.003 82-83 1.005 0.996 1.000 
83-84 1.005 1.011 1.016 83-84 1.004 1.008 1.012 
84-85 1.011 1.003 1.015 84-85 1.009 1.003 1.012 
85-86 0.990 1.022 1.012 85-86 0.991 1.021 1.012 
86-87 0.996 1.021 1.018 86-87 0.997 1.020 1.017 
87-88 1.010 1.015 1.025 87-88 1.010 1.014 1.024 
88-89 0.999 1.023 1.022 88-89 0.999 1.021 1.020 
Alcan 1.002 1.009 1.011 Afean 1.002 1.008 1.009 
90-91 0.998 1.007 1.005 90-91 0.999 1.004 1.003 
91-92 1.007 1.003 1.010 91-92 1.006 1.002 1.008 
92-93 1.008 1.002 1.010 92-93 1.007 0.999 1.006 
93-94 0.995 1.038 1.032 93-94 0.998 1.032 1.030 
94-95 1.007 1.022 1.030 94-95 1.009 1.019 1.028 
Alean 1.003 1.014 1.017 Afean 1.004 1.011 1.015 
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former scenario (-0.3% in the first sub-period and -0.2% both in the 1980s 
and in the first half of the 1990s). 
Tables 5.3.3-5.3.5 report DEA output disaggregated by regions and macro- 
regions in the three sub-periods. 
Looking at Table 5.3.3, with regard to the two inputs scenario (a), the 
average performances at a macro-regional level during the 1970s are the fol- 
lowing: the North East achieves the highest TFP growth (2.8%), followed 
by the North-West (2.2%), the Center (1.5%) and the South (0.6%). Thus, 
southern regions suffered from low productivity growth, despite the high 
rate of accumulation of both public and private capital experienced during 
the period. On the other hand, the North of the country witnessed a pro- 
ductivity gain about four times as much as the southern regions did, due 
to technological progress more than technical efficiency change. Similarly, 
central regions found technological progress to be the main source of TFP 
enhancing, performing relatively well, but below the average of the North. 
Once we estimate the DEA model under the assumption (b), TFP change 
in the South is the same as in the previous scenario8. The regions of the 
North-East show a similar behavior: an unimportant decrease in the tech- 
nical efficiency change score and unaffected TFP growth. On the other 
hand, both the North-"Alest and the central regions are characterized by a 
lower average TFP change with respect to the scenario (a) (-1.2% and -0.3% 
respectively), as a result of a decline in both of its components. 
The pattern of productivity growth depicted by the DEA model for the 
1980s (Table 5.3.4) is the following. In the two inputs scenario, the highest 
TFP growth is achieved by the North West (1.7%), followed by the South 
(1.2%), the North-East (1.0%) and the Center (0.5%). Once public capital is 
considered as an additional input in the non-parametric production function, 
'3 The technological progress component is unaffected, while technical efficiency change 
is lower by merely 0.1%. 
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Table 5.3.3: Technical Efficiency Change, Technological Progress and TFP Growth 
- Italian Regions (1970-79) 
(a) Inputs: L and K (b) Inputs: L, K and G 
Re. -ion eff. ch. tech. ch. tfp c h. eff. ch. tech. ch. tfp c h. 
PIE 1.004 1.021 1.025 0.993 0.998 0.991 
VDA 0.991 1.020 1.011 0.991 1.021 1.011 
LONI 1.007 1.021 1.028 1.000 1.016 1.016 
TAA 1.005 1.020 1.025 1.005 1.020 1.025 
VEN 1.004 1.020 1.024 1.001 1.023 1.024 
FVG 1.012 1.020 1.032 1.011 1.021 1.032 
LIG 1.002 1.021 1.023 1.002 1.021 1.022 
ER 1.009 1.020 1.029 1.008 1.021 1.029 
TOS 1.005 1.020 1.025 1.005 1.021 1.026 
UINIB 1.006 1.020 1.026 1.006 1.020 1.026 
MAR 0.996 1.005 1.001 0.991 1.002 0.993 
LAZ 1.000 1.006 1.006 1.000 1.004 1.004 
ABR 1.007 1.016 1.023 1.007 1.016 1.023 
AfOL 0.960 0.952 0.914 0.960 0.952 0.914 
CATNI 0.992 1.016 1.007 0.992 1.015 1.007 
PUG 1.014 1.020 1.034 1.010 1.021 1.031 
BAS 1.003 1.021 1.024 1.003 1.021 1.024 
CAL 0.984 1.012 0.995 0.984 1.012 0.995 
sic 1.010 1.019 1.029 1.010 1.020 1.030 
SAR 1.004 1.021 1.025 1.004 1.021 1.025 
North-West 1.001 1.021 1.022 0.997 1.014 1.010 
North-East 1.008 1.020 1.028 1.006 1.021 1.028 
Center 1.002 1.013 1.015 1.001 1.012 1.012 
South 0.997 1.010 1.006 0.996 1.010 1.006 
It aly 1.001 1.014 1.015 0.999 1.013 1.012 
5. Frontier Approach to the Mcasurement of TFP Growth in the Italian Regions 160 
Table 5.3.4: Technical Efficiency Change, Technological Progress and TFP Growth 000 
- Italian Regions (1980-89) 
(a) Inputs: L and K (b) Inputs: L, K and G 
Re-ion eff. ch. tech. ch. tfp ch. eff. ch. tech. ch. tfp ch. 
PIE 1.002 1.017 1.020 0.996 1.008 1.004 
VDA 0.999 1.017 1.015 0.999 1.017 1.015 
LOM 1.003 1.019 1.022 1.000 1.009 1.009 
TAA 1.005 0.991 0.996 1.005 0.991 0.996 
VEN 1.002 1.015 1.016 1.004 0.999 1.003 
FVG 1.001 1.013 1.014 1.000 1.013 1.014 
LIG 0.998 1.013 1.011 0.998 1.013 1.010 
ER 1.000 1.015 1.015 0.999 1.015 1.014 
TOS 1.000 1.014 1.014 0.999 1.015 1.014 
UNIB 1.000 1.013 1.013 0.999 1.014 1.013 
'MAR 1.006 1.001 1.007 1.006 1.000 1.006 
LAZ 1.000 0.987 0.987 1.000 0.998 0.998 
ABR 1.001 1.010 1.011 1.001 1.010 1.012 
NIOL 1.009 1.010 1.019 1.009 1.010 1.019 
CAM 1.023 0.980 1.002 1.023 0.980 1.002 
PUG 1.007 1.014 1.022 1.006 1.015 1.022 
BAS 0.995 1.014 1.009 0.995 1.014 1.009 
CAL 1.000 1.012 1.012 1.000 1.012 1.012 
sic 1.003 1.011 1.014 1.003 1.011 1.014 
SAR 0.988 1.020 1.007 0.988 1.020 1.007 
North-West 1.001 1.017 1.017 0.998 1.012 1.010 
North-East 1.002 1.009 1.010 1.002 1.005 1.007 
Center 1.002 1.004 1.005 1.001 1.007 1.005 
South 1.003 1.009 1.012 1.003 1.009 1.012 
Italy 1.002 1.009 1.011 1.002 1.008 1.009 
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Table 5.3.5: Technical Efficiency Change, Technological Progress and TFP Growth 
- Italian Re-ions (1990-95) 0 
(a) Inputs: L and K (b) Inputs: L, K and G 
Region eff. ch. tech. ch. tfp c h. eff. ch. tech. ch. tfp ch. 
PIE 0.999 1.015 1.014 0.999 1.015 1.015 
VDA 0.992 1.021 1.012 0.992 1.021 1.012 
LONI 1.000 1.016 1.016 1.000 1.000 1.001 
TAA 1.002 1.000 1.002 1.002 1.000 1.002 
VEN 1.006 1.021 1.027 1.013 0.993 1.005 
FVG 1.014 1.021 1.035 1.014 1.014 1.035 
LIG 1.000 1.021 1.021 1.000 1.000 1.021 
ER 1.004 1.020 1.024 1.006 1.016 1.021 
TOS 0.993 1.022 1.015 1.001 1.014 1.014 
UINIB 1.000 1.021 1.021 1.002 1.017 1.018 
MAR 1.010 1.003 1.013 1.010 1.003 1.013 
LAZ 1.000 1.004 1.004 1.000 1.001 1.001 
ABR 1.002 1.021 1.023 1.002 1.021 1.023 
NIOL 1.008 1.021 1.030 1.008 1.021 1.030 
C AIN 1 0.992 0.996 0.988 0.992 0.996 0.988 
PUG 1.004 1.021 1.025 1.008 1.016 1.024 
BAS 1.020 1.022 1.042 1.020 1.022 1.042 
CAL 1.007 1.008 1.015 1.007 1.008 1.015 
sic 0.998 1.000 0.998 0.998 1.000 0.998 
SAR 1.008 1.016 1.024 1.008 1.016 1.024 
North-West 0.998 1.019 1.016 0.998 1.015 1.012 
North-East 1.007 1.016 1.022 1.009 1.008 1.016 
Center 1.001 1.013 1.013 1.003 1.009 1.012 
South 1.005 1.013 1.018 1.005 1.013 1.018 
Italy 1.003 1.014 1.017 1.004 1.011 1.015 
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only the North-West and the North-East get lower TFP change scores (-0.7% 
and -0.3% respectively). 
The analysis of the results obtained for the early 1990s - see Table 
5.3.5 - leads to similar conclusions: TFP growth and the performance of 
its two components in the South and in the Center are unaffected by the 
inclusion of public capital in the model, influencing DEA scores in the rest 
of the country. Namely, TFP growth declines by -0.4% and -0.6% for the 
North-West and the North-East respectively in model (b) with respect to 
model (a). 
Hence, in each of the considered sub-periods, the results obtained at the 
national level do not change widely whether or not public capital enters the 
non-parametric regional production functions. Alorcover, the lower produc- 
tivity performance depicted in the three inputs scenario is mostly due to 
a reduction in technological progress whereas technical efficiency change is 
almost always found to be unaffected (with the exception of the 1970s). 
As for the analysis disaggregated at a macro-regional level, comparing 
the two models (a) and (b), only the North of the country is characterized 
by lower TFP growth in the latter, whereas the performance of the Center 
and the South is left mostly unchanged. 
Given these results, we now turn to the test of the significance of public 
capital as a productive input in the DEA model by implementing the Banker 
test (1996). 
In general, this test is based on the comparison between a basic DEA 
model including inputs X and outputs Y and a model with the same outputs 
Y, and including additional inputs Z. The significance of the additional 
inputs Z is tested on the basis of their asymptotic properties. If inefficiency 
(0) has a half-normal distribution, the Banker test (THN) is distributed as 
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an FN, N, with N indicating the number of observations: 
EN 
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where, in our case, the only output in both DEA models (a) and (b) is CDP 
and the additional input in model (b) is public capital. 
Under the null hypothesis that public capital does not affect the pro- 
e duction correspondence, we get an F of 1.04, thus we do not reject the null 
hypothesis. Carrying out the same test for the "core" component of public 
capital as a possible additional input, the F test becomes equal to 1.05, 
leading us again to conclude that there is non productive role for public 
capital. According to this result, public capital should not be considered as 
a direct productive factor. Thus, we rely on the results obtained in the two 
inputs scenario and move to the analysis of the role of public capital as a 
positive externality to regional economics. 
The Impact of Public Capital on TFP Growth 
In the second part of the analysis, our aim is to verify whether the endow- 
ment of public capital has enhanced the performance of regional economics 
with respect to both efficiency and technological aspects of production over 
the period 1970-95. With this purpose in mind, an econometric analysis of 
the impact of public capital on productivity gains (and on both of its com- 
ponents) is performed using Limdep, 7.0. In general, the estimated equation 
is given by: 
=, y - X+u (5.3.2) 
where the dependent variable y is either total factor productivity, or tCCh7 
nical efficiency or technological progress and the independent variable x is 00 
either public capital, or its "core" component or one of its nine disaggregated 
categories. 
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When efficiency is regressed on public capital 4 censored Tobit model is 
implemented, due to the fact that efficiency scores from DEA can not be 
negative. 
On the other hand, technological progress and TFP are expressed in 
terms of 1970 (first observation in time) = 100. Therefore, we refer to them 
as cumulative variables and -. vc use fixed effects and random effects panel 
data estimation techniques when these two variables are regressed on public 
capital9. 
Table 5.3.6 shows the results of the regression of tile cumulative perfor- 
mance of TFP on total public capital and "core" public capital individually10. 
A highly statistically significant positive relationship arises in both cases. 
Thus, public capital seems to have positively contributed to TFP gains over 
tile sample period, this being more noticeable for its "core" component, as 
shown by the higher magnitude of the estimated coefficients (0.39 compared 
to 0.21). 
This result is consistent with the fact that "core"public capital is indeed 
more likely to have productivity enhancing effects. Furthermore, estimated 
coefficients turn out to be noticeably higher in tile South of the country than 
in the Center-North, which confirms the results of previous studies. 
In Table 5.3.7 are reported the results obtained by considering each of 
the categories of public capital as the independent variable in the estimated 
equation". All tile categories are positively correlated with the cumulative 
performance of TFP in the whole country, with the exception of "Land recla- 
mation and Irrigation" (GLRI). Regarding the magnitude of the estimated 
parameters, we note that the category "Water and Electrical Lines" (GWE) 
9 OLS procedure has also been applied and results are not shown since the LAI test 
always led to prefer either the fixed or the random effects models to the pooled estimator. 10 t-ratios are given in parentheses, the high value of the Hausman test leads us to rely 
on the results of the fixed effects model in all cases. 
11 t-ratios are given in parenthesis; critical value of X2(1) = 3.84 (5%). 
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Table 5.3.6. - TFP Growth and Public Capital 
Italy Fixed Effects Random Effects LIM test Hausman test 
Public capital 0.21 0.19 
(10.1) (9.4) 1842.2 14.6 
Core Public capital 0.39 0.33 
(10.1) (9.3) 1877.4 15.6 
N=520 
Center- North Fixed Effects Random Effects LINI test Hausman test 
Public capital 0.18 0.15 
(7.4) (6.9) 535.3 8.2 
Core Public capital 0.33 0.26 
(7.7) (6.9) 515.3 12.5 
N=312 
South Fixed Effects Random Effects LAI test Hausman test 
Public capital 0.38 0.35 
(8.7) (7.9) 1144.9 8.1 
Core Public capital 0.77 0.68 
(7-9) (7.3) 1040.2 9.7 
N=208 
y= TFP scores (1970=100); x= per capita stock of public capital 
gets the highest coefficients followed by "Roads and Airports" (GRA), "Ma- 
rine" (CM), and "Telecommunications" (GT). Such ranking does not change 
widely across the two macro-regions. 
The breaking down of productivity growth into its two mutually ex- 
clusive and exhaustive components enables us to analysc the role of the 
endowment of infrastructure services in explaining the dissimilar pattern of 
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Table 5.3.7., TFP Growth and the Categories of Public Capital 
Italy Fixed Effects Random Effects LNI test Hausman test 
GRA 0.54 (5.6) 0.32 (4.0) 1713.0 16.0 
GRS 0.30 (13.9) 0.29 (13.6) 2336.0 5.97 
GNI 0.47(8.1) 0.43 (7.8) 1941.7 5.88 
GWE 0.73 (8.7) 0.70 (8.5) 2045.9 2.54 
GPBS 0.13 (11.2) 0.13 (11.1) 2243.4 2.11 
as 0.10 (9.3) 0.09 (8-8) 1736.8 12.8 
GLRI 0.97(0.5) -0.09 (-0.6) 1781.3 0.68 
GT 0.35 (7.1) 0.34 (7.1) 2155.3 0.31 
GO 0.13 (6.7) 0.12 (6.6) 1968.8 0.90 
Center-North Fixed Effects Random Effects LNI test Hausman test 
GRA 0.56 (5.0) 0.3 (3.5) 459.3 13.2 
GRS 0.28 (11.5) 0.27(11.4) 691.1 4.06 
GNI 0.78 (7.2) 0.69 (6.8) 550.6 5.54 
GWEL 0.61 (6.8) 0.56 (6.5) 559.9 4.52 
GPBS 0.11 (7.4) 0.11 (7.3) 620.0 2.13 
as 0.87 (6.7) 0.80 (6.3) 541.7 5.98 
GLRI 0.12 (2.4) 0.76 (1.7) 433.0 3.28 
GT 0.25 (4.6) 0.23 (4.4) 551.5 2.39 
Go 0.09 (4.5) 0.09 (4.4) 515.2 1.58 
South Fixed Effects Random Effects LNI test Hausman test 
GRA 0.50 (2-5) 0.30 (1.7) 1022.5 4.29 
GRS 0.35 (7.6) 0.34 (7.5) 1191.3 3.35 
GNI 0.34 (5.6) 0.33 (5.6) 1235.3 0.36 
GWE 0.27(9.4) 0.27 (9.3) 1371.0 1.20 
GPBS 0.17(9.4) 0.17(9.3) 1379.7 1.94 
as 0.15 (7.5) 0.14 (7.2) 1159.9 3.48 
GLRI -0.15 (-0.07) -0.01 (-0.06) 1150.4 0.02 
GT 0.10 (8.3) 0.10 (8.4) 1380.3 0.11 
Go 0.04 (8.2) 0.04 (8.2) 1332.9 0.31 
y= TFP scores (1970=100); x= per capita stock of the relevant category of C 
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TFP growth across Italian regions in terms of both efficiency and techno- 
logical change during the period 1970-95. This aim is pursued by regressing 
first technical efficiency and then technological progress on public capital 
(its "core" component and each of its categories). 
Table 5.3.8: Technical Efficiency and Public Capital 
Public capital Core Public capital 
Italy 0.27 0.47 
(36.0) (42-3) 
Center-North 0.31 0.44 
(30.7) (28.7) 
South 0.26 0.54 
(28.1) (37.3) 
y= Efficiency scores; x= per capita stock of public capital 
As shown in Table 5.3.8, the endowment of public capital seems to sig- 
nificantly explain the differences across Italian regions in terms of efficiency 
in production 12 . 
Total public capital shows an estimated coefficient of lower 
magnitude than its "core" component (0.27 compared to 0.47), for which a 
higher coefficient is estimated in the southern regions (0.54 compared to 
0.44). This evidence is confirmed by the results obtained for the nine cate- 
gorics of public capital in Table 5.3.9. 
Tables 5.3.10 and 5.3.11 contain the estimation results of the regression 
of technological progress on public capital, its "core" component and each of 
its categories individually13 - Given the different estimation procedures, the 
comparison of the magnitude of the estimated coefficients with the ones re- 0 
ported in Tables 5.3.8 and 5.3.9 does not look feasible. However, our results 
12 t-ratios are given in parenthesis. 
13 Critical value for X2(l) = 3.84(5%); the high value of the Hausman test leads us to 
rely on the results of the fixed effects model in all cases in Table 5.3.10. 
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Table 5.3.9: Technical Efficiency and the Categories of Public Capital 
Categories of Public capital Italy Center-North South 
GRA 0.65 (27.7) 0.62 (19.2) 0.71 (22.2) 
GRS 0.42 (43.5) 0.42 (40.1) 0.42 (22.6) 
GAI 0.58 (12.4) 0.14 (11.2) 0.55 (10.5) 
GWE 0.18 (43.4) 0.15 (27.3) 0.29 (71.9) 
GPBS 0.44 (24.5) 0.40(19.6) 0.51 (10.5) 
GS 0.18 (31.3) 0.25 (29.5) 0.17(71-9) 
CLRI 0.56 (14.5) 0.39 (16.6) 0.63 (13.0) 
GT 0.19 (29.3) 0.16 (24.0) 0.27(19.2) 
GO 0.48 (28.2) 0.39 (18.2) 0.76 (39.3) 
y= Efficiency scores; x= per capita stock of relevant category of G 
Table 5.3.10: Technological Progress and Public Capital 0 
Italy Fixed Effects Random Effects LNI test Hausman test 
Public capital 
Core Public capital 
0.11 (11.0) 
0.38(10.7) 
0.19(10.3) 
0.32 (9.9) 
1332.0 
1318.4 
15.5 
17.3 
Center-North Fixed Effects Random Effects LM test Hausman test 
Public capital 
Core Public capital 
0.18 (8.3) 
0.32 (8.6) 
0.16 (7.8) 
0.26 (7.8) 
426.2 
402.4 
7.4 
12.3 
South Fixed Effects Random Effects LNI test Hausman test 
Public capital 
Core Public capital 
0.40(9.4) 
0.80 (8.7) 
0.35 (8-7) 
0.68 (7-9) 
829.3 
753.2 
12.0 
13.3 
y= Tech. ch. scores (1970=100); x= per capita stock of public capital 
show the significance of the impact of infrastructure services on technolo, -, 
ical progress in the South as well as in the North of the country. As in 0 
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previous estimations, the core component of public capital is characterized 
by higher coefficients in the whole country, especially in the South. 
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Table 5.3.11: Technological Progress and the Categories of Public Capital 00 
Italy Fixed Effects Random Effects LAI test Hausman test 
GRA 0.54 (6.2) 0.32 (4.6) 1165.8 17.4 
GRS 0.24 (11.3) 0.23 (10.9) 1451.8 6.9 
CAI 0.47(8.9) 0.42 (8.5) 1283.4 7.4 
GWE 0.69 (9.2) 0.73 (9.3) 1322.4 3.0 
GPBS 0.13 (11.8) 0.13 (11.7) 1514.5 1.0 
GS 0.10 (10.4) 0.95 (9.8) 1310.6 12.8 
GLRI 0.16 (0.9) 0.49 (0.66) 1132.8 0.7 
GT 0.34 (7.9) 0.34 (7.8) 1346.6 0 
GO 0.13 (7.1) 0.12 (7.1) 1217.3 0.53 
Center-North Fixed Effects Random Effects LAI test Hausman test 
GRA 0.57(5.7) 0.32 (4.4) 339.8 13.1 
GRS 0.22 (9.5) 0.29 (9.19) 493.4 6.5 
CAI 0.66 (6.6) 0.56 (6.0) 381.9 7.2 
GWE 0.64 (8.0) 0.59 (7.8) 437.8 4.1 
GPBS 0.11 (8.3) 0.11 (8.2) 453.2 0.9 
CS 0.82 (7.6) 0.83 (7.3) 456.8 4.3 
GLRI 0.13 (2.8) 0.70 (1.8) 281.1 5.7 
GT 0.26 (5.5) 0.25 (5.4) 408.9 0.4 
GO 0.10 (5.5) 0.98 (5.4) 370.4 1.7 
South Fixed Effects Random Effects LAI test Hausman test 
GRA 0.49 (2.6) 0.25 (1.6) 662.0 4.7 
ORS 0.31 (6.8) 0.29 (6.6) 803.6 2.7 
GNI 0.40 (7.2) 0.39 (7.3) 793.7 0.6 
GWE 0.23 (8.3) 0.23 (8.2) 959.2 1.3 
CPBS 0.16 (9.2) 0.16 (9.1) 1005.3 0.6 
Gs 0.15 (8.4) 0.15 (8.1) 862.1 4.7 
GLRI 0.05 (0.02) 0.45 (0.3) 708.1 0; 15 
GT 0.99 (8.6) 0.10 (8.7) 865.4 0.4 
G0 0.35 (6.6) 0.35 (6.7) 790.4 0.03 
y= Tech. ch. scores (1970=100); x= per capita stock of public capital 
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5.3.3 Conclusions 
The results reported in subsection 5.3.2 show how the implementation of 
a DEA approach allows accounting for inefficiency in the measurement of 
TFP growth in the Italian regions over the period 1970-95. The Banker 
test has been used to test empirically the significance of public capital in 
the DEA model, concluding that it would not be correct to consider it as a 
direct productive input. Partly in disagreement with the existing literature, 
this evidence suggests that the Italian case does not fit the view of public 
capital as producing the direct effect (1) at page 9. 
However, the econometric analysis of the relationship between productiv- 
ity gains and public capital has led to the conclusion that public capital plays 
a significant role of a positive externality in enhancing both technical effi- 
ciency in production and technological progress in regional economics. Such 
a result has turned out to be particularly evident for the "core" component 
of public capital. Moreover, the geographical disaggregation of our results 
has allowed us to depict a more significant role of infrastructure services in 
the southern regions rather than in the North of the country. Finally, the 
impact of public capital on TFP - and its two components - has been 
measured for each of the nine categories of public capital, underlying their 
own contribution to the enhancing of economic performance. 
The whole set of results shows that the endowment of public capital acts 
as an environmental variable to regional economics with the effect of im- 
proving both technical efficiency change and technological progress. In view 
of this, policies aimed at increasing the endowment of infrastructure services 
maintain their relevance despite the fact that according to our results public 
capital is not a statistically significant direct input in aggregate production. 
A first extension to this empirical work could be the implementation 
of the Stochastic Frontier Approach to the same data set in order to com- 
pare the results obtained under the two alternative approaches. Second, 
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given the recent availability of data on stocks of public capital for the Ital- 
ian provinces, future empirical investigation could cover a deeper level of 
territorial disaggregation. Third, an analysis similar to the one carried out 
for public capital could be repeated for other additional inputs in aggregate 
production such as, for instance, human capital. 
5.4 Total factor productivity and the convergence hypothesis in the 
Italian regions 
The classical approach to the analysis of the sources of economic growth and 
of the convergence patterns proposed by Abramowitz (1986) and Baumol 
(1986) has been extensively applied in empirical literature on convergence 
across countries (e. g. Barro and Sala-i-Xlartin, 1991,1992,1996; Do la 
Fuente, 1997). As a result of this wide literature, the most agreed finding 
is that world economics are converging at a stable speed. This approach 
has also been employed to examine the convergence issue regarding a set 
of regions within a country. The underlying idea supporting this type of 
analysis is the fact that if regions within the same country converge, they 
are also likely to converge to the same GDP level as much as they are sharing 
similar economic fundamentals. Therefore, as shown in Barro and Sala-i- 
Martin (1996) and Terrasi (1999), within a regional framework, there seems 
no need to control the estimates for growth determinants. Following this 
scheme, the focus here is on the economic performance of the Italian regions. 
Barro and Sala-i-AIartin (1991) find positive evidence on the convergence of 
the sample of Italian regions considered in their study. They conclude for a 
2% speed of convergence and the highest dispersion in the log of per capita 
GDP across European economics. However, later research such as Mauro 
and Podrecca, (1994); Del Monte and Giannola (1997); Paci and Saba (1998) 
and Terrasi (1999) put into doubt the optimistic view of Barro and Sala-i- 
Martin (1991) not only on the convergence speed but also on the existence 
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of convergence itself. Alauro and Podrecca (1994) claim the results of Barro 
and Sala-i-'T%lartin (1991) to be biased due to the lack of (time) homogeneity 
of the data employed in their estimations. They estimate thefl-convergence 
parameter on three different time spans separately. As a result, they find 
that the dispersion of per capita income to not decline over time, if data are 
not homogenized over these three time spans. On the basis of a homogeneous 
time series analysis, Del 1XIontc and Ciannola (1997) and Paci and Saba 
(1998) show a clear divergence pattern arising around tile mid-1970s across 
Italian regions. The estimate of the coefficient attached to tile gap variable 
is found to be negative and statistically significant, with this relationship 
driven by a strong catching-up process over the 1960-75 period. 
Finally, by using a set of more sophisticated econometric tools than tile 
simple estimation of the fl-convergence parameter, Terrasi (1999) also finds 
support for the reversal in the convergence path of the Italian regions. Fur- 
ther research on the economic performance of Italian regions has also dealt 
with the discussion of whether or not Italian regions are converging each 
other. In this perspective, most of the previous literature as 1\, Iauro and Po- 
drecca (1994); Cellini and Scorcu (1997) and Di Liberto and Symons (1998) 
have found conditional convergence. In other words, Italian regions tend to 
converge to different steady state levels of per capita GDP. Despite all this 
effort, a research topic still remains tol be explored, namely the determinants 
of such convergence/divergence process within a regional framework as the 
one implemented in the present study. 
In an attempt to achieve a better understanding of this critical issue, 
the main contribution of the present work is to reconcile traditional ap- 
proaches to the analysis of economic growth determinants and convergence 
patterns with tile frontier productivity measurement literature. The use of 
Malmquist productivity indices allow previous research to be broadened by 
decomposing productivity growth into technological progress and technical 
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efficiency change as well as analysing the influence of these productivity 
growth sources on the observed development gap across Italian regions. In 
doing 'so, the decomposition of productivity growth helps the divergence 
pattern experienced by Italian regions since the 1970s to be understood. 
Thus, the results suggest that productivity gains are mostly achieved by 
innovation. Moreover, the speed at which northern regions innovate seems 
to overcome the velocity of catching up of the southern regions. In sum, 
Italian regions are found to diverge at a decreasing rate. 
5.4.1 Data and Rcsults 
The dataset employed for this study is the same as the one considered in 
section 5.3. The units considered are the 20 Italian regions taken as individ- 
uals and also aggregated within North-West, North-East, Centre and South 
regions over the period 1970-1995. The ag egate output of each region Ogr . 
is measured by its Gross Domestic Product. The total capital represents 
the stocks of private capital. Both capital stock and GDP variables are ex- 
pressed in 1990 constant prices as retrieved from CRENoS and Bonaglia and 
Picci (2000) respectively. The labour variable, also retrieved from CRENoS, 
indicates total employment in thousands. 
Tile empirical estimation process will be developed in two steps. The 
first involves the decomposition of TFP growth on the basis of considering 
GDP as output, and capital and labour as the relevant productive inputs. 
In the second, the convergence issue is analysed by means of panel data 
estimation techniques where the explanatory variable in all regressions is 
real CDP per worker and its square. Then initially, a set of Malmquist 
productivity indices are calculated14. As Mire et al. (1994) note, since this is 
14 Linear programming problems required to implement the Malmquist productivity in- 
dices can be solved using any of a variety of computer programs. DEAP Version 2.1 issued 
here. A detailed description of the computer program is provided in Coelli (1996). 
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an index based on discrete time, each region will have an index for every pair 
of years. This entails calculating the component distance functions using 
linear pro-ramming methods such as those described in the previous section. 
Instead of presenting the disaggregated results for each region and year, 
the average annual rates for TFP growth (Tfpch), technological progress 
(Techch), and efficiency change (Effch) are collected in Table 5.4.1. The 
results show there to be a major variability of TFP growth rates across 
regions. Thus, Friuli V. G. attains the highest productivity growth rate 
(2.7%), followed by Puglia (2.5%), Lombardia and Emilia Romagna (2.3%). 
A lower number of regions experienced, on average, productivity declines, 
with Molise (1.9%) and Lazio (0.1%) having lowest average TFP growth 
rates. 
On the basis of the above decomposition of TFP growth into technologi- 
cal change and technical efficiency change, the convergence patterns followed 
by the Italian regions are next explored over the sample period of interest. As 
is known, the Convergence Hypothesis is related to the idea that economics 
starting with a lower level of income or productivity should experience, on 
average, a higher growth rate. If this is the case, they catch up with richer 
economies. This hypothesis has been usually tested regressing the growth 
rates of all the economics against a proxy of the wealth of a region per 
worker or per capita income, or their logs. A negative estimated coefficient 
for this variable will be interpreted in favour of the convergence hypothesis 
(e. g. Barro and Sala-i-XIartin, 1991; Bairarn and I'McRac, 1999). 
Following Taskin and Zairn (1997), the methodolog used here allows one OY 
to test for the Convergence Hypothesis from a different and more accurate 
perspective. The Malmquist index decomposition permits the evaluation of 
whether the two components of productivity gains do show convergence, and 
so be able to shed light on the determinants of the divergence pattern expcri- 
enced by Italian regions since the 1970s. As a result, it is discussed whether 
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Table 5.4.1: TFP growth decomposition. Averap annual changes (1970-95) 00 
Region Effcli Techch Tfpcli 
Piemonte 1.001 1.019 1.020 
Valle DAosta 0.995 1.020 1.015 
Lombardia 1.002 1.020 1.023 
Trentino 1.002 1.006 1.008 
Veneto 1.001 1.019 1.020 
Riuli VC 1.008 1.019 1.027 
Liguria 1.002 1.020 1.021 
Emilia Romagna 1.004 1.019 1.023 
Toscana 0.999 1.020 1.018 
Umbria 1.002 1.019 1.022 
Marchc 1.000 1.005 1.005 
Lazio 1.000 0.999 0.999 
Abruzzo 1.004 1.016 1.020 
Molise 0.988 0.992 0.981 
Campania 1.001 1.000 1.000 
Puglia 1.006 1.020 1.025 
Basilicata 1.002 1.020 1.022 
Calabria 0.995 1.013 1.008 
Sicilia 1.001 1.014 1.015 
Sardegna 0.996 1.020 1.016 
the development gap across Italian regions has increased due to differences 
in terms of efficiency change or innovation processes. Hence, the estimated 
equations in the analysis depict the relationships linking both technological 
progress and technical efficiency change with an index for the initial level of 
the per worker income. Following Bairarn and ARRac (1999), an empirical 
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framework that predicts linear convergence is compared with a set up where 
convergence is allowed to be non-linear, and which of the two prevails ex- 
plicitly tested, using the former as the null hypothesis. Moreover, because of 
the small number of regions, but especially since the OLS framework would 
overestimate the effect of the dependent variable on the index, panel data 
estimation techniques are adopted. The panel is obtained according to Islam 
(1995) by averaging the indices over five years of non-overlapping panels; it 
is believed that these spans represent a good compromise in order to obtain 
a robust relationship between growth rates and initial levels - which forces 
to have time spans as big as possible - with the use of a panel data frame- 
work - which leads to reduce these spans. Finally, the hypothesis that the 
panel data framework encompasses the OLS pooled estimator is also tested, 
resulting in more reliable estimated coefficients (Quah, 1997). 
Table 5.4.2 reports the results for the set of alternative linear convergence 
(a) models and non-linear convergence (b) models. Strong evidence against 
a simple OLS pooled estimator approach is found in all estimated models: 
the Lagrange multiplier test clearl shows that this model should not be 0y 
regarded as the favouritc empirical framework. Moreover, the fixed effects 
model encompasses the random effects, as shown by results of the Hausman 
test. This type of model is preferred because other control variables are 
not used, and the fixed effects framework is helpful in controlling for their 
effects on the growth rates. Finally, it is found that the two-ways estimator 
encompasses the one-way set up 15. 
Tile results are listed in Table 5.4-3. The hypothesis that the productiv- 
ity gain is achieved by innovation is confirmed by the positive coefficient 
estimated for the gap variable for the technological progress. However, 
this process is found to be non linear: the model allowing for non lin- 
15 The particular way used to build the panel has avoided autocorrelation and het- 
eroscedasticitY in all rnodels (not reported). 
5. I; Yontler Approach to the Aleasurcment of TFP Growth in the Italian Regions 178 
C) 
C) 
C) 
0 
C-) 
tý PQ 
C: ) (. I.: ) t- 
C4 
LID 
00 C: ) C) 
CD CD 1-: D 
00 1, - C11 
tl- C'j t- 
C3 C; rý C11 
C: > C) CID 
00 - 00 UD 00 
t-: 06 L-S 00 
00 ", C) C: ) C: ) (:: ý cq CD 
C: ) C: ) cm 
'IV 
o6 14 6 
C) C: ) C: ) r- -4 C14 kf,:, %- m 
Cý C--5 14 co 
CD 
C) C) 't, t-- t- C14 L:: ) 
cs 
ui 
a a a - :1 
ýý 
'. 
C) 0 
Z o 0 0 x C. ) 
C3 
o ý m 
C) E Q C) ;> > C3 
C) 
-zj 0 0 0 0 x > 1 
5. Fýontier Approach to the Measurement of TFP Growth in the Italian Regions 179 
C) 
C) 
C) 
0 
0 
0 
C) 
12. 
ýL4 
E-A 
,4 
9 
00 
cs 
C) 
C) 
C? 
00 
00 
cli 
8 
C: ) 
m 
00 
Ci 
cl 
cs 
4-1 
0ý c? C) 
CD 
t- 
Cý 
v-3 L'ý 
C) 
cs t- 1-0 
Cl) 
I C) , G LID C) 
I ý2 
C) 
C-0 
C) 
N 
o6 
Cýs 
C-6 
I 
0 
C) 
tO LID 
C4 C: ) C-'ý 
co 
* 
00 
C: ) 
cli 
t- 
CD 
cl? C-1. ) 
Cý 
5 
Ei 
0 
0 
44 
8Q 
Cý 
W 
Cý 
U 
0 
to 
c, o 
,4 21 m C) 
C"D 
CD 
I 
, 
cq t- 
- cl'ý 
C. ) 
L, 
, -4 
U-1 
00 
C) 
r- 
- 
C) 
Q 
cli 
6 
0 
z 
. 53 
-Cý 
0 
. z 
oo 
CD 
cq 
I- 
ts 
* 
LD 
U- 
0ý 
C9 
c! 
C) C: ) 
z 
CID C14 
0 
C-1 
.E ý4 
0 1! 4 
0 
9 
z L. r- 
d *z > 
to 
C4 
Q', ý? 
d 
En cj 
C) - Cq - 0 C) q -5ý 4 C. 
V 
"a 
rl 
CD 
ý4 1-1 
N 
co 0 
. a- 
45 
b 
, 
-5 M 
5. Rrontier Approach to the Measurement of TFP Growth in the Italian Regions 180 
car convergence/divergence encompasses the model imposing linear diver- 
gence/convergence process. Tile squared value of the initial level of initial 
productivity is positive and robustly correlated with innovation processes. 
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Figure 5.4.1: Technological progress and initial per worker income level 0 
This also follows from the intuition behind Figure 5.4.1. The opposite 
is true for the technical efficiency change component. The model nonlinear 
convergence parameter is not significant, and with a slightly negative cor- 
relation between efficiency change and initial level of per worker GDP. The 
results plotted in Figure 5.4.2 also seem to confirm this. Finally, the strength 
at which northern regions innovate overcomes the velocity of catching up of 
the southern regions; this, in turn, drives the convergence process. Indeed, 
the relation between the productivity growth and initial level is driven from 
16 the former 
" All models have been re-estimated adding two slope dummies of the form (south* YL) 
and south* YL 2, where south takes value 1 if the region belongs to the southern group of 
regions, and 0 otherwise. These models were all encompassed by the relative unrestricted 
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Figure 5.4.2: Technical efficiency change and initial perworker income level 0 
5.4.2 Conclusions 
This study had the aim of contributing to the debate on the catchin-up 0 
hypothesis for the Italian regions over the period 1970-95. Data Envelop- 
ment Analysis has been used in order to decompose total factor productivity 
growth in technological progress and technical efficiency change, interpret- 00 
ing the former as a proxy of innovation and the latter as a measurement 0 
of catching up. According to the results, productivity gains experienced by 
regional economics during the sample period are mostly due to innovation, 
rather than improvements in productive efficiency. Furthermore, the econo- 
metric analysis shows that the northern regions tend to innovate at a speed 
higher than the velocity at which southern regions catch up. As a conse- 
quence, it is concluded that Italian regions have diverged at a decreasing C, 
rate over the sample period. 
models without these dummies, rejecting the hypothesis that the southern regions follow 
a different convergence path to their own steady state with respect to northern economics. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The model built in Chapter 3 provides a flexible framework capable of study- 
ing the growth effects of fiscal policy both in infinite and finite horizons 
scenarios and reducing to limiting cases some recent Barro-type models. 
The optimal lifetime consumption plan has been determined within a stan- 
dard representative agent model, the only difference being a rate of time 
preference augmented by a positive probability of death parameter. The 
government was assumed to run a balanced budget constraint, equating to- 
tal expenditures to total revenues collected by levying a flat-rate income 
tax. I have distinguished between productive and unproductive categories 
of government expenditures. Productive public spending includes invest- 
mcnt in public capital and private investment subsidies. On the other hand, 
public consumption and lump-sum transfers to households were assumed to 
be unproductive. 
Comparing the two alternative scenarios of finite and infinite horizons, I 
have obtained results on (i) the growth effects of each category of government 
expenditures on long-run economic growth, and (ii) the relationships relating 
the Barro rule to the other categories of government expenditure. 
Regarding the first set of conclusions, both categories of unproductive 
government spending are shown to have a decelerating effect on long-run 
growth. This result is in line with the existing literature and verified re- 
gardless of the assumption of uncertain lifetime. However, a rise of either 
lump-sum transfers to households or public consumption reduces the long- 
run rate of growth less in the finite than in the infinite horizon scenario. 
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On the other hand, the growth effects of the two categories of productive 
expenditures are ambiguous, and for both I have derived a growth maximiz- 
ing value. As for public investment, tile Barro rule still holds in the infinite 
horizon scenario but, in contrast with tile existing literature, is negatively 
linked to the probability of death parameter. This implies that 
The growth maximizing level of public investment is lower under the 
assumption of uncertain lifetime. 
which provides an answer to the first research question raised in the Chapter 
1. Similarly, the growth maximizing level of private investment subsidies is 
reached earlier in the finite than in the infinite horizons scenario. 
Relative to the second set of conclusions, the effects of public consump- 
tion, lump-sum transfers to households and investment subsidies on the 
optimal provision of public investment are similar. Indeed, it is shown that 
the growth maximizing level of public investment tends to increase in the 
presence of higher levels of other categories of expenditures. This result 
takes place regardless of the assumption on uncertain lifetime. 
In section 5.3, the aim of contributing to the debate on the empirical 
linkage between public capital and economic activity has been accomplished 
by implementing a frontier approach to the measurement of TFP growth. 
In the first part of the analysis, I have used non-parametric techniques 
to decompose productivity growth in technical efficiency change and tcchno- 
logical progress in a DEA model. Comparing the two alternative scenarios 0 
of two (labour and private capital) and three (labour, private capital and 
public capital) inputs, the analysis has led to the conclusion that including 0 
public capital in the non-parametric production function, leaves mostly un- 
changed the productivity growth pattern experienced in the sample period, 
especially in the southern regions. Given this evidence, the significance of 
public capital as additional input in the DEA model has been tested using 0 
the Banker test. The null hypothesis that public capital does not directly 
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affect output as a direct factor of production could not be rejected. This evi- 
dencc does not support the view of public capital affecting aggregate output 
as a direct unpaid input. 
The second part of the analysis has been devoted to the study of public 
capital as a source of a growth promoting externality. Using economet- 
ric techniques, I have studied the impact of public capital - and various 
disaggregated categories of public capital - on total factor productivity, 
technological progress and technical efficiency change scores obtained in the 
DEA model. In general, the conclusion has been that public capital has 
significantly contributed to productivity gains, and both its components 
over the sample period. In line with the previous studies, such a result has 
turned out to be particularly evident in the southern regions, compared to 
the North of the country and for the "core" categories of public capital. In 
sum: 
Public capital has played the significant role of a positive externality 
in enhancing both technical efficiency in production and technological 
progress in regional economics. 0 
Empirical work of section 5.4 has also followed a two stage procedure. 
First, the decomposition of TFP growth obtained in the two inputs scenario 
in section 5.3.2 has been used in order to attain proxies of innovation and 
catching up within Italian region. Second, an econometric analysis has been 
carried out, concluding that: 
Italian regions have tended to diverge at a decreasing rate over the 
sample period 1970-95. 
Both the theoretical and the empirical work of the present thesis should 
provide more insights into the respective fields of research. Nevertheless, 
they are not free of limitations, which make them admitting, of developments 
and extensions to be attained in future research. 
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Barro (1990) and the following literature have revalued the growth en- 
hancing effect of fiscal policy, within the new growth theory underlining the 
role of policy externalities in generating endogCnous growth. Typically, the 
simultaneous presence of opposite policy externalities allows the determina- 
tion of the optimum level of productive public services supply. This pre- 
diction crucially depends on the assumption that the externality associated 
with the provision of public productive services in taken as purely exoge- 
nous by the representative firm. Relaxing this assumption would make it 
possible to introduce into the analysis the strategic aspect of interactions 
between the private and the public side of the economy. Our attempt in 
future research will be to analyse the relationship between fiscal policy and 
growth in a framework where investment decisions are linked by strategic 
interactions - Vencatachellum (1998), Shibata (2002) and Philippopoulus 
and Economides (2003). 
Furthermore, most of the recent literature on fiscal policy and growth 
assumes a balanced government budget constraint, neglecting the analysis 
of government deficits and public debt. This lack of attention does not fit 
the relevance that fiscal policy rules currently have in practice as designed 
either on the basis of instruments to be used or in terms of targets to be 
fulfilled, like specific values for the ratios of deficit and/or debt to GDP. 
As shown in recent empirical work - Gernmell et al. (1999); Bleaney et 
al. (2001) - in exploring the expansionary effect of alternative categories 
of public expenditure, it is relevant to specify their own source of financing 
(distortionary, non-distortionary taxation, deficit). The so-called "golden 
rule of fiscal policy" postulates that the government is allowed to run a bud- 
get deficit so long as this is used to finance productive public spending and 
- given the composition of fiscal policy on both taxation and expenditure 
sides - can be regarded as the benchmark with respect to modulate more 
or less binding budget rules (Greiner and Semmler, 2000). Future research 
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will aim at verifying whether and at which extent the predicted growth en- 
hancing/growth hampering effect of fiscal policy might be affected under 
alternative budgetary regimes. 
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